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THE EUROPEAN CAPITAL OF CULTURE: THE POLITICS OF A BECOMING EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

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The European Union (EU) is a highly contested institution and space. The EU is experiencing a "crisis of legitimacy." This stems from the persistence of state-centric geographical imaginations of citizens and member states. As a result, the EU has turned to "culture" policies to foster a greater European identity and "social cohesion." This thesis examines one of these cultural policies: the European Capital of Culture (ECOC) event. In particular, this thesis investigates the 2007 ECOC, which included two cities from Western and Eastern Europe, Luxembourg and Sibiu, Romania. This thesis uses discourse analysis and social network theories, to examine the 2007 ECOC event through the websites of these cities. Conclusions suggest that strong state-centered geographical imaginations persist and maintain a set of dualities between Eastern and Western, "old" and "new" Europe. Findings also suggest that "the network"--as a space and process--is an essential component of the new EU.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER Page

CHAPTER Page

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The story of Europe is one of many narratives, forged through centuries of conflict and coexistence between many diverse peoples. The space of Europe has simultaneously been homeland, battleground, foreign land, and now an institutional field for many different peoples, in many different ways and purposes. There have been and still are endless attempts to claim, control and conceive of this space; and those endeavors have shaped the modernity of this "region." A story perpetually in progress, Europe's most recent manifestation is dominated by the European Union (EU) and its project to unify and organize the countless competing, contradictory and conflicting peoples and spaces. However, the distinction must be made between the space of the EU or (EU)rope, and the space of the wider Europe that exists beyond the institutional bounds of the EU. Therefore, throughout this thesis, the mention of "Europe" implies the entire, contested, fuzzy bounded region. Where "(EU)rope" implies the separate, institutional space of Europe that is defined and led by the European Union (EU). This is necessary because although the EU is a part of the region of Europe, they are not the same. This is despite the EU's unabashed attempts to speak for the entire region.

What emerged as a practical, economic cooperative of Western European states has evolved into a political union of peoples concerned with social and cultural cohesion across a much wider regional space (Shore 2000). Throughout this evolution, the EU continues to be concerned with its future. In particular, issues that challenge its political legitimacy and its reactions to globalizing forces have forced its elite bureaucrats, known as Eurocrats, to construct a union centered in the notion of a "European" identity (Borneman and Fowler 1997; Smith 1997; Shore 2000; Paasi 2001; Burgess 2002; Sassatelli 2002; and Rifkin 2004). This construction[1] of the EU as a cultural and spatial "imagined community" (Anderson 1991), a "naively perceived region" (Ostergren and Rice 2004) and an institutional reality (Burgess 2002) is thus an attempt to create a more "knowable and governable space" (Shore 2000, 4). By fostering a (EU)ropean identity in the "known" space of (EU)rope, the EU also intends to foster (EU)ropean *citizens*. Most significant in this process is the position of EU policy in institutionalizing, negotiating and diffusing notions of European cultural unity and social cohesion (European Commission 1992a).

An exemplary symbolic initiative, the European Capital of Culture (ECOC) project is one that has aided the construction of a "new Europe" by fostering extra-national, inter-urban network relations between the disparate peoples and places of the divided, "national Europe." The ECOC is a policy that

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[1] Following from the theories of Berger and Luckman (1967), "Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man [sic] is a social product" (61). Any idea or representation of reality is then a social construction made by a social being.

links two separate European cities into a network of culture and identity. Through the annual pairing of ECOC cities chosen by the EU, there is an effort to extend and shape a "European Cultural Area" (European Commission 1988). Overall, (EU)ropean space is increasingly seen as a networked space (Börzel 1997; Castells 1998; Jonsson, Tagil, and Torngvist 2000; Kohler-Koch 2002), and the forming of a (EU)ropean culture area can also be seen as a network. By looking at the ECOC policy as a network, a range of discursive positions become available for investigation--from the institutions of the EU itself, to the participating national governments that legitimize or challenge such institutions, to the individual cities that participate in and implement the ECOC competition themselves. From such a simplified understanding, these positions are partially representative of the range of actors participating in the construction of a European Union in particular and a wider (EU)rope in general. As such, the ECOC policy is a lens through which the ordered and networked character of the EU can be analyzed, as well as the cultural and political spaces and relationships that are part of a Europe in a state of becoming (Gibson 2001).

Through the ECOC policy, EU hegemonic discourses regarding legitimacy and community are negotiated and re-produced by individual ECOCs (Gibson 2001). The resulting networked (EU)ropean culture area is a space where power and resistance work simultaneously to influence becoming. Studying the ECOC policy can provide some insight into the multiple, situated cultural and geopolitical imaginations that construct European space and identity today. Examining the ECOC policy, as a representative of a becoming (EU)rope,

suggests an investigation from both the top-down politics of construction *and* from the bottom-up politics of practice. More specifically, a top-down perspective focuses on discursive production through EU policy, while a bottom-up perspective interrogates the mundane and local politics of practice where meanings and discourse are negotiated and transformed on a day-to-day basis by the social actors that are charged with implementing these policies.

But first, why study the EU at all? The EU is a leading global force. Its successes and setbacks have been widely reported, theorized and studied by many different individuals and institutions. Its achievements over the last fifty years have seen the restructuring and reconciliation of the European continent, unprecedented prosperity of some its members and the founding of a political institution that is centrally based on universalist, humanist and peaceful ideals (Ostergren and Rice 2004; Rifkin 2005). At the same time, its setbacks have attracted widespread attention: the logistical and bureaucratic challenges of the negotiation of multiple languages, competing interests and actors; the related issues of a "democratic deficit" and "lack of demos" and the bouts of "Eurosclerosis" (Shore 2000) that are manifest in the recent rejection of treaties and sporadic protests of legislation; and most especially, its future endeavors toward further enlargement and deeper integration, both particularly controversial actions within (EU)rope.

Regardless of the setbacks, there are still many states and intergovernmental organizations that aspire to be part of, or at least like, the EU. Most significant for the EU's future, both culturally and politically, is the current

admission negotiations with the Balkan states and with Turkey. These negotiations are quite controversial because of practical institutional and security concerns, but also, most saliently in the case of Turkey, the tensile strength of the current cultural values being constructed as "European." Because of the unique and unprecedented nature of the EU as a governance structure and its postmodern ideological outlook, there has already emerged several institutional and policy imitators: the peace-oriented governance in the African Union; regional trade agreements of *Mercado Comúm del Sur* (MERCOSUR) in South America; and the in-between governance and trade coalition of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The ECOC itself has also spawned similar initiatives in other world regions, like the American Capital of Culture in Central and South America and the Arab Capital of Culture in North Africa and the Middle East. These imitators point to the global position of the EU as an ideological and political leader, as well as to the opening up of the idea of culture in policy at large. Such operations using culture are increasingly defined by values of diversity and coexistence, rather than traditional representations of state cultural homogeneity and difference.

This thesis is thus concerned with the following: What are the constituent perspectives and relationships that are involved in the cultural processes of becoming Europe? This question leads to several questions that breakdown this becoming process: What is the political nature of the becoming space? How do cultural politics inform ECOC implementation? How do geopolitical imaginations of ECOC actors influence the becoming process? Such questions

specifically relate to the political nature of becoming space and the examination of the actors that shape such politics. A critical human geography framework is built upon the works of cultural and critical geopolitical geographers and these critical human geographers are not only interested in discursive processes, but also in the active politics behind these processes. In the remainder of this chapter, the literature of critical human geography is introduced as the theoretical foundation of this thesis. Building on this foundation is literature concerning the EU, particular its policy and governing structures.

Europe in a State of Becoming: A Geographic Theoretical Framework

One of the ways in which the space of Europe is being understood today is through the overlapping, interrelated stories of the EU and its institutional pursuits of: 1) (EU)ropeanization as a multi-trajectory and contradictory process reorganizing forms of identification between territory and people (Borneman and Fowler 1997); 2) integration focused on widening, expanding and deepening the institutional mechanisms of this supranational institution (Jonsson, Tagil, and Torngvist 2000); and, 3) legitimation as a strategy of continual political-economic and socio-cultural survival (Shore 2000; Sassatelli 2002). These stories are also connected by an interdependent purpose. (EU)ropeanization as an identity process and integration as an institutional process are both trying to connect the space of Europe to either a culturally or institutionally defined sense of community. The legitimation process is a response to the tensions that arise in the "spaces between" the (EU)ropeanization and integration processes (Burgess 2002), as (EU)ropeanization and integration meet resistance from the expansive

identities possible in the ever-evolving supranational state of (EU)rope. As these processes are negotiated, it is clear that the EU must play a central role in the making of a new European space, or (EU)ropean space. This happens through both the structures and boundaries of its supranational institution (Jonsson, Tagil, and Torngvist 2000), and through the legitimation efforts in its narrations of a culture and identity to coincide with this (EU)rope (Borneman and Fowler 1997; Shore 2000; Barnett 2001; Brueter 2003). Investigating a becoming space as a process or negotiation requires sensitivity to a multiplicity of perspectives and possibilities that is rife with political tensions and decisions. The next section explains the mindfulness for politics that such a critical human geography framework requires and its application to investigating becoming spaces.

The Politics of Becoming

Considering the EU's focus on its construction of a (EU)ropean identity, its institutional emergence as a supranational space and its constant desire to legitimate itself, it is valuable to investigate the constitutive politics that are part of a Europe in a state of becoming. This means beginning with the understanding that there is no singular cultural or geopolitical perspective that constructs a singular European space. Instead there are multiple situated spatial knowledges constructing Europe (c.f., Massey 2005). And, there are many actors involved of which the EU is only one. Indeed, it can be argued that there are many "points of struggle" from which to explore Europe's construction (Mitchell 2000). This includes, for example, actors working within the EU as well as those localized political actors that struggle for and against integration, (EU)ropeanization, and

legitimation. As we will see, the struggles include those actors involved in the ECOC policy themselves, who work in and across their own geopolitical futures by constructing themselves as European and Other at the same time--appealing to a narrative of inclusion and difference to both be part of (EU)rope and to attract people to their cities because of their differences.

If we see Europe as a space, that is a sphere of possibility, heterogeneity and multiplicity (Massey 2005), then we cannot appreciate any future, open or closed, by only considering the narratives of the EU. It is necessary, instead, to take an approach that will do more than investigate the ECOC policy as merely a discursive expression of (EU)ropeanization and as a product of EU imaginations (c.f., Nash 2000; Müller 2008). As such, discourse is open to interpretation and negotiation, performative and expressed through an "unformulated practical grasp of the world" (Taylor, quoted in Nash 2000, 655). In this theoretical move is a conscious recognition of the situatedness of all political processes (Sharp 1996). It is also cognizant of the differing power/knowledge nexuses that inform situated geographical imaginations, and thus, situated social worlds (Atkinson et al. 2005).

Seeing space as political is also to acknowledge that space is mutually constitutive with subjectivities and other social entities. These resulting narratives of multiplicity and plurality must be recognized and told (Massey 2005). It is thus necessary to explore both the top-down and bottom-up relationships of the production, interpretation and negotiation of space and identity (Sharp 1996; Mitchell 2000). In this idea is an implicit assertion that the situated actor, through the social network relationships within which it is

embedded, are individually important for the making and re-making of spatial discourses (Müller 2008). Discourses are negotiated from each actor's position in the network and the multiplicity of such situational interpretations serves to either strengthen or transform existing hegemonic representations and practices. Discourses continue to circulate through multiple positions and these multiple negotiations are what inform the becoming process. This is particularly important for this research and the investigation of the ECOC policy, where the EU and individual cities are all involved in (EU)ropeanization discursive processes of identification and legitimation.

New Structures of Interaction and Governance

In the critical human geographic framework of this thesis there is a focus on the webs of global interdependence and global circulations of goods, capital and people, and the ways they restructure social lives (Mitchell 2000; Tuathail 2000; Agnew 2003). Mitchell (2000) recognizes that in this current era of deterritorialization "identities are more and more constructed out of the new opportunities, the new flows of people and goods, the new reach of the media, each of which is global in scale" (262). Tuathail (2000) further contends that constitutive of these new opportunities are a "postmodern geopolitical condition" in which boundary-transgression and undermining of state-centrism have become hallmarks of the practice and logic of postmodern world politics. Neither of these points implies a complete transformation but both offer evidence for new power struggles where different social groups and their distinct mobilities and connections are continually produced and reproduced (Mitchell 2000).

Within a broader discussion of globalizing networks, it is the city that has often been identified as an influential site through which the structuring and managing of these contemporary global flows take place. Understood as nodes in countless networks, the city is being transformed by these mobilities into a space of unceasing movement. At the same time, the city is retaining its role as "the locus of collective action, of innovation, of interest-aggregation mechanisms, of negotiation, and of conflict" (LeGalès 2002, 25). It is through these flows, particularly of people and of capital, that the city becomes an important touchstone for contemporary notions of multiculturalism, diversity and tolerance at the heart of the EU's claims to its own legitimacy. The city's structure, its building in history and through everyday activity, has thus always been shaped by a symbolic economy where culture and capital together continually form new urban spaces (Zukin 1995). The power of adjustment in the symbolic economy of cities has also been influential for their adaptation to "new forms of territorialization and institutionalization" (Le Galès 2002, 6), which in (EU)rope are being forged by the EU. In particular, cities share in this process by contributing to the "compromise between social integration, culture and economic development" in Europe (LeGalès 2002, 6). The rise of the city in (EU)rope, in relation to the member states, has been part of the institutional politics behind EU governance, and reflects a partial "loosening grip of the state" (LeGalès 2002) that has come with (EU)ropeanization and globalization processes.

The processes of the EU are contributing to a becoming (EU)rope, as well as to a becoming Europe (Jonsson, Tagil, and Torngvist 2000; Rifkin 2004).

Within this discussion, critical human geography acknowledges the plurality and multiplicity of actors and relationships, and the resulting situatedness of their contributions and interpretations as they operate within globalized, hyper-mobile spaces of interaction. Any investigation of these processes, therefore, must connect the character and context of networks and flows with the discursive politics that emerge from such postmodern relationships between actors and spaces. Contemporary cities thus provide an exemplary space from which to view the politics and possibilities behind these global trends.

Policy discourse: Culture and space in (EU)ropeanization.

(EU)ropeanization, in relation to the EU and the becoming space of Europe, is an ongoing effort to institutionalize and legitimize the integration between spatial and institutional realities (Burgess 2002). In the space of (EU)rope, this engenders multiple social and individual forms of identification from the city, sub-state region, nation-state and Europe (Borneman and Fowler 1997) and that are manifest in postmodern social lives as multiple, overlapping identities (Smith 1997; Shore 2000). In order to become truly meaningful to all social communities involved, such symbolic identity-based discourses must employ a mutually-constituted set of cultural and spatial elements (Paasi 2001). Thought of in this way, (EU)ropeanization discourses that deploy the idea of Europe, the EU or Europeans are always inherently cultural and spatial, and thus are also always political (Mitchell 2000; Massey 2005). However, this inherent connection is not always readily acknowledged by Eurocrats. In the institutional, legitimating policy-making activities of the EU, and the hegemonic discourses that ultimately

shape them, there certainly is a naivety regarding this inherent connection between culture and space. This naivety is clearly illustrated in the intellectual separation of culture and space into disconnected policy fields. Yet, in practice, discursive structures behind each policy field reveal the inherent connection between culture and space.

There are several policy avenues that reveal Eurocrats' notion of space. Clearly, the Eurocratic notion of space is fundamentally different from the notion of space that this thesis recognizes. Most of the policy avenues that call out "space" deal specifically with the *absolute* space of (EU)rope, or the actual structures or infrastructure that define material space. The conception of space by Eurocrats, as absolute or material space, is a naïve conception. It is an understanding that does not fully grasp the depth of space and its true interdependence with culture.

These material spatial policies are particularly concerned with infrastructure and material connections that will unite transportation, communication and other essential (EU)ropean networks (Jensen and Richardson 2003a, 2003b). Such spatial policies are not yet legitimated in a formal competency, and instead inform the essential and necessary actions that extend the EU's foremost legitimating purpose of extending and "bridging the gaps" (Jensen and Richardson 2003a, 2003b; Richardson and Jensen 2003) of the networks that form its Common Market and institutional functions. These activities are relinquished to an ad hoc, disjointed category at the mercy greater of institutional politics and political needs (Richardson and Jensen 2003). Such

policy activities are focused on the linking up of existing, discrete and predominately national infrastructures. Thus, the absolute space of (EU)rope is still very much at the mercy of the political tensions between members' national and EU's supranational institutions.

In such policies there is always also an accompanying socio-cultural discourse that is used to resolve the politics behind institutional and developmental tensions, and to communicate a policy's importance and its ultimate legitimacy, however (Jensen and Richardson 2003a, 2003b). Jensen and Richardson (2003a, 2003b) have carried out a substantial study of the discursive character of these absolute space policies and found that there are often particularly symbolic meanings and representations that imbue notions of (EU)ropean community and identity in these policies. In particular, representations and impressions of (EU)ropean absolute space dispense meaningful symbols of polycentric organizations and "shrinking" space (Jensen and Richardson 2003b), which inform overall notions of a becoming (EU)ropean community. In the "Shrinking Europe" (Jensen and Richardson 2003b), the connection of the "missing links" in the overall (EU)ropean transportation and communication networks serves the ultimate goal of creating a material space that has the "seamless freedom of mobility" (30). Yet, there is also a polycentric network organization that implicates the emerging role of urban networks and cross-border regions (Richardson and Jensen 2003). Both of these material spatial discourses then implicate a becoming (EU)ropean community that is hyper-mobile and overlapping, which is also connected to an emerging (EU)ropean

identity as being postmodern, or characterized by multiplicity, and also overlapping.

In a similar vein to so-called spatial policy, is the role of space in EU cultural policy. Again, there is a naivety behind the inherent connection between culture and space that is observed in this discursive structure. Ultimately, in the cultural policy field, the EU is engaged in constructing European identities as a reaction to its "crisis of legitimacy" (Burgess 2002). The ultimate goal of creating Europeanness, as a cultural and political identity, is to also create a (EU)ropean citizenry or *demos* that will legitimate and carry on the integration and (EU)ropeanization project in the future (Shore 2000; Barnett 2001). Culture, through EU policy, is meant to contribute to an imagined community by narrating a common past (Shore 2000; Banús 2002) or by identifying common practices, values and norms associated within Europe's multicultural experience (Shore 2000; Sassatelli 2002). The notions that inform such understandings of "European Culture" or "common cultural heritage" (European Commission 2002b) are often based on a selective reading of European space. Yet, this selective reading is intended to translate to the overall European Cultural Area (European Commission 1988) that the EU hopes to remind (EU)ropeans that they are a part of, but also, contradictorily, to inform (EU)ropeans that it indeed exists (European Commission 2007f). Such contradictions extend naturally from the inherent tensions of political and economic integration, and the challenges to sovereignty and legitimacy at the heart of (EU)ropeanization.

Overall, EU policy actions, with their naïve and contradictory discursive structures, remain dedicated to the construction of a unified (EU)rope. Through such an understanding of space that informs both policy avenues, the EU uses culture and space interchangeably as it discursively constructs a cohesive space of belonging or of interaction. To some degree, both of these seemingly distinct policy avenues are interdependent in the (EU)ropeanization process. On one hand, discourses that support the cohesion activities of absolute, material (EU)ropean space are an essential underpinning behind any claim to a European community that is built on a shared culture. On the other hand, the discourses that claim a European community are rapidly being forged in the infrastructure and material relationships that structure the absolute, material space of (EU)rope. Ultimately, the intellectual tension between culture and space in EU policy provides further evidence of the inherent, symbolic connection that exists between culture and space in practical undertakings.

ECOC Policy: A discursive vehicle for (EU)ropeanization. As mentioned briefly, there are tensions that produce the discursive separation between culture and space in EU policy. Through the (EU)ropeanization process, as evident in the discourses of explicitly cultural or spatial actions, potential institutional, cultural and geopolitical conflicts become institutionalized and mitigated as symbolic policy initiatives. This is perhaps one of the central motivations behind creating cultural or spatial policy, as they certainly become ways for the EU to preempt political tensions that arise in the multiple interpretations of its legitimation and identification discursive structures. Indeed, Shore and Wright (1997) point out

that "policy increasingly shapes the way individuals construct themselves as subjects. [. . .] Changing styles and systems of governance are reconfiguring the relationship between individual and society" (4-5). Symbolic policy fields, of which cultural policy is the most salient example in the EU, are especially helpful in examining these conflicts. As part and parcel of "changing styles and systems of governance," or perhaps more accurately of the "changing styles" of governance, cultural policies guide socialization of citizens. As one such symbolic policy initiative, the ECOC policy is a discursive vehicle for (EU)ropeanization. It is a policy that introduces and incorporates EU symbolic discourses of an idealized European Cultural Area (European Commission 1988), which can be discursively unraveled according to any inherent politics that may have influenced its ultimate purpose. But, politics are not only evident in the production of such a policy, and a significant part of the process is the opportunities that emerge for other interpretations and subsequent implementations.

Policy Network(s) in (EU)ropeanization

(EU)rope itself is a convoluted networked space. It is made up of webs of interrelations that have fueled and been shaped by historical and contemporary flows of people, capital, and goods. The space is also structured and streamlined by countless material networks, like those in urban concentrations of transportation and communication. A condition and consequence of such fluidity and complexity, the EU has been accurately called the "network state" (Castells 1998, 332) because of its multi-level governance "opportunity structure" (Börzel

1997, 9). Such a governing structure is made up of path-dependent, resource-reliant networks of bureaucratic decision-making focused on opportunities for alternative and unexpected futures (Jonsson, Tagil, and Torngvist 2000; Kohler-Koch 2002). As such, the EU's policy network is an important structure used to legislate, debate and execute policy in this growing supranational organization. Looking at the "procedural framing" of (EU)ropean policies as a whole, Kohler-Koch (2002) identify that the "multi-level governance" relationships like the policy network have two central characteristics: 1) the scattering of decision-making power among politically "equal" governance actors; and, 2) the opportunities that such diffuse relationships offer for negotiation in decision-making. Kohler-Koch (2002) argues that the policy network thrives on coordination, persuasion and compromise of the diverse interests between the multiple actors participating. Such interactions and values at work in the policy network have turned the structure into something more than a necessity of multi-level governance.

The policy network is now an ethical standard for institutional and decision-making actors and has emerged from multi-level governance discourses. The nature of such relationships in the networks of the EU have allowed for Rifkin (2004) to offer an underlying philosophy of the network at work in the EU: "Networks are based on the notion that every player counts and that no player alone can dictate outcomes. Networks require letting go, a willingness to trust, listen to others, reciprocate and compromise. One enters a network with the idea that optimizing the welfare of the whole is essential to optimizing one's own

individual interest" (280). This characterization has emerged as more than the balancing of needs and interests within a decision-making context, but has now become a model of how to construct hegemonic discourses. Through such mundane, pragmatic values as cooperation, equality, negotiation, and compromise, which have emerged out of its necessary workings (Börzel 1997; Jonsson, Tagil, and Torngvist 2000; Kohler-Koch 2002), the network has become the discourse through which to promote such values to a wider European and global audience.

Rifkin's (2004) words present an accurate reflection of the value-oriented nature of network discourse in the EU. Moreover, the reality is that most of the institutional or policy networks that make up the EU have not been formed as "self-organizing modes of governance" (Leitner and Sheppard 2002, 505). They have emerged directly through the practices and discourses of the EU, between (EU)ropean institutions, member states and non-member actors, and through specific objectives the actuality of the network has been practiced. Network values have been institutionalized into countless policies with the intention of fostering the continued creation of networks, and thus of the propagation of these values as a new philosophy of governance (Börzel 1997). The resulting moralizing of the network, which has become apparent in EU discourse, is a view of the network as another avenue for "social cohesion" (European Commission 1992a), or rather socio-spatial cohesion. This means that in sponsoring network governance, the values of the network are impressed upon powerful actors, such as governments, institutes and associations, universities, industries and

corporations, or almost any variety of transnational or international organization. The discourses of networks as best-practice for the EU stress cooperation, equality, negotiation, and compromise. This serves to also indoctrinate (EU)ropean actors. And, through this moralizing and encouraging of networks, the EU indelibly anchors itself as a key player in all the networks it fosters.

European Capital of Culture: A Discursive Policy Network

Connecting the two above ideas, the existence of tensions between cultural and spatial discourses in EU policy actions and the emergence of a network discourse that has arisen directly from EU policy machinations, is the conception of the ECOC as a cultural and spatial node within the EU. The ECOC policy network is therefore multipurpose in structure and both practical and meaningful in its operations. There is also an attempt to deal with the political tensions that are inherent in such a becoming space, whether these exist as mundane institutional tensions that come with integration or as symbolic socio-cultural tensions that arise in supranational community-building. The ECOC thus operates on the one hand as a typical policy network, connecting policy actors together to initiate and implement the practical necessities of the policy event. However, on the other hand, through such typical interactions of negotiating policy discourses of culture/space/identity in the context of best-practice network relationships of cooperation and negotiation, the ECOC policy also becomes a moment for a broader set of discursive enactments and the dissemination of a (EU)ropean hegemonic identity.

Discursive studies of the ECOC. The European Capital of Culture is one of the clearest manifestations of the EU policy framework's dual focus on culture and space. Embedded within the policy's language and imagination are discursive constructions of "Europe" and "Europeanness." And, yet, most of the literature on the ECOC has not addressed it from such a political perspective. Overall, the literature exhibits a collection of analyses that are interested in urban place-making strategies, such as: the policy and planning focus on urban regeneration and development, of either economic or cultural development (Booth and Boyle 1993; Alden and Da Rosa Pires 1996; Sjøholt 1999; Balsas 2004; García 2004; Griffiths 2006); and, the impacts on urban culture and image (Jones and Wilks-Heeg 2004; Richards and Wilson 2004; García 2005). These literatures are very focused on the effects on urban space, particularly in the arena of economic development and strategy. Few of these literatures have considered the consequences of a critical human geographic perspective for the ECOC policy, most especially the mutually constitutive nature of culture and space. Such a perspective is essential for any study of the meaningful identity-based discourses that certainly are a part of the ECOC policy.

This thesis is thus not interested in the one-sided, urban place-making and development strategies of the individual cities that have dominated the study of the ECOC policy. Instead, this thesis turns to a noticeably smaller body of literature that does somewhat tackle the political questions behind the policy, in particular, of European identity (Sassatelli 2002; Aiello and Thurlow 2006; Sassatelli 2008). These works are interested in understanding the idea of

European identity through the exploration of symbols: either of the ECOC itself as a symbol (Sassatelli 2002; Sassatelli 2008) or of the symbols that are created in ECOC events (Aiello and Thurlow 2006). As such, this literature is largely interested in official discourse and objectives set by the EU, and the ways these discourses are negotiated and implemented by individual cities, or as in Sassatelli (2008) the ways cities are becoming Europe.

This thesis is also interested in the way that cities are becoming Europe as well as the tensions and contradictions that emerge as a result of this becoming. In fact, the argument of this thesis is that the contradictory relationship within EU metaphors of cultural and spatial idealisms, like *unity in diversity* (Sassatelli 2002) and a "Europe without borders" (Debeljak 2003), are evidence of the dialectic nature of the process of making (EU)rope. Tensions in the (EU)ropeanization process, for example, stem from the desire to narrate a (EU)rope as a culturally and spatially cohesive unit. However, any narratives of (EU)rope are problematic because of the multiple cultural and spatial imaginations that are involved in the construction and negotiation process. In fact, in the above idealisms, imaginations are still dominated by ethnic cultural division and state-centric boundaries and reflect the inherent challenge to attempts at altering them. In recognition of this complexity, this thesis is interested in approaching the ECOC policy in a different way. Particularly, in a way that reflects the power relationships and politics that are behind such discursive contradictions.

Network studies of the ECOC. Looking at the ECOC policy network as a discursive vehicle is another way that this thesis intends to contribute to the growing literature on the ECOC. Thus, while there is plenty of literature that looks at EU network governance, none pushes the idea of the network any further than its material reality. Some have used the context of the network to investigate identity, but have done so by analyzing the specific relationships of a network's organizational structure (Moingeon and Ramanantsoa 1997). Others, have dedicated much study to the structuring structure of the "Network Society" (Turkle 1995; Castells 1997; Barney 2004), where they have particularly focused on the role of technology and the Internet as they correspond to post-modern notions of identity. In the ECOC, connections between discourse and network are compelling enough for this to be the first step in a new direction for ECOC studies. Seeing the ECOC as a discursive policy network is important for: 1) tracing the dissemination of EU discourses on European space and identity; 2) examining their circulation and negotiation among diverse, multi-perspectival actors; and, 3) interpreting how such actors, in their turn of power, implement discourses according to their own interpretation, and thus ultimately changing them.

One of the aims of this thesis is to connect the hegemonic ideas and actors, like (EU)ropeanization and the EU, with their micro-contextual counterparts (Nash 2000), its component actors, place/spaces or institutions, through the novel conceptual structure of a discursive policy network. In applying a network perspective, then, all of these are seen as "nodes" making up the ECOC policy

network, and each are representative of collective actors operating at different scales (e.g., for urban collective actors see LeGalès 2002, and for EU as collective actor see Rifkin 2004, 214-233). In short, the EU and the individual ECOC cities each have opportunities to exercise power in their definition, negotiation and/or implementation of policy objectives. Yet, the network relationship is also shaped by the differing power structures that these actors represent. These emerge from the relative positions of actors with their situated interests and knowledges. Each actor operates through the requisite interaction and connections that are made by the purpose of the network. These connections between actors are facilitated or hindered by the path-dependent nature of the network as it has been built upon existing governance structures (Börzel 1997; Jonsson, Tagil, and Torngvist 2000), embedded into the urban management of flows (LeGalès 2002), or stayed to the value relationships of negotiation, compromise, and dialogue (Jonsson, Tagil, and Torngvist 2000; Kohler-Koch 2002). The previous power structures, of which categorize actors as primary or secondary in their role or importance, continue to affect the later functioning of the network, regardless the new purposes or goals that go into their making. In the ECOC policy network, this means that the "primary" hegemonic structure of the EU remains paramount to the "secondary" inputs of the two ECOC cities.

Through the ECOC, this thesis will investigate the circulation of discourses that will influence a becoming (EU)rope. By paying attention to the political tensions of multiplicity in a space like (EU)rope, current challenges as they are observed from different positions and situations will shed light on the

becoming process. A methodology must then be crafted with this multiplicity in mind. In chapter 2, the methodological framework from which the question of a becoming (EU)rope and its constitutive politics will be investigated is introduced. The methodology of this thesis is a weaving together of discourse analysis with social network analysis. Such an approach is applied to the ECOC, observing it as an EU policy network and as a discursive structure of the EU. The specific method employed to execute this methodology will be detailed, including the data collection procedures and the specific considerations that were taken through the analysis and knowledge creation stages.

Chapter 3 provides a background for the thesis' case study of the ECOC. The chapter begins with the emergence of culture policy in the EU. Then, this development is traced through the specific historical contexts of EU integration or enlargement activities where there was a conscious turn to culture to help solve the crisis of legitimacy (Burgess 2002). The ECOC is one expression of the EU's turn to culture policy, and the history and current state of the policy is explained. Both the larger history of culture policy and of the ECOC illustrates some of the political tensions that emerged over the course of those histories.

Chapters 4 and 5 offer the findings that emerged from analysis. In chapter 4, the ECOC is investigated as an EU culture policy network. The network structures are examined and explained. Then, the network structure is investigated for evidence of an EU hegemonic discursive structure. In particular, two discursive devices were identified to illustrate the regulatory frameworks behind EU geographical imaginations. In chapter 5, the perspective is shifted

away from the hegemonic actor toward the individual cities as the interpreters and implementers of the EU's discursive structure. In particular, the connection between the two cities in the policy network was investigated for the political tensions that exist in their implementation of the ECOC.

In chapter 6, a conclusion is offered with final remarks that summarize the thesis' main discursive findings. These findings are then reflected on further, as the connections that exist between discourse and politics are expanded. Following such reflections, some avenues for further research are then suggested. Upon reaching the conclusion of this thesis, a becoming (EU)rope can be identified through its constitutive discursive structure, political tension and networked future.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

The European Capital of Culture policy is an excellent case for the examination of the (EU)ropeanization process. The policy encompasses hegemonic cultural and geopolitical discourses of space and identity. Further, the EU inserts interconnecting cultural and geopolitical narratives into the policy, which must be interpreted and enacted by designated cities. This provides opportunity to evaluate the political tensions situated within the grander discourses about (EU)rope. These discourses and tensions are structured by the ECOC as a functional policy network, which is also increasingly ethically structured by a network philosophy. One of the compelling endeavors of this research is to interpret the various discourses and the political tensions of those discourses among the varying (EU)ropean actors involved. By turning these questions to the ECOC policy in particular, a becoming (EU)rope will be better understood, as an interrelated, open-ended, political and global process. Such an understanding may shed light on the construction of spaces and identities through the deterritorialized flows of network relationships involving the negotiation and cooperation of multiple, multi-level actors so prevalent today.

The conceptual goals of this research are carried out in two general analytical moments. First, I examine the hegemonic discursive expressions of the EU, with their ultimate intent at legitimacy, and the related production and dissemination of spatial and identity discourses that emerge from that intent. In this first analytical instance, the following questions will be pursued: What are (EU)ropean discourses on space and culture? What are the specific discursive devices used? What are the means of dissemination of those discourses or devices? What are the possible futures or goals that may be found in these discourses? Second, I analyze how the emergent discourses of the EU are negotiated and performed by individual ECOC participants--particularly Luxembourg and Sibiu. In the second analytical instance, the following questions will be pursued: What are the ECOCs interpretations of EU-led discourses on space/culture? How are these discourses negotiated and performed relative to the individual cities' position and situation? How does the network relationship of each city manifest in their performance? What are the possible futures or lessons that these cities interpret and narrate? By investigating these questions, the cultural and geo- politics within the ECOC will be disentangled from their overarching discursive structures.

In this chapter, specifically, the methodological framework that was used in this thesis is introduced and described. First, this chapter begins with the methodological literature that follows from previous chapters' theoretical literature. The work of critical human geographers is again referred to as this body of literature suggests the appropriate actors and objects that study may be

directed upon. In particular, the use of discourse analysis as an approach is viewed through the lens of these critical human geographers. Following the critical focus on multiple actors and positions, along with a textual and performative notion of discourse, the methodological framework of this thesis then connects some literature from the study of social networks. From social networks, this thesis remains cognizant of the actors and relationships that define network structures and materiality. Finally, in this chapter, the resulting method that emerged from this framework is detailed.

Analyzing Discourse and Networks: A Methodological Framework

The methodological framework of this thesis is largely based on an extended, critical concept of discourse (Müller 2008) that will be applied to the websites of the EU and the individual ECOCs. These websites are seen to make up the actors/nodes in the policy network of the 2007 ECOC event. To further flesh out this framework, it is necessary to first introduce discourse analysis and specifically on how discourses are analyzed. In particular, it will be explained that discourse analysis is a method that helps to tease apart the narratives and devises of which discourses help to create meaning in the world. Next, attention will be turned to social network analysis. Social network analysis will offer a further analytical framework from which to study the ECOC policy. From social network analysis, the ECOC policy will be viewed as a particular subset of a social network: the policy, hyperlink network. Finally, the methodological framework will then be connected to the study of web data and will offer a broader look at websites as being discursive nodes in social and spatial networks.

Discourse Analysis

The social world is constituted by a tangled web of discourses (Mason 2002). For geographers, these discourses are always spatial and are centrally engaged in the multiple forms of meaning creation that produce and transform spaces. Thus, space is entirely engaged through processes of meaning creation, which are then revealed as its discursive character (Laclau and Mouffe 1990). In short, discourses are "abstract forms of knowledge" (Müller 2008, 329). Discourses, in practice, form into groups of meaning statements that help to generate the characteristic and/or value of a specific item or idea in the world. Such groups of meaning statements can also be coded as "knowledge." Further, some of these groups of meaning statements become privileged and then create "truths" or authoritative accounts of the world, or discursive structures (Waitt 2005). Through the creation and interaction of meaning, in its multiple forms, discourses emerge as "sets of socio-cultural resources used by people in the construction of meaning about their world and their activities" (Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 192). These "sets," in turn, structure a "set of capabilities, an ensemble of rules by which readers/listeners and speakers/audiences are able to take what they hear and construct it into a meaningful organized whole" (Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 192). It is through such discourses that the social world can be known. Yet, such knowledge is neither complete nor uncontested because of the sheer volume and dynamism of the individual readers/listeners and speakers/audiences.

Such an understanding of discourse analysis implicates a Foucauldian understanding of power: that "power is everywhere" and that "it circulates through negotiated social practices in all levels of social existence" (Waitt 2005, 173). In this understanding, power is productive in that it produces discourse and knowledge as well as other social things (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002; Waitt 2005). In the words of Foucault, power "needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole of the social body" (Foucault 1980, 119). Power is important in the process of privileging discourse because of the "mutually interdependent relationship between power and knowledge" (Waitt 2005, 175). A discursive "regime of truth" is a formation of power/knowledge that is privileged and sustained in its "historically and spatially contingent" social context (Waitt 2005, 174), and then becomes a further mechanism for maintaining certain discourses in circulation as being normal, powerful, coercive, absolute truths.

Such a concept of discourse sees both language/text and social practice/performance as equally influential in the creation and alteration of such "meaning hegemonies" (Müller 2008, 333) or, in the above Foucauldian understanding, as regimes of truth (Waitt 2005). As such, discourse *analysis* is interested in three aims: 1) exploring outcomes of discourse; 2) identifying regulatory frameworks where certain discursive ideas or statements are produced or communicated; and, 3) detecting the "support or internal mechanisms" that maintain certain discourses as incontrovertible or common-sense (Waitt 2005, 164-165). Discourse analysis has an "ability to move beyond the text, the subtext,

and representation to uncover issues of power relationships that inform what people think and do" (Waitt 2005, 166). In particular, the Foucauldian legacy of discourse analysis is concerned with the seeming naturalness of hegemonic accounts and their maintenance through regimes of truth (Waitt 2005), and of their political implications.

Discourse analysis is a highly conceptual, and thus, an extremely nebulous methodology. This is especially evident in the academic debates around what constitutes discourse and, particularly, where it can be found or studied. In general, discourse is found in all forms of cultural texts (Mason 2002). However, what constitutes a cultural text has also been under debate. Most accepted has been the definition of cultural texts as written and visual representational sources of discourse (Mason 2002; Waitt 2005). Typically, such "texts" as language or imagery have been studied for their discursive structure, production or outcomes. The representational analyses of discourse have produced a very diverse and fascinating range of literature: from all forms of literature and language; to images, symbols and signs; to landscapes, both in those as fluctuating reality and those frozen in reflection.

An interesting critique has emerged that is directed at such conventional linguistic and imaged discourse analyses, and argues for the inclusion of attitudes and practices as cultural texts (Laclau and Mouffe 1990; Diez 1999; Müller 2008). In particular, Laclau and Mouffe (1985; 1990) have argued for an expanded notion of discourse to integrate written, visual *and* practiced forms as cultural texts. Laclau and Mouffe (1990) introduce a theory of discourse that

"allows thinking about hegemony as the fixation of contingent meaning within and through discourse" (Müller 2008, 331). And similar to Massey's (2005) conception of space, this "fixation" of meaning is only partial and notions of its finality are ultimately impermanent (Müller 2008). Such a notion of hegemony leads to the awareness of a "surplus of meaning" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 111), which are all the other possible meanings that are excluded from the hegemonic ones. All of this amounts to a larger "field of discursivity" (Laclau and Mouffe 1990). This "field" is a collection of "the totality of other meanings not articulated a discourse" (Müller 2008, 331) and is still extant in the larger discursive realm that is the social world. This idea allows for the inclusion of social practices in the study of discourse, as cultural texts that are extra-linguistic and performative, and which are seen as "hidden and mundane acts of power" (Dowler and Sharp 2001, 166). Within this concept of discourse is an embedded theory of the political that can also be extended to social practices (Laclau and Mouffe 1990).

Thus, cultural texts are shaped through patterns of discursive formations that are repeated across any number of other texts, actions, processes, subject positions, or attitudes (Waitt 2005). "In the context of discourse, meanings cannot only be confined to a single word, sentences, or particular text, but depend on the outcome of relationships between texts [or] intertextuality" (Waitt 2005, 171). Intertextuality is especially salient in its form in the narrative, where discursive texts are woven together by actors in the production of intentional, situated inter-*discursive* devices. In terms of practice, the inter-*discursive*

moment emerges through contextual, situated social actions of different groups as their performance of discourses are either "a recitation of the already established knowledge, positioning the subject within certain discourse, [or] a contestation, in asserting subversive difference" (Müller 2008, 333). Regardless, this integrative understanding of cultural texts realizes that both narrative and practice share in and structure inter-*discursive* moments.

This thesis takes the concept of intertextuality to heart, and engages in an analysis of websites as cultural texts, as both representational and performative sources. A website can be seen as strongly intertextual as it is structured by other texts that are all organized, connected, and interdependent with one another, and thus creating its own discursive narrative. Thus, intertextual moments can be explored for their resulting discursive structures through the production context and intended audience, as they are investigated as a rule in discourse analysis (Waitt 2005). Further, the website is uniquely performative in that it is a situated, contextual, and thus, a *political* performance of discourse. The website, as representative of actor(s) and as actor-produced narrative or practice, either positions itself or contests such a position, relative to whatever discourses are available. In other words, the practice of creating a website is a social activity, one that is carried out by social beings. This particular practice is made up of meaning creating moments that are based upon existing, situated knowledges or understandings. This illustration of discourse as political, relational, and ephemeral is in agreement with the overall critical human geographic framework of this paper, and even more so, with its analytical device and performative

reflection, the network. Now, after this introduction to discourse analysis, it is time to make the methodological connection to the social network, of which policy networks are one selected example.

The Social/Policy Network: Analysis of Structure and Discourse

For this second methodological foundation, there is no precedence for a procedural connection made between discourse and network. It is an imperative for the methodological framework of this thesis to then connect the material, functional studies of the network (Castells 1996, 1997, 1998; Börzel 1997; Kohler-Koch 2002; Park 2003) with the extended understandings of discourse that are found in cultural texts and performances (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 1990; Waitt 2005; Müller 2008). The goal is to look for inspiration in network studies approaches, in particular of social networks, and then to apply such approaches to discourse analysis.

First of all, the network is essentially a structure that is defined by its material relations, its nodes and flows. There are a number of different types of networks, and also many different ways to analyze them. For the purposes of this methodological framework, the social network is of particular interest. "[A] social network is composed of nodes (people, groups, organizations or other social entities such as nation-state) connected by a set of relationships" (Park 2003, 50). In this way, network approaches view the social world as being structured by multiple, overlapping networks, which are often defined by the specificity of their constituent relationships. A particular social network is the communication network, which is composed of interconnected nodes linked by

the relationships of communication or the patterned flows of information (Rogers and Kincaid 1981). In general, a policy network can be understood as both a social and a communication network, in which policy-related social interaction and communication flows of information link the nodes of the policy network.

Even further, in social network analysis, there is a specific form of the social/communication network that is made up of further, specified networks: the computer-mediated network. A computer-mediated network is defined by the interconnection of nodes by computer systems. And yet, this type of network is also further channeled by a connection to the internet (an Internet network), or even further, as flows are restricted to hyperlinks as the primary channel of information flow (as a Hyperlink network) (Park 2003). Hyperlink networks are an extension of social/communication networks, but the structure for the constitutive social system is based in the Internet, specifically through shared hyperlinks on websites. The website itself becomes the primary node in this type of network, and is both an actor in the network and also representative of "real" social actors or the same social entities of a general social network (Park 2003).

Beyond the nodes and flows of social/policy/hyperlink networks, a social network analysis is concerned with the patterns of flows, the relative positions of nodes, and how these flows and positions in turn affect the behavior or attitudes of nodes/actors (Park 2003). Social network analysis is particularly interested in "patterns of [social] relations" between these nodes (Park 2003, 50). For hyperlink networks the patterns of relations are "designed or modified by individuals or organizations who [*sic*] own websites reflect the communicative

choices, agendas or ends [. . .] of the owners [and thus,] serves a particular social or communicative function" (Park 2003, 53). Finally, because hyperlinks are seen to represent the connections between nodes/actors, the social or communication structures among them can be interpreted from the hyperlink structure of the website (Park 2003).

Now, the interests of social network analysis will be extended into the field of discursivity (Laclau and Mouffe 1990). According to Castells (1996), "New information technologies are integrating the world in global networks of instrumentality. Computer-mediated communication begets a vast array of virtual communities" (22). As the premier virtual community and social network structure, the Internet offers "a key space for enacting social practice, and for reflecting and shaping social process and problems" (Mautner 2005, 810), and is thus a key space of discourse. As Mautner (2005) provocatively states, "if it was not for the internet, many representations of reality and of social relationships would not be articulated at all" (813). The Internet has a central role in the discursive enactment of social/internet networks: "it provide[s] a highly dynamic, interactive space for debate and resistance from a multiplicity of stakeholders, and it [does] so by drawing on a vast array of multimodal resources" (Mautner 2005, 813). As part of all-encompassing social existence, discourse is inherent in all social/Internet network connections, communications and relationships. The functions of such networks can thus be seen as constituting "discursive acts" (Diez 1999). Just as power/knowledge and meaning circulates in cultural texts,

they also circulate in networks. Since networks are social, actor-driven entities, they are part and parcel of the field of discursivity (Laclau and Mouffe 1985).

And, just as with discourse, the situated positions of nodes/actors in the network that enable them, constrain them, or provide them with alternatives to contest their positions or to create new ones. The network also emerges as a political entity with flows of power/knowledge between its nodes. Even further, in the hyperlink network, the act of creating a website, as both a cultural text and hyperlink structure, is an interrelated discursive act. The website, as a cultural text/hyperlink structure, offers opportunity for the same "hidden and mundane acts of power" (Dowler and Sharp 2001, 166) as does the wider social world. Network actors can limit or expand their connections. Networks can reorient hyperlinks/discourse and completely reorient the structure/text of the website. The next question then emerges: who are these network actors?

Web Data: The Nodes in the Policy Network

Recalling the "network of networks" (Berners-Lee 1999), the Internet is made up of virtual communities of social/communication networks that are themselves made up of actor/nodes represented by websites. As another social space where conventional social products and practices are located, these social/Internet communities are inset in a more convoluted network experience that is structured by hyperlinks and, at the same time, is so vast in its paths and possibilities to be completely undetermined. At the heart of discourse and of the network, is the social: the subject, the actor, the node. These are the beings, the becomers and the networkers, that structure and construct the social world,

whether that world is defined by face-to-face or virtual relationships. These nodes are what also fuel the overall dynamism and development of the social world. Further, these nodes are represented by individual people, entire groups, like institutions, or are increasingly "virtual" or "cyber" actors, like the website.

In the specific case of the ECOC, the policy and its actors are viewed as a social/policy network and also as a social/hyperlink network, in reference to its representative virtual or *e*-component that is hosted by the Internet. The social network of ECOC-related websites that exists through the Internet becomes the structural support for the *e*-component of the ECOC policy network. Overall, this is evidence of the opening up of new channels for governance and institutions that have emerged out of the facilitative and transformative nature of the Internet (Chadwick and May 2003).

It is within this methodological framework that this thesis is positioned. By investigating the individual websites of the EU and each ECOC as web-actors, then, there is plenty of textual sources from which to analyze both hegemonic and non-hegemonic discourses. The analysis of each website/actor will proceed through a discourse analysis approach that will be pushed further by integrating the social network approach. With a particular focus on actor/nodes and relationships, this approach will offer this thesis a perspective that can better recognize the dissemination, circulation and interpretation of discourse in policy action. It is now appropriate to turn to a description of the actual method that was employed in this thesis.

Method: Web Data, Discourse Analysis and Navigating the Network

In completing the analysis, the first step was to determine the appropriate sampling frame and collection procedures. Since this thesis is concerned with the actor/nodes of the ECOC policy network, the sample was composed of the EU's Culture portal and the two individual websites of the 2007 ECOCs. The limit of the sampling to these three website nodes was based on the character of the policy network and of the websites themselves, which offer plenty of textual sources each. The collection of the websites was already completed through a web search and link exploration of European Capital of Culture websites, and was narrowed down to the preferred three.

The next step involved the collection and organization of the data sources. For each website source the same steps were employed to collect and organize any subsequent data. First, the web-structures of the EU website, known as *Europa*, were navigated. Second, the 2007 ECOCs of Luxembourg and Sibiu, were each navigated in turn. For each of the websites, a single document was created and titled with each website's name and homepage web address. Each document included the essential reference information of the date collected, hyperlink titles, titles of sub-pages and related web addresses. In navigating through each website's hyperlink network structure individual webpages were "frozen" (through the print-screen function) and saved in the relevant document (c.f., Mautner 2005). These crude, static representations of the dynamic websites, or screenshots, served as important reference data for later analysis. Some of these screenshots are featured, unaltered as image figures within both analysis

chapters. In addition to the screenshots, textual data were also collected from the websites by copying and pasting into the appropriate website's document. With both the screenshots and pasted text, important reference information was recorded, in particular, of dates of access and webpage addresses. The final task of collection and organization was to arrange each document in a clear and easily navigable format that was achieved by using electronic bookmarks and purposeful title and heading formatting. Overall, the data collection and organization step was completed between November and December of 2007.

Following the careful collection of these data and the thoughtful organization of the documents, the analysis steps were executed. In general, the analysis was carried out using three general research techniques: note-taking, coding, and interpretation. The first step of analysis was to read through all of the data. In each document, interesting images, language or mottos were highlighted and brief notes were made regarding the nature of their interest. Throughout this process, cognitive connections were being made between the objects of interest in each website document. Aside from the subconscious ruminations about the connections of individual objects, there was also a deliberate effort to flesh out the network connections and policy relationships that exist between the actor/nodes in the 2007 ECOC hyperlink network. As a result, a separate document was started to include these emerging themes and longer descriptions of objects of interest, be they cultural, geopolitical or network objects.

Once each data document was thoroughly reviewed, the next step of analysis was to pull out the strongest discursive themes and then to further data to

support them. The coding of the website documents was a way to further develop and support each theme. In general, the objective of coding is to investigate how the source material and its producer are embedded within particular discursive structures (Waitt 2005). In coding the website documents, a very simplistic coding framework was created through the navigation and familiarization with the source materials (Waitt 2005). In the analysis document, a rudimentary codebook was created by organizing themes and sub-themes along with actual, concrete references to each data document. Each reference to a data object was accompanied by a short analysis of that object and a description of its connection to one of the major analysis themes.

The final step was a secondary discursive and social network analysis. This involved a reading of the themes and support data. However, more than just re-reading, this stage was carried out while mindful of the power of interpretation. Ultimately, the interpretation, communication and presentation of this thesis were approached through a post-positivist "writing-IN" model that conceptualizes research in terms of located, partial, and situated knowledges (Mansvelt and Berg 2005). Following this model, this thesis is an attempt to communicate its analyses with particular attention to contextuality, partiality, and positionality of the research and researcher (Mansvelt and Berg 2005). By utilizing such a model, this thesis has been positioned squarely in the qualitative arena and is concerned with establishing rigor, integrity, and honesty in such forms of interpretive and subjective research.

The analysis of this thesis and the described findings are products of interpretive, narrative, and illustrative moments of engagement with the objects of study. The findings portray the partial structure, production and effects of EU discursive structures as they have been interpreted from the analysis of the ECOC policy network actor/nodes. Further, the EU discursive structure has then been contested and complicated by the individual cities and the unraveling of the political moments that are behind each city's position. Yet, this descriptive moment is at the mercy of the researcher's partial and reflexive understanding of the texts, images and symbols as discursive touchstones as well as on a situated reading of the intertextual practices that create them. The final stage of analysis involved a symbiotic procedure of continued analysis and of knowledge creation. Clearly, there was no definitive movement from the analysis stage to the actual act of writing, and analysis continued until the final draft was handed over to this thesis' committee. Overall, the pre-analysis, analysis, knowledge creation (writing) and presentation stages took about one year to complete.

Now that the methodological framework has been outlined and the method employed following this framework has been described, the presentation of the analysis of this thesis can be introduced. An explanation of the particular organization of this presentation is warranted here, as it is squarely a result of the procedural process of this thesis' methodological framework. Ultimately, the following chapters present the two perspectives that were deemed necessary in both the theoretical and methodological framework, of top-down and bottom-up analyses. The first analysis chapter, chapter 4, provides the top-down description

of the web data of the policy network and of the hegemonic discourses that form the discursive structure of the policy network. It offers a descriptive analysis of the actor/nodes and hyperlink network structures of the entire 2007 ECOC policy network. Following the web data description, the discursive perspective of the EU is privileged as the initial creator of this policy network and the hegemonic discourses behind the ECOC policy are introduced and analyzed. The next analysis chapter, chapter 5, reverses its focus to a bottom-up perspective where analysis focuses on the individual ECOCs as discursive enactors of the 2007 ECOC policy. In this bottom-up perspective, an in-depth interrogation of each ECOC is carried out by highlighting the situated, positional interpretations and performances of hegemonic discourses in each city's implementation of the policy. But, first, a background of the EU's foray into culture policy and of the development of the ECOC as one of these culture policies is necessary.

CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND: LEGITIMACY AND CULTURE

Introduction

The story of the European Union is one that is both fantastic and banal. What is most interesting in this story, is the role that culture is playing in the EU's integration progress, economic and political pursuits, and related efforts at creating a unified (EU)ropean space and identity. Compelled by its need for legitimation and reterritorializing globalization processes, the project to construct a (EU)rope by appealing to culture is a political and purposeful move. With that said, it is clear that throughout the contested and complex (EU)ropeanization process there is constant negotiation between the competing interests and claims over existing cultural spaces currently being called European. Overtime, the underlying motives and needs of this process fluctuate as actors and contexts change.

At times, the EU has expected to foster its unification through political and economic integration. Access to the institutional space of the EU, or participation in the flows of the economic market, were meant to inspire familiarity and closeness. Instead, pragmatic institutional acts have created frustration and detachment. From the Commission's own *Eurobarometer* surveys, there is plenty of evidence that suggests that the development of

European identity is indeed, limited (Duchesne and Frognier 1995). "The massive transfer of regulatory and decision-making powers from the nation-states to the European Union, [has seen] no corresponding shift in popular sentiment or political loyalty" (Shore 2000, 18). This lack of a politically legitimating base has degraded the perceived authority of the EU over the interests of the peoples of (EU)rope. In some people's minds, this calls into question the EU's overall vision of a unified (EU)rope. Some of its current activities have also worsened this situation. In particular, the most recent enlargement of the EU in 2004/2007 has challenged some of the gains that have been made in the realm of "social cohesion" (Delhey 2007). Such challenges to the authority of the EU result in questions to this organization's legitimacy. These authority and legitimacy issues stem from many different scales and actors, spanning the individual citizen to entire nations. In short, the future of the EU and the symbolic success of its idea of Europe will depend on its ability to successfully cultivate belonging and the loyalty of its citizens to its institution and ideals (García and Wallace 1993).

The EU's current plan is to call out culture as tool and target of (EU)ropeanization and to inspire a sense of "unity" among (EU)ropeans (Barnett 2001). For the EU, culture is often defined in official discourse as a whole realm (Sassatelli 2002), and it is always ambiguous and nebulous. In some of its policy discourse, culture is largely tied to the production of material (cultural) things (Banús 2002). The relative role and importance of culture in EU policy also varies: it can structure an entire policy, with many actions referring to culture, as in the framework Culture Programmes (discussed later in this chapter) or the

European Capital of Culture Policy; or, it can be one discursive support in a larger, broader EU initiative, such as the Common Market and the supportive role of culture productions like those which define outputs of the entire "culture sector" (European Commission 2008e). Regardless of the form of culture's dissemination, EU actions in the name of culture have amounted to a considerable presence in the everyday lives of (EU)ropeans. Concern with the representation and practice of culture spans education, training and research, communications, audio visual, and entertainment activities of the EU. Culture is now recognized as an entire economic sector, as a model for societal ethics, and as a point of "political dialogue with partner countries and regions around the world" (European Commission 2008e, paragraph 5).

As geographers have long noted, these cultural practices are also always tied to the spatial politics of institutions, such as the EU (c.f., Mitchell 2000). Through discourses of culture and space, the EU intends to: 1) define a meaningful, (EU)ropean place/space through functional, yet symbolic initiatives; and 2) organize a "Europe of flows," based on postmodern, globalizing spatial practices and relationships (Richardson and Jensen 2003). The resulting spatial framework found in certain policy initiatives, although not formally acknowledged in these initiatives, are fueled by a response to the sometimes disruptive transnational spatialities that challenge the established territorial order of (EU)rope (Richardson and Jensen 2003). This happens through, for example, the increasing mobility and flows of people and the expected interaction of their power/knowledges, cultural values and practices. These flows create new

"hybrid" forms of culture that span both the "fixed local with the mobile translocal" (Meethan 2003, 18). Although this is a result of the (EU)ropeanization process itself, it is contested and problematic and remains a broader concern for a western-centric EU that must continuously manage the cultural spaces of its growing, dynamic union. As a result of these emerging tensions, the definitions and applications of culture have changed in response to each new context of integration or enlargement. Such changes, may be undermining both the legitimization of the EU and the broader restructured cultural spaces of (EU)rope that the EU relies on. It is through these changing definitions and applications of culture that the political moments behind the becoming (EU)rope can be analyzed.

In this chapter, the history of the EU is related to the long-term emergence of (EU)ropean cultural action. The development of (EU)ropean cultural action is argued to be a response to the political and economic integration efforts of the overall history of the EU. First, this history begins by detailing the emergence of cultural discourse as it is used to justify and frame EU enlargements and emerging geopolitical possibilities. Second, this narrated history is expanded within the contemporary context of the 2000/2007 framework Culture Programmes and the 2004/2007 Eastern enlargement. Each of these political developments are the major efforts at further integration or "deepening," as the Culture Programmes are part of the Maastricht Treaty and the extension of EU governance, and at further enlargement or "widening," as the 2004/2007 enlargement is the largest admission of members that the EU will probably ever experience. This current

context provides the insight into the case study of this thesis, the 2007 ECOC event. Following the description of the current context, the background of the ECOC is offered and then followed by the connection of the 2007 ECOC to these contemporary developments of EU integration and enlargement.

Growing Pains of Unification: The Role of Cultural Policy in (EU)rope

Before turning to the analysis of the ECOC as a case study of (EU)ropeanization, it is essential to understand the development of the role that culture plays as part of policy in the EU. Such a history sheds some light on the principles and expectations of Eurocrats, demonstrating how, at each juncture that the EU was either widened or deepened politically and economically, there were some kinds of corresponding symbolic appeals to culture as a tool for policy. The changing definitions of and uses for culture in the EU's imagination and its legislation are thus responses to this institution's dynamic changes. And, these mirror the short-term and long-term demands of integration, enlargement, and ultimately of legitimacy.

The Early Years of Unification: It is Not "Culture" Yet

During the first years of European unification,[2] from the 1950s to the early 1970s, the process of (EU)ropeanization was geographically and symbolically

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[2] Following World War II, the countries of Western Europe organized themselves by various treaties into differing series of intergovernmental organizations or "communities." The earliest was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of the Treaty of Paris in 1952, followed by the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC) of the Treaty of Rome in 1958. In 1967, with the Treaty of Brussels these three intergovernmental bodies were united and supplemented with

naturalized as an obvious outgrowth of the region's longer-term contestation. The strength of the lessons of history and realist necessity was what kept France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in a constant state of integration motion. The political incorporation and economic rebuilding of what would become the EC, and then the EU, marginalized to a certain degree, questions of social and cultural integration. Peace and unity, as they related to the members would be achieved through political integration and economic harmonization. In the minds of an emerging class of Eurocrats, integration was a completely rational process (Shore 2000). The building of (EU)rope would be achieved by the breaking down of national barriers to facilitate the free movement of goods, capital, services, and labor. It was believed that after the economic structures of the nations of (EU)rope were reorganized, pressures would emerge requiring subsequent harmonization and integration in other areas, namely in the political and social arenas (Smith 1983; Taylor 1983). A focus on economic language was also a way to circumvent any threat to the social and political control of the member states by one entity: for all intents and purposes the European communities were purely functional, pragmatic projects that were based on economic rebuilding and peaceful cooperation.

Whatever sense of community did exist in those early years was surely due to the shared history between those first members and their common spatial scars of battlegrounds and bombed out cities. The further deepening of

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supranational institutions in the European Communities, referred to as the European Community (EC).

unification was facilitated by the successes of cooperation and emerging prosperity. In 1957, this small, peace-seeking set of European states morphed itself into an economically-motivated customs union becoming the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1967, the EEC was transformed once again, into the European Community (EC), which was followed by the community-wide single market, or Common Market, a single currency, the Euro, and the overall progression towards a more federalist-style political union[3] (Ostergren 2004). The increasing political and economic stakes meant that more profound considerations for community-building and social identification were becoming needed to ensure the legitimacy and longevity of this burgeoning union.

What is in a Name? The European Community and Community-Building

It was the cultural and spatial test of the first enlargement of the early 1970s that saw *Culture* emerge as a discernable policy discourse. The admittance of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark (1973) was coupled with the first legislative efforts to frame the becoming culture of (EU)rope. This is evident in early policy language that was intentionally symbolic and narrated a (EU)ropean culture. In 1973, the *Declaration on the European Identity* proclaimed that the

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[3] In the 1987 Single Europe Act, the combination of intergovernmental communities with supranational institutions became the preferred governance structure for a becoming EU. The creation of the Common Market, single currency and federalist-supranational structure laid the foundation for later widenings and deepenings.

current nine member states shared, "the same attitudes to life," "cherished values of their legal, political and moral order," and "the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law," "social justice," and "respect for human rights" (European Commission 1973, 119). These early statements employed heavy symbolic language, which narrated a selective reading of Western European history. Such narratives were often based on essentialist, universalist conceptions of European identity (Shore 1993). At the heart of the *Declarations* was a selective philosophical structure to narrate the inherent unity of (EU)ropeanness.

Such a philosophical focus was informed by a civilizational geopolitical imagination that saw the world separated into distinct "civilizations," of which Western Europe was one (see Bassin 2007). This discursive structure relied on the historical and normative construction of Europe as a "naively perceived" region (Ostergren 2004, 5). Civilizational (EU)rope was based on the naturalness of its "continental" borders and was equally formed by its actions and interactions in the world that "in discovering the world, Europe discovered herself" (Ostergren 2004, 7). The EU relied on the historical experiences of its members to form its own narrative and to advance its institutional legitimacy. As new members were drawn into the EC, their histories were mapped onto the current (EU)ropean historical and geographical imagination (c.f., Gregory 1994). Specifically, the admission of the UK was celebrated for the "new world dimension" it brought to the EC, with its transatlantic and commonwealth relations (Granell 1995, 137). This was indeed a factor of the EC's geographical imagination that saw the legacy of Colonialism as one uniting narrative for (EU)rope.

These early cultural statements were always strongly tied to the ambitions and realities of the EC's political institutions and Common Market (Passerini 2002). In the mid-1980s, it was acknowledged that the Common Market was tied to cultural life (Banús 2002). Accordingly, there emerged stronger cultural justifications for the EC's economic objectives (Barnett 2001). As a result, the People's Europe Agenda was introduced along with a loose grouping of cultural initiatives that awarded financial grants to various participants (e.g., member states, cities, or intergovernmental organizations). In this context, culture was seen by the European Commission as a device that could be used for "explicit exercises of 'consciousness-raising' " at the local scale (McDonald 1996, 54). The People's Europe Agenda was thus an attempt to highlight "European solidarity" (Fontaine 1991) by providing institutional incentives through grants and funding in return for small-scale performances of (EU)ropean cultural unity.

Of course, the Agenda had a larger purpose. It was a political response to the distresses over the emerging discourses of the EC's so-called democratic deficit (Barnett 2001), which occurred despite economic and political integration successes. The deficit stemmed from three related concerns between member states and citizens. First, there was alarm at the lack of accountability that emerged from the apparent absence of the citizenry's involvement in decision-making of the supranational apparatus of the EC. Second, there was also worry over member state sovereignty and the lack of clear jurisdictional responsibilities between political scales. And third, together the issues of legitimacy and want of the popular approval of citizens correlated with a marked absence of any

participatory debate about the EC (Barnett 2001). The reality and complexity of the democratic deficit required a cultural discourse that would prove more flexible for the dynamic and contested nature of (EU)rope.

Despite the increasing application of culture as a device promoting integration, there was still no formal approval in the EC to create policy that explicitly dealt with a unified (EU)ropean culture. This was because there was a need to tread carefully among the member states, specifically so as to not appear to be trampling upon their national cultural sovereignty. An example of this can be found in 1983, within *The Solemn Declaration on European Union*, which extended a cautious "invitation" to member states to help "promote European awareness and to undertake joint action in various cultural areas," of information, education, audio-visual policy and the arts (Shore 2000, 45). These areas, which included activities of leisure/entertainment and communication, reached deep into the everyday life of citizens. The *Declaration* signaled the next step in the explicit use of cultural initiatives, which were hoped to "affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an element in the European identity" (cited in De Witte 1987, 136 cited in Shore 2000, 45). These cultural actions legislatively restricted funding for regional and local projects that were encouraged to highlight (EU)ropeanness, as non-state-centric expressions of cultural richness and diversity (Barnett 2001). Further, because such cultural actions exhibited non-state-centric initiatives, they were often intentionally constrained by the overlying member state governance structures that dominated the EC's institutional frameworks.

Regardless of the institutional constraints, culture in this early sense became one of the EC's preferred mediums through which to get to the citizenry and proselytize the unity between them. Following the discursive traditions of nationalism, sensationalist symbolic events were staged to instill a sense of "Europeanness" while at the same time serving urban redevelopment or place promotion strategies. These measures were still not part of any legally legitimate cultural program, or competency, in the EC. Instead, they were offered as "economic support" for local arts festivals, orchestras, music and performing arts, in return for calling them European (Barnett 2001). In a sense, the utility of culture was ambivalent: there was a balancing between the broader EC goal for generating a wider (EU)ropean set of cultural symbols, on the one hand, and the maintenance of member state power to control those symbols locally, on the other.

The EC continued to make the most of culture in this institutional grey area of policy action. Particularly, in the next two enlargements, of Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986, the EC relied on loose appeals to culture to mend the minor discursive snags to the standing logic behind the connection of culture and unity. In general, religious, economic and political differences discriminated against the three new members. All three were predominately non-Protestant, agrarian, less wealthy economies, each with recent authoritarian political histories (Delhey 2007). In the case of Greece, there was a significant degree of cultural ambivalence behind its admittance to the EC. Its Orthodox religion, strong cultural identity and language set it apart to some degree from the

Protestant/Catholic experiences of the nine existing members. This was overcome because its admittance allowed the EC to extend and deepen its symbolic claim to the "cherished values" of "democracy" that were so revered in the 1973 *Declaration*. As an attempt to reconcile this discursive ambivalence, it is no coincidence that the first Capital of Culture event was created and staged in Athens in 1985.

Overall, the admissions of Greece, Spain and Portugal, with their noted limitations, discursively and materially strengthened the geopolitical space of the becoming (EU)rope. Framed as the commonsense widening of the united (EU)rope, their admissions extended the political/institutional space of the EC to the Atlantic and further into the Mediterranean, the conceived "natural" boundaries of the European continent (Ostergren 2004). The inclusion of Spain and Portugal was also geopolitically significant for the strength of the EC's international relations due to their neocolonial links to Latin America (Granell 1995). The social and cultural diversity that these admissions brought were ultimately economically and politically justified. The resulting narrative of economic and political broadening was touted for the significant gains of people and resources that would be brought to the EC (Ostergren 2004). And, it was argued that the relatively lower levels of development in these new members would offer "certain economic complementarities that would benefit the EC in the long run" (Ostergren 2004, 211).

Following these enlargements, culture continued to be used as a way to re-frame a united (EU)rope. The EC was particularly active in introducing

"symbolic measures" that were intended to raise the cultural and spatial consciousness of its citizens to more visual and subliminal unity messages (Barnett 2001). The discursive structure of unity had its foundations in a selective European heritage and the natural boundaries of (EU)rope as a united territory. As a representation of this unity, the Commission created the EC emblem and flag in 1985. Formally raised in 1986, the year of Spain and Portugal's admittance, the design featured a circle of twelve yellow stars against a blue background (Shore 2000). The symbolism, originating from the member state dominated Council of Europe,[4] draws on a specific assortment of member state and Western European histories that connect to the number twelve, the then current number of members. This narrative featured ancient Greek, Roman, and Christian traditions.

> Twelve was a symbol of perfection and plentitude, associated equally with the apostles, the sons of Jacob, the tables of the Roman legislator, the labours of Hercules, the hours of the day, the months of the year, or the signs of the Zodiac. (Council of Europe 1989, cited in Shore 2000, 47)

The flag representing the unified (EU)rope is the most pervasive visual representation in the EC's, and now the EU's, symbolic collection. In addition to the flag, other initiatives were proposed, such as a (EU)ropean passport, driver's license and car license plates, a (EU)ropean anthem, (EU)ropean postage stamps, and even (EU)ropean holidays (Shore 2000). Most of these have since been introduced. Overall, these discursive devices were intended to, "reconfigure the

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[4] The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1949 to further the ideals of human rights, democracy, rule of law, and cultural co-operation in Europe. The Council is a parliamentary body that is not part of the European integration efforts of the EC, nor the later EU.

symbolic ordering of time, space, information, education and the media" (Shore 2000, 50) away from the member states, and more in line with the institutional reality of the EC.

The important role of culture as a symbolic medium for articulating the space of (EU)rope throughout the 1980s reveals much about the challenges that the EC was facing at the time, especially as it struggled to balance its own unity with the autonomy of its member states. As a result, early symbolic initiatives were indicative of ideas that were more in line with the "conservative current of nineteenth-century social evolutionist thought [that] portrays the European Parliament and Commission as heroic agents of change, on the side of history" (Shore 2000, 50). This endeavor is also not entirely different from that of the nation-state. It is, in fact, being built on the same "symbolic terrain" that nationalism engaged (Shore 2000).

Yet, at the same time, the (EU)ropean cultural heritage that is called upon to represent the becoming (EU)rope is inherently contradictory. This contradiction exists because of changing perspectives between (EU)ropean institutions and member states. At the (EU)ropean level, culture at the regional-scale is seen as complex, multiple and defined by diversity. This is opposed to the retrenchment of national culture as a device that is defined by the unity and commonality in a territory, as exhibited largely by the perspective of EU member states. Shore (2000) argues that this contradiction also exists in the mind of Eurocrats themselves. On the one hand, Eurocrats have assumed that a (EU)ropean culture, and thus identity, is already present in the mind of citizens.

Yet, on the other hand, Eurocrats have realized that the reality of socio-cultural differences that exist across nationalized spaces demands the active creation of a (EU)ropean culture and identity. These fundamental contradictions of (EU)ropean cultural unity continue to be problematic. As a result, the needs of the evolving structures of governance and economy require continual (re)consideration of a becoming (EU)ropean culture.

Preparing for the Eastern Horizon: The Revision of Culture

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Soviet power over Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, introduced new horizons and challenges for the existing unity models of (EU)ropean culture and territory. Cold War discourses in the EC that were based on the ideological division of Europe into West and East were replaced by discourses of economic and political reunification of East and West Germany and more broadly, of the impending "re-integration" of the former Soviet Bloc into (EU)rope (Rifkin 2004). The prospect of Eastward enlargement required an updated strategy for the continued cultural management of the (EU)ropeanization process. The *de facto* admission of the German Democratic Republic in 1991 showed the difficulty of hasty integration: the inhabitants of post-Cold War (EU)rope were concerned with the complicated integration of socialist political and economic systems and, most importantly, with the increasing cultural diversity that accompanied enlargement once again (Granell 1995).

Despite the discursive work that was already done in narrating a cohesive (EU)ropean culture based on a certain selective history and naturalized

geography, the EC had to once again revise this cultural narrative to justify Eastward expansion. This cultural narrative was predominately revised with the understanding that there could be no singular European history that could account for the diversity of experiences and daily life of all the member states and the prospective Eastern and Central members states (Barnett 2001). Thus, there was a need to balance all the preceding work on narrating a unified (EU)rope with the latest acknowledgment that there could be no single, specific culture within this unified space. In the words of the European Parliament:

> The European Community dimension has and can continue significantly to contribute to [. . .] the harmony upon which diversity thrives, through increased contact, comparison and mixing, and the identification of both different cultural traditions and of common uniting principles, of mutual understanding and the elimination of prejudices between people. [. . .] The European 'cultural model' is not all exclusive, still less a 'melting pot', but rather a multi-various, multi-ethnical plurality of culture, the sum total of which enriches each individual culture. (European Commission 1990, 28-29)

Before the European Commission could implement this new "cultural model" of balancing the diversity of cultures within the EC's *institutional* unity it had to acquire the political legitimacy to act. By connecting the economically-driven cultural events of the early 1980s with the cultural rationalization activities of sustaining free movement and Community-wide audio-visual and taxation measures, the EC began to establish its case to make culture a formal competency. As a result, the European Commission introduced a new device into its formal discursive structure in 1991, the *European Dimension* (Barnett 2001). In this discourse, the promotion of the *European Dimension* would "contribute to the

enhancement of European citizens' sense of belonging to an emerging multicultural community" (European Commission 1991, 19). The *European Dimension* became the sanctioned space for the narration of (EU)ropean culture, providing a discursive shelter from the institutional tensions of the expanding (EU)rope.

As part of the legislative manifestation of the *European Dimension*, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty unified the various institutions of the EC and advanced political and economic integration to its furthest reach.[5] Maastricht, formally known as the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), embodied the contemporary confluence of cultural legitimacy and post-Cold War geopolitical opportunity. Officially creating the European Union (EU), the TEU's provisions set the precedent for an agenda that moved towards a more explicit social and cultural union. The TEU also included a post-Cold War geopolitical design that provided for the continued expansion of the EU into the Northern, Central, Eastern, and Mediterranean regions of Europe (Rifkin 2004), effectively bolstering the size and scope of (EU)ropean space. To illustrate, Article O of the Treaty explicitly

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[5] The Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 supplemented the European Community with larger, stronger supranational structures. These structures are known as the Three Pillars and they structure cooperation into three supranational organizations. The First Pillar is the European Community (EC) which is officially made up of the three existing economic communities, but most importantly establishes citizenship to the EC and the subject of the (EU)ropean citizen. The Second Pillar is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which unites the discrete policies of the member state into one common policy. And the Third Pillar is the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), later changed in 1997 to be the Police and Judicial cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). The CFSP and JHA/PJCC represent deeper political infiltrations into member state sovereignty.

establishes that membership in the EU would be open-ended, stating that: "Any European state may apply to become a member of the Union" (European Commission 1992, cited in Granell 1995, 2). Together with the creation of the category of (EU)ropean citizen, the open-endedness of membership in Maastricht constructed yet another articulation of the becoming (EU)rope as a universalist community.

At the same time, such actions were secondary to the pursuit of economic and political integration within the TEU, namely the tasks of introducing a (EU)ropean-wide citizenship, the single EU-wide currency, a common foreign and security policy, and the harmonizing of rights and courts among member states (Rifkin 2004). Moreover, satisfying the need for legitimization and justification, Culture was formalized as a legal competency or jurisdiction, right alongside the new social competencies of education and youth initiatives in the TEU (Shore 2000). These legal competencies were not an unchecked concession for the EU to create cultural policy on its own, but provided a legitimating opportunity to introduce policy and act alongside the contributions of member states. In certain circumstances, this meant that the EU could actually *prohibit* member states from acting alone in "critical issue-areas," such as Culture (Rifkin 2004). Legal competencies give the EU a powerful role in any of the areas deemed "critical."

As always, the EU role remained contested by legitimacy issues, which were particularly sensitive to the concerns of member state sovereignty. This tension was then codified in the "checks and balances" system of the TEU, and

exemplified by the EU's Subsidiarity and Proportionality principles. These two principles inform many EU legislation and initiatives as they offer grounds for balancing authority across supranational and national scales. Both of these are outlined in Article 5 of TEU. The Subsidiarity Principle says that the EU should not act on its own unless it is agreed that it will be more effective than the actions of others at the national, regional or local levels (European Commission n.d.). In addition, in that same article, the Proportionality Principle states that when EU intervention is necessary, the EU must opt for an approach that allows for the most freedom of member states and non-member actors in which to act (European Commission n.d.).

Thus, in the critical issue-areas, like cultural policy, there is always this broader institutional politics at work. These institutional tensions reveal the conflicts over the spaces of jurisdiction and sovereignty between member states and (EU)ropean institutions. Within all this governance intricacy is the reality of the centralization of authority from the member states to the EU. This is, in turn, countered by the attempts to maintain authority at the national level to counterbalance the tendencies toward centralization at the EU level. But, such a balancing-act is also a response to the opportunities for further de-centralization of authority away from the national level by the emergence of new sub-national actors, like cities and regions, within the EU's new decision-making structures (Barnett 2001).

The introduction of culture as a legal competency did not escape this institutional quandary. In Article 128 of the TEU, updated as Article 151 in the

amendment of TEU in 1997, the Culture Articles provided legal justification for the EU's intervention into the "cultural field" (Shore 2000, 53). The Articles are a telling example of the cultural, geopolitical and institutional politics that have influenced culture's becoming as a policy instrument. Since the beginning, there was a cautious, pragmatic balance between those who wanted to open up culture for EU action, like Eurocrats and non-state actors, and then those who wanted to restrict it, like many member state governments (Forrest 1994). Cautious of the sensibilities of the member states, Articles 128/151 maintained purposeful cultural ambivalence between the acknowledgement of difference and the persistence of commonality, as exemplified in the motto, *unity in diversity*. Through its emphasis on balance, most prominently articulated between diversity and unity, the Articles effectively introduced a new ordering of cultural space and institutional agency.

As a result of such institutionally and spatially contradictory actions, new decision-making structures were introduced and encouraged through the TEU. These new structures favored the formation and operation of network relationships in decision-making and execution of EU policy initiatives. Despite the emphasis on the "horizontal approach" of networks in the Articles (European Commission 2000b, 9), the reality was that certain Western European actors often remained privileged.

To illustrate the complexity that exists between actors and interests that continues to plague the EU, is the role of the Committee of the Regions (CoR). Also established in 1992, the CoR was an answer to the increasing call for the

representation of the interests of non-state actors in the EU, or those actors at local and regional scales like cities and regional associations. Thus, the CoR offers a prescient example of the opening up of (EU)ropean decision-making, so that cities and regions that were conventionally spoken for by member states now have their own supranational body to represent them. The CoR is a EU consultative body that works with and lobbies the European Commission directly on the behalf of (EU)ropean cities and regions. It was written into Maastricht to be a requisite actor in all decisions that relate to (EU)ropean-wide actions (Barnett 2001). The CoR works with non-governmental European associations, like Eurocities and the Association of European Regions, and publishes its Opinions on proposed European actions, including culture, social and territorial cohesion, enlargement and integration policy (CoR 2008). Because of the privileged access of member states in every aspect of (EU)ropean-level decision-making there is an added impetus to the CoR's actions in shaping networks that, for the most part, circumvent the national level (Barnett 2001). This means that cities and regions in (EU)rope are no longer completely reliant on the governance structures of member states. And, this means that it cannot be assumed that there is a clear division over sovereignty or authority within the EU between supranational and national. Such tensions are increasingly complicated by other scales, actors and interests.

This is certainly the case in the Culture Articles in the TEU. Behind their formation was the conventional framing of cultural diversity as a territorially-bounded phenomenon (Barnett 2001). An expected result of this framing was to

then continue to privilege the role of bounded, national space in defining cultural diversity. However, because of the role of the CoR in introducing other actors into decision-making, the result has been to challenge this conventional framing and to formulate a (EU)ropean culture that is defined by many overlapping scales of cultural diversity. This re-framing of culture helped to set up a discursive structure for the impending enlargement by normalizing the overall complexity of diversity in the becoming (EU)rope. But, it also made it much more difficult to find a complementary discursive structure that could at the same time support any idea of (EU)ropean cultural unity. Thus, because of this quandary over culture, the efforts at preparing for the Eastern enlargement were largely limited to governance considerations.

Preparing for the Eastern Horizon: New Considerations for Enlargement

The institutional politics that emerged in the formation of cultural policy in the TEU, and in the structural transformations of the EU itself, were also evident in the interim 1995 enlargement negotiations. The first enlargement of the new European Union (referring to its new structures and name) was the admission of Austria, Finland and Sweden. The negotiation process was altered to comply with the new governance structures and requirements that were set in place by Maastricht, namely the acceptance of the entire Common Market and new decision-making practices.[6] Each of the 1995 candidate countries went

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[6] New applicants as of 1995 must accept the following entirely: a) free movement; b) the common rules of economic harmonization, including rules and standards of free competition, monopolies, and taxation; c) other common

through a long process of application, negotiation, referendum, and accession. In the end, the 1995 enlargement process showed the need for a parallel agenda that was mindful of the effect on existing institutional structures (Granell 1995). The establishment of specific admission criteria[7] was intended to aid quicker integration and greater cohesion of future members.

The 1995 enlargement also had strong outward discursive framings. Maintaining the geopolitical assumptions of previous enlargements, these admissions were viewed as the consistent expansion toward the natural boundaries of (EU)rope. In his summary of the negotiations written for the *Journal of Common Market Studies*, a European Commission publication, Granell (1995) states that, "The Nordic and Alpine members will tilt the EU's centre of gravity towards the north and with it the EU will reach the Artic Circle and the Russian border" (134). This fourth enlargement was said to be warranted for its geopolitical links to Eastern Europe and Russia, the extension of the EU's northern reach into the Artic and the Baltic Sea, and for its "contributing to a post-Cold War geopolitical dimension for the EU" (Granell 1995, 137). Moreover, the 1995 enlargement was also rationalized for its contribution to "cultural stability,"

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policies, including the Common Agricultural Policy, Customs Union, Development and Regional Policy; d) the Economic and Monetary Union, as the acceptance of the Euro and related monetary policies; and, e) the Three Pillars of Maastricht which structure Community cooperation as (EU)ropean citizenship, common foreign/security policy, and common judicial policy (Granell 1995).

[7] The criteria were based on political and economic touchstones, such as: political stability relating to democracy, rule of law, and human rights; and economic stability relating to a functioning market economy and capacity for competition (Agnew 2001).

as it was argued that "Northern Protestant uprightness will serve as a useful counterbalance to the more passionate political traditions of the Mediterranean countries" (Granell 1995, 134). Cultural and geopolitical considerations, yet again, provided discursive justification for enlargement.

The 1995 enlargement was also influential for the further development of cultural actions and concerns over institutional structure as they were set into the TEU. The persistence of institutional politics, and the ensuing discursive ambiguity of the definition and implementation of culture evident in Maastricht, became increasingly presented among Eurocrats as a "problematic element." From this perspective, Eurocrats recognized that culture had the potential to destabilize other policy areas that were more firmly dedicated to political and economic "harmonization" and "standardization" (Barnett 2001). Seen to be at competition with the ultimate needs of economic integration, the increasing cultural diversity of enlargement and the increasing complexity of institutional structures that came with expansion, have made reconciliation between economic and cultural pursuits in the EU a foremost imperative.

Current Context: Culture Programmes and 2004/2007 Eastern Enlargement

The incremental development of cultural policy in the EU has proceeded in stride with the major integration and enlargement activities of its recent years. Enlargements have been the biggest challenges for the EU, as they often incite economic, political, social, and cultural grievances between member states. They are also the most upsetting for established discursive structures that have been aimed to mitigate such grievances. Integration and enlargement, and the

uncertainty of "cohesion" that they bring, have fed the development of direct cultural actions and new policy avenues. As the largest and most demanding endeavor yet, the current context of the 2004/2007 enlargement nearly doubles the EU from 15 to 27 member states. Not surprisingly, while this enlargement was in its planning and preparation stages in early 2000, the EU introduced yet another updated cultural action, the framework Culture Programme.

There is no doubt that cultural policy in the EU has come a long way from its ad hoc, naïve applications of the 1980s. The EU's framework Culture Programme that was introduced in 2000, and then revised and reintroduced in 2007, provides a more detailed and sophisticated application of culture. Overall, these framework Culture Programmes reveal that they are now much more about the "multiplication of culture's utility" across many EU policy avenues (Bennett 1995). As a result, culture is found to apply to most (EU)ropean activities, especially major economic, political and social pursuits. In some ways, then, culture is a stand-in for (EU)rope--it is considered an expected reality of what is (EU)ropean, perhaps masking the much more complicated political and economic realities of unification.

It is within this current context, of the introduction of the EU's most recent cultural strategy as a response to its most difficult charge for further integration, that this thesis and its case study are situated. As the latest milestone of EU widening and deepening, there is no coincidence of timing between the introduction and amendment of the framework Culture Programmes and the impending Eastern enlargement. The ECOC policy, being an integral part of the

framework Culture Programmes, is thus perfectly situated for the study of the becoming (EU)rope. Before moving into a discussion of the ECOC, it is important to provide a background description of the framework Culture Programmes of which the ECOC is a part. It is also important to introduce some of the specific concerns and uncertainties that the 2004/2007 enlargements bring to the EU. Only after the current context of cultural action and enlargement has been explained can the ECOC be properly introduced.

Current Cultural Action and The Framework Culture Programmes

Following the legal validation for cultural action in the TEU, the "Culture 2000 Programme (2000-2006)" was introduced as the "first framework programme in support of culture" (European Commission 2000a, *summary* paragraph 1). The policy had clear cultural objectives, conditions for participation and ample budgetary support of €236.5 million. These attributes are all indicators of a truly political action or policy (Banús 2002). However, the conscious limiting of the EU's role as coordinator, integrator and supporter in the Programmes has been highlighted by those who doubt the policy's ultimate effectiveness (Forrest 1994; Littoz-Monnet 2003). Regardless, upon its expiration in 2006, the 2000 Culture Programme was deemed a success and worthy of renewal. As a result, its budget was increased to €400 million and it was revised to become a "more complete, more open and more user-friendly" policy (European Commission 2007c, paragraph 1). Reintroduced and slightly renamed, the Culture Programme (2007-2013) provides a larger role for culture

among disparate EU policy avenues. Moreover, within the framework it provided a larger role for the ECOC among all specific cultural actions.

The overall rhetorical force behind both incarnations of the program was: 1) to protect the "common cultural heritage" of (EU)rope; 2) to promote a better knowledge and awareness of the diversity of cultures among (EU)ropean peoples; and, 3) to instill the recognition of diversity as the richness of the European Cultural Area (Sassatelli 2008). The 2000 Programme's idea of culture was developed through "in-depth consultations" between (EU)ropean, international, and member state institutions. This is evident in its laconic compromise-rhetoric, where "the concept of culture [. . .] covers popular culture, mass-produced culture and everyday culture" (European Commission 2000a, *summary* paragraph 1). Such a definition is absurdly redundant and calculatedly ambiguous, reflecting the definitional impasse between the competing interests of Eurocrats, member states, and other key non-governmental actors involved. All of this ambiguity is meant to leave room for the changing interpretation and implementation of cultural action in the EU (Sassatelli 2002). This definition of culture seems to allow for as much openness of interpretation for the participants as possible, of member states, the EU or other non-governmental players.

After its revision, the Culture Programme (2007-2013) offered *no* attempt at all to define culture. Giving up on the politics behind creating definitions, this Programme offered a more action-oriented discourse: "the general objective [. . . is] to enhance the cultural area common to Europeans with a view to encouraging the emergence of European citizenship" (European Commission 2007c, *summary*

paragraph 1). This idea of "European citizenship," intentionally *not* European identity, is advanced in the Programme through three central aims: 1) the transnational mobility of cultural sector professionals; 2) the circulation of 'artistic and cultural products beyond national borders'; and, 3) the promotion of intercultural dialogue (European Commission 2007c, *summary* paragraph 2 list). Evident in the action-oriented discourse behind these objectives are the political struggles of the EU.

These new Programme objectives contain no definitions of culture or any mention of identity. This is part of the EU's resignation to insurmountable difference that has come with the 2004/2007 enlargement. It is also the latest tactic to negotiate the institutional politics between EU and member states and their struggles over sovereignty. Evident in this new discursive rhetoric is a postmodern geopolitical framing (Tuathail 2000) that transgresses the normative state-centric, bounded notions of culture activities and actors in the EU. The uses of certain spatial keywords like "transnational" and "beyond national borders" in the Programme remain sensitive to the flows that the EU has created in its new structure. While, at the same time, the language gives weight to the culturally hegemonic position of member states, reifying in practice Europe as a space of nations: so its language of *intercultural dialogue*, is most obviously understood as an inter-*national* dialogue.

An interesting example of the "multiplication of culture's utility" (Bennett 1995) is also evident in the Cultural Programmes. The framework of the Programmes has attempted reconciliation between the competing interests of

economy and culture in the EU. This is particularly evident in the European Cultural Area metaphor, which addresses both domains as interrelated in (EU)rope: first, as an economic space, that is an area for the promotion of European culture *industries,* which combine into a cultural economy; and second, as a cultural space, in which, "cultural goods [as products of a cultural economy] are protected and promoted [and then] legitimated because they are bearers of cultural identity" (Sassatelli 2008, 232). This (EU)ropean cultural economy of cultural sector professionals is an industrious sector which generates "artistic and cultural products" (European Commission 2007c, *summary* paragraph 2 list). And, as an intended effect of cultural productions, the cultural economy of (EU)rope also fosters the building of cultural identity. A likely driver of the cultural economy are thus activities generated for tourism and leisure in (EU)rope, which could assist in the acceptance and adherence of cultural diversity discourses and probably help to re-define identity at the same time.

In the Culture Programme's objectives, the program is said to offer a "real European added value" (European Commission 2006b, 2), which at first appears to be just another figurative reference to the economic "value" of culture. But, in light of the Programme's objectives, this "added value" is understood in two contradictory ways. First, as made explicit by the European Commission, the "European *added* value" was justified through the Principle of Subsidiarity. This reasoning acknowledged that, at times, the EU was best suited to act in certain issue-areas, of which culture was a primary example (European Commission 2006b, 2). The Principle of Subsidiarity is yet another stipulation that reflects the

implied cultural sovereignty of member states as the holders of culture, and whose "right" it is to give over access or action in that area. The European *added* value is also another demonstration of the ever-necessary assertion of legitimacy, that (EU)rope is something additional and non-threatening, and thus, something to be accepted. Second, a more symbolic and spatialized reading sees a "*European* added value." In this idea, the emphasis is meant to illustrate the value of *European* additions. This is again specifically in reference to the member states, that the space of (EU)rope exists in addition to those spaces and brings its own values. Some of these values are about cultural diversity and morality, and some others are about cultural economy and prosperity.

Other policy actions relating to a European added value are also applied to the framework Culture Programmes. One example is the creation of a (EU)ropean "knowledge society" (European Commission 2002a). In the knowledge society, the importance of the cultural field as a site for knowledge and economy is linked with the emerging importance of the technological field as a site for culture. By drafting the importance of a knowledge society into institutional discourse, the EU is counting on the importance of technology and mass communications in contemporary life to aid in the reorganizing of identities and spaces through their network structures. Further, the EU has specifically connected that culture is "a fundamental part of the knowledge society" (European Commission 2002a, 1). And from this connection, the "digital, knowledge-based economy" will encourage "added value by exploiting and networking European cultural diversity" (European Commission 2002a, 1).

Recalling the important discursive relationship of power/knowledge, in the knowledge society technology and culture become effective means for supplying subjects with power and agency in negotiating discursive structures.

The creation of a knowledge society is also evident in the Culture Programme's "complementary actions." These actions, which are called complementary because of their intent for cross-fertilization with other EU competencies, aim "to remove certain practical obstacles to cooperation through the development of an Internet tool for exchanging information and good practice" (European Commission 2004, 5). Thus, the fundamental part of the knowledge society is its network character and its application to all EU competencies. In terms of such complementary action in culture, the EU and the member states should,

> promote the networking of cultural information to enable all citizens to access European cultural content by the most advanced technological means, particularly by continuing to encourage the development of the European electronic portal started by the Commission and by linking this portal with the digital cultural content that exists in the Member States. (European Commission 2002a, 1)

Overall, the EU is creating not only a knowledge society through technology and networking, but it is also forging a networked, technologically-articulated notion of (EU)ropean culture. In a similar way that the *unity in diversity* device aims to re-order the *diversity* of national cultures into a *unity* of (EU)ropean culture, the network of the knowledge society is hierarchically ordered with the (EU)ropean web-portal as the host to the many member state web-portals.

The Culture Programme's 2004 revision was also suggestive of the politics of contemporary enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe. In reference to its third objective, the promotion of intercultural dialogue, the European Commission's explanation highlighted the "fundamental role, particularly in integrating new Europeans from a range of cultures" (European Commission 2004, 6). This "integration" of new (EU)ropeans was also to be achieved in the virtual arena, as the technological network of (EU)ropean cultural diversity continued to be linked up into a structure of (EU)ropean culture. The appeal to culture has always been a part of integration, and now it is complemented by a parallel integration into the "*e*-Europe" (European Commission 2002a, 1). This is even more significant in the face of unprecedented enlargement, where the addition of twelve new members and their 100 million residents will become acquainted with new, unconventional ways that frame and integrate the many diversities of the becoming (EU)rope.

The 2004/2007 Eastern Enlargement: Challenges to a Becoming (EU)rope

> The EU used to know where it stood on history--it was best kept simple, and in the past. In the early decades, history was about one big thing: the Second World War, and the grand project of Franco-German reconciliation. From the outset, the EU was partly meant to make war unthinkable inside Europe. But over the years that miracle of continental forgiveness has ossified into something more inflexible, even smug. Just as pioneering Eurocrats toiled to create single European markets in widgets or wheat, their political masters crafted something approaching an approved European history (challenged only in awkward-squad Britain, where the war was a matter of national pride). This history portrayed a smooth moral progression from nationalism and conflict (bad) to the sunny uplands of compromise, dialogue and border-free brotherhood (good) . . . Enlargement is now challenging all this--especially the

> recent expansion to 27 countries, including ten former communist ones . . . (The Economist 2007, 59)

As *The Economist* so aptly points out, the foundations of the EU's "integration project" (Jonsson, Tagil, and Torngvist 2000) are now being problematized by the social, cultural and spatial complexities that have emerged with the enlargement of the union. The latest enlargements are often mentioned together because all of the states were provisionally admitted at the same time, but the two 2007 states required more time to meet the admission requirements. As such, the latest enlargement includes: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004; and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. The increasing social, cultural and spatial complexity of this enlargement has certainly required new strategies for facilitating social, and thus political, cohesion in the EU. Negotiating the admission of twelve new members and the addition of 100 million new citizens seems difficult enough, but the true challenges will be in the integration of these significantly different political and economic cultures. That is why the 2004/2007 enlargement is particularly trying: these new admissions are requiring a redefinition of the established links between the institutional reality of the EU and a becoming (EU)rope.

The concerns of existing members to the integration of the 2004/2007 new members has manifest in three general areas. First, economic integration is viewed as problematic for the potential drags that would be laid on the entire EU economy due to the new members' relative economic "underdevelopment" as

compared to the existing members (Ostergren 2004). During the admission negotiations, it was already clear that these were concerns to be addressed ahead of time and so the mantras of the neo-liberal market economy were adopted as narratives for the (EU)ropean success of the new members (Agnew 2001). This was an explicit recognition of the bane of their socialist histories, and of the poor state of their relatively immature capitalist development schemes of their current economic structures, which were either shaped by policies of "shock therapy" or socialist adaptation (Gowan 2002). The economic difficulties, and their potential costs, have since produced new requirements for admission. Positioned from a mitigating neo-liberal rationale, the minimum levels of required macroeconomic indictors were set at levels found only in the Western states (Agnew 2001; Ostergren 2004). Overall, it was the concerns of existing members combined with the real adjustment difficulties of the new members, which contributed to a change in previous notions of competitiveness and development in the EU. Eventually, the goal of a "single Europe" with relatively similar levels of development was replaced by a increasingly differentiated, divided (EU)rope that is resigned to neo-liberal economics of uneven development and the unforgiving needs of overall EU global competitiveness (Agnew 2001).

Second, are the equally pressing concerns for political integration. These concerns were particularly about the new members' past political experiences and their part in the (EU)ropean future. Because of their political histories of failed socialism and the subsequent revival of romanticized nationalism (Debeljak 2003), the new Central and Eastern European members were feared to be more

"socialist communities," which are characterized by their lacking of some of the basic elements of a democratic, civic society. Further, these new members are still perceived as "etatist," meaning that they are characterized by a strong ethic of state intervention (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002). Such considerations of the new members' capacity for democratic, civic community are mostly relinquished to the criticisms of existing members.

Third, are the tensions that are emerging for the existing governance structures of the EU. There is worry that the admission of these new members will in effect undermine the political stability of bureaucracy and decision-making among existing members and institutions. This is particularly about the incessant federalist predicament of integrating politically and geographically varied members, and in the balancing of their diverse interests as well as in managing their "equality" within governance structures. This is especially palpable in the European Parliament (EP), since the number of seats for each member state is determined by its proportion of the total population in the EU. With the first group of new members in 2004 and the overall increase of total population, nearly every single existing member lost one or more seats in the EP. For many of the existing members, this outcome suggested that with the new members the already delicate balance of decision-making could potentially be upset (Ostergren 2004), and this could further degrade the possibility of forging a united European identity (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002).

Taken all together, these concerns are the partial basis for an increasing trepidation over the cultural gap within (EU)rope, between West and East (Fuchs

and Klingemann 2002). Overall, the gap is one of knowledge and understanding, one that was rooted in Post- WWII and Cold War spatial divisions. Debeljak (2003), speaking about the Western imaginary, refers to the European East as the "*terra incognita* of Europe." The assumptions about this unknown space arise from the differing socialization and experience of opposing societal systems, and the different traditions and historical events that occurred have increased the difficulty of creating a (EU)ropean *demos* or identity (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002). This gap is also quite evident in the differing spatialities that exist between West and East. Western Europe's quintessential experience of territorial organization in the nation-state is actually rather new in the East where "softer, more open borders" persist (Debeljak 2003, 159). Again, this situation is seen as a legacy of the Soviet-era connections that were made between the (EU)ropean outcasts of the East. Whereas Soviet bloc states had previously made connections with their neighbors, those connections have been disrupted as certain Eastern states have been "re-integrated" and others have been left out. This is most obvious between Poland and Ukraine, where long established connections between these states did not necessitate a strong border between them (Debeljak 2003). Thus, the expansion of the EU's frontier to the East has become another source of alarm for existing members. Because of the very real prospects of border difficulties related to illegal immigration, human and drug trafficking, and terrorism existing members find much about which to worry (Ostergren 2004).

The 2004/2007 enlargement admissions have also required the EU to find new identification and cohesion strategies that will continue to instill a sense of

community and belonging despite increasing difficulties and fears. Such strategies are necessary for the continuing need for political legitimacy of the EU and for its ultimate future as a governing body. However, such community-building discourses are often detached from the realities of enlargement. In particular, such discourses make a point to discount the *centrifugal* character of this expansion (Delhey 2007), dismissing the difficulties associated with the increasing physical distance and cultural diversity of members and the resulting deepening democratic deficit (Zielonka 2004). Community-building discourses tend to remain focused on the *centripetal* effects as, "Western Europe is exporting its political institutions and way of life to the Eastern countries and thus turning 'Easterners' into 'Westerners' in the long run" (Delhey 2007, 274). If anything, the community-building discourses of the EU, with their primary focus on culture, are exclusively concerned with this Westernizing or "re-integrative" effect. Regardless, there is a recognition that the optimal conditions for community-building exist with cooperation, coordination and collaboration between members. And, this means that new EU citizens should *not* be framed as competitors (Delhey 2007) or foreigners (Debeljak 2003). Moreover, the enlarged EU will require more "cross-border solidarity [and innovative] democratic deliberation and participation," and an overall re-thinking of "its ways of handling social and cultural cohesion" (Zielonka 2004, 34).

The EU is certainly working in multiple ways to combat such conceptions of Central and Eastern European citizens within (EU)rope, and certainly in the directions for which Zielonka (2004) calls. These efforts have been in the usual,

ambivalent avenues of breaking down borders, both between member states and within the imaginations of its citizens. Returning to the central assertion of this chapter, it is the EU culture competency that specifically been called upon to take on this duty. Through the Culture Programme's emphasis on "added values" and the knowledge society, the becoming (EU)rope is certainly going to be influenced by networked relationships that also depend on values of cultural cooperation, collaboration and understanding. By examining the Culture Programme's most important initiative, the ECOC, these values can be further interpreted. But first, a brief history of the ECOC policy, of its inception and perceptions, is necessary.

The European Capital of Culture: Cultural Conceptions and Applications

The first fifty years of the EU have been quite busy. The Union has built up its governance structures, political symbols and civil society. As an intergovernmental and supranational institution it has pushed the integration threshold of its members and the membership threshold of integration. These activities have needed to be constantly responsive to all kinds of pressures. Outwardly, these pressures have come from globalization and legitimation, and inwardly they have come with enlargement and integration. An appeal to the ideas of culture, in mitigating and responding to such pressures is what informs the overall framework Culture Programmes. In the vanguard of these developments, of (EU)ropeanization and of cultural action, is the European Capital of Culture policy.

History of the European Capital of Culture

Introduced in 1985 in Athens, after the accession of Greece in 1981 and upon the impetus of the Greek Minister of Culture, Melina Mercouri's 1983 proclamation: "It is time for our [referring to member state Culture Ministers] to be heard as loud as that of the technocrats. Culture, art and creativity are not less important than technology, commerce and the economy" (cited in Sassatelli 2008, 234). Following her request, Mercouri organized an informal gathering in Athens of the other member states' Culture Ministers where the idea for a "capital of culture" award was formulated. Both the meeting and its creation, being pre-Maastricht, were celebrated for their European level cultural action (Sassatelli 2008). This meeting was the catalyst for the eventual institutionalization of culture as a competency, and as the legitimate capacity to act in the framework Culture Programmes.

As illustrated in Athens, cultural and geopolitical considerations have always been behind the ECOC event. Evident in Mercouri's statement introducing the nascent ECOC, is a pre-Maastricht, state-centric vision. It posits the institutional separation between state bureaucrats, like herself, and their (EU)ropean equivalent, Eurocrats. Her act of organizing Culture Ministers was based on the assumption of state responsibility over cultural action, even as this action would eventually provide the opportunity for the EU to assume some of that responsibility as well. Mercouri's statement also reflects the intellectual tension that revolved around the concepts of culture and economy in the earlier incarnations of the Community. This is especially present in the 1980s when

economic integration was the only formal integration. That meant that any appeals to culture, which were squarely understood as being in the domain of nation-states, had to have been justified in terms of their economic necessity.

ECOC: Cultural Map of Europe

Through 2008, there have been thirty-seven capitals of culture, with nine future capitals already announced, and many more planned. Each of these cities create a map of cultural (EU)rope (Sassatelli 2008). Taken together, these maps combine into an overall atlas of (EU)ropean culture (Sassatelli 2008). The ECOC also provides a symbolic route for a becoming (EU)ropean culture, made up of the culture capital(s) in each year (Sassatelli 2008). The first sets of ECOCs were individual cities that were designated in each year following Athens in 1985. The first group of capitals was the historically-situated centers of European "high" culture: the first five being Athens, Greece; Florence, Italy; Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Berlin, Germany; and Paris, France (Griffiths 2006; Sassatelli 2008). A second group was initiated with Glasgow, Scotland in 1990, and changed the idea of culture underlying the policy, away from one solely of traditional, high culture. Beginning with Glasgow, culture was extended to declining industrial



FIGURE 1: Map of EU expansions and ECOC Capitals of Culture. This map illustrates the "Cultural Map" of the ECOC, as well as the political map of expansion. The ECOCs identified are from 1985-2013 (European Commission 2007e).

cities that were without any cultural reputation, but were able to fashion culture into a redevelopment strategy. These ECOCs included Antwerp, Belgium, Rotterdam, The Netherlands and Lille, France (Griffiths 2006; Sassatelli 2008).

What is most interesting about the changing definition of culture in the ECOC are the relatively explicit political objectives that have been linked to some of the earliest ECOC selections. As mentioned in the context of developing cultural policy, the ECOC has also privileged the greater needs of (EU)rope and has been timed with many of the EU's integration and enlargement projects. In particular, the choice of Berlin, Germany in 1988 was charged as a "reclaiming of the Berlin then still divided" (Sassatelli 2008, 236). Also, the enlargement-specific selections were identified as the "rites of passage" that came along with membership, as in Madrid, Spain in 1992 and Stockholm, Sweden in 1998 (Sassatelli 2008, 236).

Since 2000, the map of cultural (EU)rope has been a more contextualized and symbolic network for (EU)ropean culture. Instead of a culture map, the ECOC is increasingly networked, where each year two or more ECOC nodes have been named. This is especially evident for the nine cities chosen in 2000, a network of millennial (EU)rope was created with a purposeful mind to the various spatialities and divisions that existed in the EU. The 2000 ECOC event saw "three from the South (Avignon, Bologna, Santiago de Compostela), three from the Centre (Brussels, Prague, Krakow), and three from the North (Bergen, Helsinki, Reykjavik)" (Sassatelli 2008, 237), to create separate, yet parallel networks of culture in one year. This shift in the spatial arrangement of the

ECOC marks an important change in the purpose behind the policy. As in material networks, the importance lay in the relationships that define the network. From 2000, the partnering or networking of various ECOCs provides an excellent opportunity to investigate the rationale behind each year's network relationships.

ECOC: A Strategic Device

Overall, the policy has been the most established and high profile EU cultural initiative (Gold and Gold 2005). The ECOC has exhibited itself as a venue for exchange, debate and reflection in each city, with the hopes that designation as an ECOC will attract more (EU)ropean attention and events (Sassatelli 2008). As the crown jewel of both Culture Programmes, the ECOC is representative of the institutional and cultural politics that were behind the overall development of cultural policy. Fundamentally, the ECOC adheres to the ambivalent cultural discourse of *unity in diversity*, and also has required criteria for a *European Dimension* (European Commission 2008d). The 1999 revision of the ECOC revealed the Commission's bottom line of the policy: "The Commission may also make any proposals for revision of this Decision which it judges necessary for the smooth operation of this action and, in particular, with a view to the future enlargement of the Union" (European Commission 1999a, 3). Behind the symbolism and functionalism of the ECOC is the EU's own propaganda event.

Through its use of the *European Dimension* and its calling out of cities as the featured actor in the policy, the EU is making a strong statement for a resulting (EU)ropean space. The policy gives the "opportunity", itself inciting

notions of power, to cities to "present a cultural programme lasting around a year, highlighting the richness diversity and shared characteristics of Europe's cultures" (European Commission 2007f, paragraph 1). In this way, the city becomes a direct link to (EU)ropean citizens, one that reaches past the structures of the member states, and provides an uninterrupted local space in which to instill the values of the *European Dimension.* This process is also reflected in the 2006 revision of the ECOC policy, which has changed the selection process to re-site competition, from between cities in different member states to between cities within pre-designated member states (European Commission 2007c). This is seen as a strengthening of the member states' role in constructing the *European Dimension* by giving them the power to select the cities to be designated. Yet, at the same time that the member state becomes the site for competition, it nullifies competition between cities at the (EU)ropean scale. This amounts to a strengthening of the symbolic unity that is supposed to structure the interactions of the *European Dimension.* Also, the revision of the selection process serves to strengthen the EU's opportunity for inculcating political objectives into the policy. Since it is only the EU that is able to choose which member states host the ECOC in a year, the symbolic power of partnering member states is certainly in service at the (EU)ropean level.

The ECOC's revision of the selection process reflects an explicit strategy for negotiating its own enlargement. The 1999 amendment to the policy bolsters the symbolic power of the policy by having two ECOC's a year, and as mentioned, only allowing the EU to designate the pairing of member states from

which the individual ECOC's will be chosen (European Commission 1999a). Starting in 2007, pairings were intended to correspond with the current enlargement because member state hosts were explicitly selected "from the EU-15 and the other from one of the 'new' Member States" (European Commission 2007f, paragraph 5). Since these "new" member states are from the 2004/2007 enlargement, these new selection procedures are evidence of the enduring cultural binary in (EU)rope, between old and new, West and the rest.

In particular, the culture gap between West and East in the EU is also being addressed within the ECOC policy, through the discursive device of *intercultural dialogue*. This idea still represents the consistent effort to balance between the recognition of cultural diversity and a forging of a sense of unity by identifying the cultural commonalities in this diversity:

> The event offers an opportunity to strengthen cooperation in the field of culture and promote lasting dialogue at European level. It must underline the common features and the diversity of European cultures. This diversity also refers to the cultural input from all the resident populations of migrants or new arrivals from European countries and beyond. One of the key objectives of the event is to foster the knowledge which European citizens may have of one another and at the same time to create a feeling of belonging to the same community. In this respect, the overall vision of the event must be European, and the programme must have an appeal at European level. (European Commission 2008f, paragraph 4, point 4)

The ideas reflected in this statement are indeed recycled, but have also been infused with contemporary relevance. The reference to "new arrivals from European countries and beyond" recognizes the substantial transmigration taking place in and across the EU. The influx of migrants into the urban areas of

Western Europe has increased tensions between nationals and migrants. In particular, inter-(EU)ropean migration has been taking place since the accession of the 2004 Central and Eastern European members (especially salient in the UK, e.g. BBC 2006). But, for the most prosperous states of Western (EU)rope, there has also been an increasing presence of "Third Country" nationals, as the EU calls them (European Commission 2007g). Whether from Central and Eastern Europe or from other countries, the ECOC being an urban, cultural initiative is designed to help mitigate the political tensions that arise with such enlargement episodes.

e-ECOC: Websites and the Flows of Culture

All in all, the ECOC policy is representative of the EU's efforts to build the *European Dimension* (Shore 2000). The ECOC policy has also focused on the knowledge society requirement of the Culture Programme, and has created an *e*-ECOC component accordingly. Through the *e*-ECOC, the hyperlink network is designed to "encourage the reception of citizens of the European Union and reach as wide an audience as possible by employing a multimedia, multilingual approach" (European Commission 2006a, paragraph 4, point 4). As an implicit requirement of the policy, each ECOC creates its own website to inform, invite and interact with its audience, participants and interested parties. One of the first ECOCs to have a website was the 2003 ECOC Graz in Austria (Graz 2008), and since then every city has had its own *e*-component.

Through these websites, each ECOC outlines and chronicles their entire year's program, its themes and goals as they were established in the application phase, as well as the event calendar of activities that makes up the program's on

the ground, everyday implementation. While the EU's *Europa* websites are primarily informative and textual, the links and representations on the individual ECOC websites are more performative. Each ECOC performs its own accepted proposal through the in-practice formation of its hyperlink network and the in-place presentation of each day's event. All together, the ECOC's intend to enact the capital of culture ideal as they outlined in their application proposals and in so doing they enact certain discourses of culture, urbanity, and (EU)rope, among others. They also link up to one another, a requirement of the *European Dimension* of the policy and of the knowledge society, effectively performing the network, of (EU)ropean culture or of 2007 *e*-ECOC policy.

The ECOC websites are where the politics of the ECOC policy, of EU cultural action, and of (EU)ropeanization will be examined. It is already established that the ECOC's are *becoming* European (Sassatelli 2008), particularly by reproducing particular discourses that are built into the ECOC policy (Aiello and Thurlow 2006). Even as the individual cities seem to conform to key hegemonic discourses in their institutionalized programs, there are still political choices that are made in the way that they frame their particular position and situation, as well as that of their partner city. However, in consideration of the significance of EU-led discourses in shaping the ECOC's policy objectives and technological expressions, the next chapter investigates some of the devices that have become part of the EU's hegemonic discursive structure of (EU)ropean culture. The two following analysis chapters thus reflect the theoretical and methodological framework of this paper, as a top-down discursive approach

followed by a bottom-up discursive approach, both applied to the 2007 hyperlink/policy network.

CHAPTER 4

ECOC POLICY NETWORK: DATA AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

The ECOC, as a specific cultural policy, was initially formed by the EU with purposeful intent to build and disseminate (EU)ropean unity. However, because of the reality of institutional tensions and the requisite balancing act that is built in to most EU legislative and decision-making activities, the ECOC often exhibits contradictory and non-specific hegemonic discourses. Furthermore, such discourses have also followed the contentious development of cultural policy into a formal competency, and have subsequently shaped the evolution of the ECOC from its inception to its 2007 incarnation. While the ECOC was periodically revised along with the Culture Programmes, the hegemonic discourses were also revised and updated according to the current context of EU legitimation needs, whether they stem from integration or enlargement activities.

In this chapter, the ECOC is investigated specifically as an EU-designed policy. First, a description of the ECOC policy network structure is introduced. This will provide a description of the top-down policy network formation and the resulting structure of the hyperlink network that the EU has formulated. Second, the discursive structure of the policy network is interrogated. This discursive structure is investigated in the current context of the revision and updating of the

Culture Programme that proceeded with EU enlargement actions and planning for deeper integration in the near future. To begin this top-down investigation of the ECOC hyperlink/policy network, this analysis begins with the EU's *e*-component, *Europa* (Figure 2). The web address, www.europa.eu, provides the entry point for the entire EU's *e*-governance structure. From this initial webpage, the massive structure of an *e*-(EU)rope unfolds and includes descriptions of its institutional functions, governance legitimacy, symbolic explanations, and much more.

The ECOC Social/Policy/Hyperlink Network

As a social/hyperlink network within the Internet at large, and *Europa* more directly, the significant structure of the ECOC *e*-policy network is: 1) a triumvirate of actor/nodes, the EU and two ECOCs, each with their own individual hyperlink network of other actors; 2) defined by its connections of ECOC policy affairs, like of application, designation and implementation; and, 3) a discursive structure, where the flows of ECOC policy discourse are circulated through its connections (Figure 3). In the ECOC *e*-policy network, each actor/node has its own website, which represent their respective actors, since to some degree, either directly or indirectly, they are a product of those actors' inputs. It is from these websites, as individual hyperlink networks, that the actor/nodes narrate or perform their own power/knowledge.



FIGURE 2: *Europa* home portal. The entry point for the EU's internet/hyperlink network, *Europa*. The resulting *e*-(EU)rope is incredibly varied and complex, as indicated by the many subsequent language versions of the *e*-(EU)rope governance network (European Commission 2009).



FIGURE 3: Diagram of the policy/hyperlink network of the 2007 ECOC. This highly simplified network diagram shows the structuring relationships and hyperlinks that exist between the nodes of the 2007 *e*-ECOC.

Part of the agency of the ECOC websites is in structuring social connections, and thus *e*-experience, through its web-building blocks of written text, audio, images, videos, and more importantly, of hyperlinks. The websites, themselves, represent nodes where routine and symbolic messages and queries are funneled and forwarded through paths of hyperlinks (Park 2003). It is important to point out again that these websites were created by social actors, with their own input and perspective for the resulting hyperlink structure and *e*-experience. The involvement of these situated social actors means that the process of website creation is also a political act. Discourses operates through the hyperlinks of the website and influence the network participants', or web-viewers', experience or perception of the website. Further, other websites in the network are purposefully linked by their hyperlinks, and the nature and arrangement of these network links are exhibitive of the politics of actors in the network. This is especially true for the ECOC *e*-policy network, where each website is hyperlinked to one another and the representation and position of these websites in the structure of hyperlinks provides for discursive reflection.

Individual ECOC Policy Network Nodes

The actors that make up the nodes of the ECOC policy network are the EU, represented through the Commission's webpage *Europa* (Figure 2), and the two ECOCs, Luxembourg and Sibiu, each with their own websites. The structure of this *e*-policy network (as illustrated in Figure 3) is an imposed and unavoidable bounding of the limits of the greater social/ hyperlink network that is the ECOC. Due to the vast nature of the Internet, of Internet and hyperlink networks in

general, it is absolutely necessary to set limits to the nodes and hyperlinks that qualify the network of interest. Otherwise, following hyperlinks could continue on and on infinitely. For the ECOC network, the resulting bounded network remains true to the nature of its purpose and relationships, as interpreted in this research, as well as in its material, "real world" functions.

The *Europa* hyperlink network is vast and complex, defined by its many links. Its primary purpose is to introduce and explain EU decisions and policies to its citizens and prominent actors. This is evident in the dense network of links that the *Europa* site is made up of and embedded within, each one representing a certain institutional capacity. One of the hyperlink networks within *Europa* is the "European Cultural Portal" (Figure 4). This specific network is defined by the cultural competency of the EU (see chapter 2). The main purpose of the European Culture Portal is to introduce and explain the competency's Cultural Agenda and its related initiatives. In setting out the EU's legislative agenda, the European Culture Portal becomes a legitimating network because it is directed at an intended audience of citizens and other vested actors. Each explanation gets its own link, and these links are further fleshed out by subsequent links to official documents or additional summaries or descriptions. Many of the Cultural Activity links offer further links to other organizations and institutions (as nodal/actors in other hyperlink networks) that are also concerned with culture, or the specific initiative or activity.

One such hyperlink embedded within *Europa*, in the European Cultural Portal leads to the Culture 2000 Programme or "Culture Website" (Figure 5),

which is a specific EU culture initiative. The Culture 2000 Programme as an EU initiative will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, although it is useful to also discuss its hyperlink network character briefly here. The Culture 2000 Programme hyperlink network includes similar legitimating information as the preceding European Culture Portal, particularly official legislation and initiative explanations. However, the Culture 2000 Programme hyperlink network is directed at a different audience: that of member states, non-member institutions and organizations. Most of its hyperlink structure is made up of news about and calls for culture-related initiatives or proposals. The Culture Website is a wealth of information for cultural funding, cultural education opportunities, and development of cultural industries. Within this hyperlink network is a particular cultural initiative of interest, the ECOC policy.

Within the Culture Website is the link to the ECOC policy webpage and this is where the EU narrates the objectives of the initiative and infuses them with its hegemonic discourses. The ECOC policy webpage is laid out the same as the Culture Website page and it is even more spartan in its images and links. This is because it is geared specifically toward Candidate Cities and offers general information that is intended to be generated for a universal audience of citizens, but is particularly presented in a way that is more useful for potential urban participants. Within the ECOC policy webpage, a wealth of information is structured by hyperlinks. In this ECOC hyperlink network, there are detailed descriptions of the policy's objectives, process and previous events and participants. These webpages and their hyperlinks, serve to direct web-viewers to



FIGURE 4: European Culture Portal hyperlink network. There are many lists of hyperlinks on the homepage, and the European Culture Portal is itself just one hyperlink in the larger *Europa* hyperlink network. This is an illustration of the density of hyperlink networks in the *e*-EU. In addition, the header images, behind the webpage title European Culture Portal are representations of (EU)ropean culture. Also, the left-top sidebar labeled "Activities," where the activity-driven notions of culture are exhibited. Finally, the left-bottom sidebar labeled "National Cultural sites," where a typical spatial organization of (EU)ropean culture is embodied (European Commission 2007g).



FIGURE 5: Culture Website on the Culture 2000 Programme. The website homepage for the 2007 Culture Programme provides the descriptive and legislative purpose for the *e*-component of EU culture policy. The entire right sidebar box, underneath the title "News this month" lists several links that network to the legislative justifications of the Culture 2007 Programme (European Commission 2007d).

the related legislation of the *Official Journal of the European Union* or to *Europa* summaries of legislation. These important hyperlinks legitimate the greater narratives of Culture as a competency and of the ECOC as a valid cultural initiative. Further, just as with the Culture Website, the literatures within these links are what define the phases of the policy and of the particular roles and responsibilities of each actor in each phase. Overall, the ECOC policy/hyperlink network webpages are intended for the pre-phases of preparation and application of prospective cities.

Among the policy background and informative webpages of the Culture Website, are hyperlinks to the individual ECOC websites. That these cities are even hyperlinked in the webpage embedded within the wider *Europa* network, as the ECOC policy/hyperlink network is indicative of their positions in the process: each city hyperlinked has already prepared, applied, and been designated an official ECOC. In particular, this means that the EU, represented by the European Commission and its proxy, the ECOC Selection Committee, has already judged the individual Candidate City's prepared program and application to be in accordance with the ECOC objectives and criteria that were laid out. Thus, the Culture Website's ECOC policy/hyperlink network reveals the EU's role in the policy process. To begin with, the EU's power is concentrated in the overall creation and modification of the policy as legislation, and also in its *e*-component of the hyperlink network that communicates and disseminates that legislation. To end with, the power of the EU is in its implementation of the policy by selecting

and designating ECOCs, but also in the *e*-component of the hyperlink network that introduces and narrates those ECOCs.

The websites of the individual ECOCs are thus denoting the final phase of the policy/hyperlink network process. Each ECOC's website unveils the program that was formed in the early application phase, and was tailored to correspond with the objectives that were set forth by the EU. Their ultimate designation is also revealing of the relative approval by the EU for the city's proposed program, as it meets the interpretation and imagination of the Eurocrats that judge it. Further, as part of the final phase of the ECOC policy/hyperlink network, the websites and their approved ECOC programs become free to link up with their partnered ECOC in the manner that they chose. In the implementation of their programs, the websites as *e*-components for the real world event are effectively freed from the acquiescent constraints of the initial policy designation process. It is in the hyperlink structure of the ECOC websites that differing imaginations and enactments impart a becoming (EU)rope.

The 2007 ECOC *e*-policy network thus provides an excellent example for the examination and interpretation of the discursive structures of a becoming (EU)rope. By applying the methodological framework outlined for this thesis, the hegemonic discourses of a becoming (EU)rope can be analyzed in context. In particular, the regulatory frameworks (Waitt 2005) that maintain certain discourses as "true" can be sought out, understood, and contested. It is through the relationships that connect the actors/nodes of the 2007 ECOC network that such hegemonic discourses are circulated, institutionalized, negotiated or enacted.

Considering the 2007 ECOC websites as actors/nodes in such a network also provides an opportunity to observe the interplay between discourses, and their manifest narratives, rhetorical devices, texts, performances, and other materializations. Also, in applying such a methodological framework, which sees these actors/nodes as social beings, the political moments in the 2007 ECOC can be explored as the spaces between discursive structures. In other words, how do individual actors navigate the politics that are behind the overarching geographical imaginations of (EU)ropeanization, integration and legitimation activities in a becoming (EU)rope? In short, the 2007 ECOC's contribution to the greater field of discursivity momentarily provides a possible conception for a future, becoming (EU)rope.

A Becoming (EU)rope: The Hegemonic Discursive Structure of Culture

The becoming (EU)rope is a space that is constantly being produced and negotiated. This process of becoming has been constructed by actors and actions that exist at all scales. Following the theoretical framework of critical human geography then means that the politics of becoming must be examined from the top down and the bottom up (c.f., Gibson 2001; Massey 2005). As the object of study for this thesis, the *e*-component of the Culture Programmes provides a perfect example for investigating major actors in the 2007 ECOC: the EU and the individual ECOCs. Considering the EU's overarching and leading role in the Culture Programmes and in (EU)ropeanization processes, analysis begins with the EU hegemonic discursive structure. This analysis is still, however, mindful of the overall dynamism of such a process and will continue to interpret changes as

being related to the same tensions that existed throughout the background narrative of EU culture policy.

In investigating the discursive structure of the ECOC policy from the EU perspective, this discourse analysis aims to do two things. First, to illustrate the main finding outlined in the background chapter: that culture policy, enlargement, and integration are interdependent, and that any changes that have been made to one of these actions has instituted an overall change of each one. In fact, both the European Culture Portal and the Culture Website experienced this change. As the *e*-component of the Culture Programmes, when the policy was renewed and revised, the websites were updated as well. This update took place in 2007, following the adoption of the revised framework Culture Programme in 2004. During the negotiations of the Programmes' renewal and revision was certainly when the cultural discursive structure was also updated.

The second task of the remainder of this chapter is to present a brief analysis of two discursive devices that were changed as a result of the larger policy update. To complete this analysis, two hegemonic discursive devices will be traced from their last contextual incarnation up to their most recent update that has come with current efforts at wider enlargement and deeper integration. Each of these devices is part of the EU's cultural discursive structure. The current cultural discursive structure is made up of two distinct rhetorical narratives directed at: 1) (EU)ropeanization and the creation of a (EU)ropean identity/citizen; and, 2) places, especially sub-national places, with a cultural economy rationale that sees culture as economic development. These devices will

be pulled from the *Europa* hyperlink network in general, but specifically from the European Culture Portal and the Culture Website. Thus, the ultimate goal of this section will be to offer a top-down narrative about the dynamism of EU hegemonic discursive structures in the current context of the 2004/2007 enlargement, as revealed by its constituent devices.

Updating of EU Discursive Devices

The EU is partial to certain discourses that are intended to balance the challenges that arise from their policy of consistently creating *unity in diversity*. Thus, the maxims of cultural diversity that exist within the (EU)ropean space of unity, like the *European Dimension*, the European Cultural Area or the Europe of Flows, are all coded messages that are intended to influence a future in favor of supranational unification over the maintenance of state-centered difference. As the most prominent means for discursive delivery, the EU's culture competency gives legitimacy for legal action in the name of (EU)ropean culture. This has certainly been the case with the development of culture policy in the EU, of which the ECOC is one central example. Since the ECOC is already understood as a symbolic initiative, it was clearly meant to aid in the construction of the becoming (EU)rope and to ultimately influence (EU)ropean identification and citizenship outcomes.

While the overall messages have been fairly constant, the EU's attempts to obscure the contextual and political realities of its discursive devices as they contribute to a becoming (EU)rope have evolved over time. The rethinking of EU strategies concerning cohesion and identity was a necessary response to the

unparalleled increase in diversity of the peoples and the bifurcation of cultural space, into West and East that came with the 2004/2007 enlargement. The EU has increased its conceptual horizon in order to properly react to the needs of (EU)rope's future space. As a result, some of the discursive devices that have been heavily featured in the past have been revised or replaced by ones that reflect the current contextual changes of enlargement. Despite these changes, what is still apparent is the EU's interest in developing the framework Culture Programme's *European Dimension* (European Commission 2007f, *summary* paragraph 6) and the ultimate goals of (EU)ropeanization, as a Europe brought together by the EU. These evolutions of the discursive structure and its specific devices have occurred alongside the major tensions that have risen from enlargement and integration efforts. Especially with such difficult issues of increasing diversity and decreasing state sovereignty, the EU has consistently needed to construct fresh legitimating narratives from which to deliver its discursive devices.

The current context of the 2004/2007 enlargement, and to a lesser degree of other recent events, has seen the steady updating of established EU discursive devises, like *unity in diversity* and the *European Dimension* through the new medium of the (EU)ropean knowledge society. This combination of culture policy and the knowledge society, as an *e*-Europe (European Commission 2002a), means that EU hegemonic discourses can benefit from the rapidity of Internet time/space, and can be easily revised for the changing needs of (EU)ropeanization. Thus, the vast *e*-Europe of hyperlink networks provides

another medium for dissemination and another layer for the circulation of discourses.

The entire Culture Website in the *Europa* hyperlink network was revised in 2008, timed with the earlier, drawn out revision of the entire Culture Programme put in effect in 2007. Through the website's introduction and explanation, the EU is narrating its own vision of the policy, and it relies on discursive rhetoric and/or devices to do so. This is important because the 2007 ECOC event has been caught in between these changes. From 2007 to 2008, the *e*-component of the Culture Programmes was changed and the re-structuring of its hyperlink network was associated with subtly different cultural discourses. By investigating the text and hyperlinks featured in the updated Culture Websites of 2007 and 2008 in connection with changing contexts, the dynamic and political imagination of the EU as it responds to contemporary challenges can be examined. It is now to these analytical findings that this chapter turns, to the discursive "updates" of two major EU devices: *unity in diversity* and *European Dimension.*

From *Unity in Diversity* to *Intercultural Dialogue*: The Openness of Ambiguity

The constant need for legitimacy of the EU has led to new interpretations of some of the old tools in the EU's discursive toolbox. An established favorite, *unity in diversity,* has long been recognized as a purposefully open and ambiguous discursive motto (Shore 2000; Sassatelli 2002, 2008). Its emergence was the result of institutional and cultural politics that appeared with (EU)ropeanization processes and became a discursive force through the reiteration of the normative

antagonism between the EU and the member states over the sensitive areas of sovereignty and identity. As a result, the EU, at every mention of the unity of (EU)ropean culture would also cautiously and purposefully bring up the diversity of cultures in (EU)rope that qualified that culture (Sassatelli 2008). Once again, this paralleled the difficulties experienced by the EU in developing culture policy since the 1980s.

Through these acts of state-centered prudence, *unity in diversity* was increasingly formalized into official discourse and has become the most influential expression of (EU)ropean identity yet (Sassatelli 2008). Behind *unity in diversity* is a set of discursive assumptions about the structure and politics of (EU)ropean culture. As may already be apparent, the reference to unity is a conscious combining of difference. Yet, it is not a process of homogenization. Rather, it is an ethically-based recognition of and satisfaction with the diversity of cultures, which also becomes the recognition of difference as an expression of particularly "European" unity (Sassatelli 2002). Such a narrative is pragmatic and moralizing; it describes unity as a basis for cooperation and as a value to uphold. As such, it turns unity into a cultural feature of (EU)rope (Sassatelli 2002). To be unified is a key aspect of this space's cultural morality. Proper behavior in this context, then, recognizes difference (and diversity) as the strength of unification.

The narrative behind *unity in diversity* is still alive in EU discourse. But now the 2008 Culture Website features an updated, more sophisticated device: *intercultural dialogue*. This discursive device, mentioned profusely within the 2008 Cultural Agenda is also featured as its own year long initiative, "2008

European Year of Intercultural Dialogue" (European Commission 2008e). In the outline for the 2007 Culture Programme, *intercultural dialogue* sits alongside "cultural diversity" in the very first set of objectives (European Commission 2008g). Values of cooperation, understanding, and respect are obligated ethics of the culturally diverse society that is (EU)rope and of the approved cultural relationships characterized by *intercultural dialogue*. The *intercultural dialogue* is a device created to serve the (EU)ropeanization process and to instruct EU citizens to acknowledge and tolerate the overall diversity of which they are a part. This is certainly reflective of the change in strategy that came with the 2004/2007 enlargement, which was directed at the East-West culture gap (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002). In this change, the idea was that *intercultural dialogue* will facilitate, "greater mutual understanding and respect" between the many diverse cultures of (EU)rope (European Commission 2008g, paragraph 1). This is intended to build (EU)ropean citizens, as they would identify with (EU)rope and the pervasiveness of diversity that defines the (EU)ropean cultural and institutional space.

Apart from the politics of cultural diversity, which are addressed in the identity/citizen cultural rhetoric, the Culture Agenda also identifies an economic value behind *intercultural dialogue,* whereby the policy should "ensure that we exploit our cultural diversity to the full" (European Commission 2008a, paragraph 3). This is carried out through a geopolitical schema to "enhance the *cross-border* mobility of artists and workers in the cultural sector [and] dissemination of works of art" (European Commission 2008g, paragraph 5). Although the rhetoric seems

harmless, the discursive movement is evocative of the contemporary geopolitical condition (Tuathail 2000), which encourages boundary-transgressing activities by cultural producers and their products, with the aim of undermining the implied state-centric hegemony over the production of culture. Further, the "cultural sector" implies a cultural economy rhetoric that infers economic development goals, like "[t]he cultural sector stimulates creativity and enhances Europe's economy and global competitiveness" (European Commission 2008a, paragraph 6). In this narrative, the flows of the culture sector will contribute to the overall (EU)ropean market by circulating jobs and capital within the (EU)ropean economy. These messages are largely directed at emerging non-state actors, in particular of urban and regional actors, who would surely buy into a (EU)ropean cultural economy rhetoric for its promises of local economic development, and would, in exchange willfully embody messages of (EU)ropean cultural unity. *Intercultural dialogue* is a discursive device that is bound up with an economically-driven logic, wherein economic flows transcend the boundaries of the state. This discursive device is also intended to foster the movement and re-territorialization of those cultural bodies that participate in the flows of cross-border economic development, which is the underlying hegemonic discourse of *intercultural dialogue.*

In the 2008 update of the Culture Programme and of the ECOC policy, the open and ambiguous use of *unity in diversity* was replaced by the cultural identity/citizen and cultural economy rhetoric of *intercultural dialogue.* Yet, the open ambiguity of *unity in diversity* is still at hand in the ECOC: "The European

capital of culture is a golden opportunity to show off Europe's cultural richness and diversity, and all the ties which link us together as Europeans" (European Commission 2008b, paragraph 3). Thus, the ambivalent balance between celebrating diversity while framing that diversity as a unifying, common trait of all (EU)rope, still informs *intercultural dialogue.*

Emerging from this ambivalence are the places in (EU)rope that most clearly embody this diversity as well as the accompanying cultural economy rhetoric. A resulting (EU)ropean cultural space, as diverse and culturally productive, is then tied together with a common *urban* thread. This thread is situated in thinking beyond the state and alludes to a discursive re-emergence of the urban in (EU)ropean governance structures (LeGalès 2002). The discursive legacy of *unity in diversity* is instructive for the subtle play of discourse that combines ambiguous definitions, like *unity*, with normative assertions of *diversity* as they are enacted through particular state-centric transgressive actions, like cross-border movement or intra-urban identification. *Intercultural dialogue* is merely a reorganization of this basic understanding. It assumes that (EU)rope is a diverse space, where intercultural interaction is prevalent. It also teaches the best-practices that emerge from individual citizens' diversity interactions as well as cross-border interaction of cultural sector actors in performing this dialogue. The next discursive device implies the re-placement of these cultural rhetoric narratives from the territory of the member state to that of (EU)rope.

European Dimension: The EU's "Future" Space

As another veiled effort at legitimacy, the *European Dimension* is an idealized discursive structure that is intended to contribute to the eventual realization of its particular unified version of (EU)ropean cultural and social space. Like *unity in diversity*, the *European Dimension* is not easily captured or defined. In its EU applications, the *European Dimension* is a device that is widely used in the rhetoric of critical issue-areas of (EU)ropean competencies including economic actions like "Jobs and Growth" (European Commission 2008c) and social actions relating to education and culture. In these formal competencies, the *European Dimension* is where (EU)ropean actors, typically bound to the governance structures of member states, coordinate and interact with other similar actors across (EU)rope. Thus, in critical issue-areas like human resources, education, training, research and the cultural economy, participant actors are encouraged to form a *European Dimension*. Despite the potential application of this device, the *European Dimension* is not directly referenced in the 2008 Culture Policy website. By following the hyperlinks deep into the EU network and the European Commission's official proposal for legislation of the original 2000 Culture Programme (European Commission 2007f), the device is found to be used repeatedly in bureaucratic language however. And among Eurocrats, the device literally forms the structural underpinning of the ambivalent logic that exists as a result of (EU)ropean institutional politics.

The effect of institutional politics follows some of the discussion on *unity in diversity* and the ambivalent role of the member state in either loosening or

mediating the complexity and multiplicity of the postmodern, (EU)ropean world. In all of the competencies mentioned previously, of job creation, economic growth, education and culture, there are powerful connotations of state sovereignty. By then locating these competencies explicitly in the *European Dimension*, they are not a threat to member states. Being a part of the *European Dimension* highlights an activity's European *added* value to the member states, which then defuses the potential conflict over sovereignty. This undertone of the *European Dimension* gives the impression of (EU)rope being something outside of the state, and thus, non-threatening to national authority.

The *European Dimension* is effectively the space of *unity in diversity/intercultural dialogue.* In the Culture Programmes, the *European Dimension* is a mediating instance between the global and the local (Lenoble and Dewandre 1992, cited in Sassatelli 2002). It is the space between *unity* and *diversity,* and results from the EU's own geopolitical imagination. It is an oversimplified expression of the complexity of the postmodern world (Sassatelli 2002) and, particularly, of the increasingly complex nature of the "multiple identities" that are part and parcel of the contemporary subject in the postmodern world (Smith 1997; Sassatelli 2002). The discursive device also serves to deny the complexity of the past, of the (EU)rope that was equally "diverse" before the last enlargement and even before unification. The *European Dimension* is thus constructed through the kinds of interactions that constitute shared values of cooperation and exchange in (EU)rope (Sassatelli 2008). The emerging Europe of Flows (Richardson and Jensen 2003) that is fostered through this *Dimension* is

assumed to be managed through trans-national networks, and thus, of relationships of cooperation and exchange between member states.

Two themes emerge from this analysis of *European Dimension*, one quite expected and the other relatively unexpected. First, in accordance with its mediating purpose, the signposting of the *European Dimension* is the reference to a spatial field of action that is both within and outside the territory of member states (European Commission 2004, 2007f). This relates to the etymological interpretation of the choice of the *European Dimension*, and that (EU)rope is certainly permeating the state from all possible fronts and becoming a justifiable aspect of member state being. Second, and more surprisingly, is how these actions taken in the *European Dimension* are then "embodied" as (EU)ropean. Actors that are active in the *European Dimension* are effectively representing a (EU)ropean space through their actions within the *Dimension*. An EU statement acknowledges that "[b]odies working for cultural cooperation [. . .] present a real *European dimension*. In this regard, they must carry out their activities at the European level" (European Commission 2004, 22). In the context of cultural actions, the cultural body, being either a private or public actor embodies (EU)ropean space by networking and performing the *European Dimension*.

Through all of this, the *European Dimension* can be seen as both a value and a space. The device establishes acceptable intercultural relationships in a space defined by its cultural diversity. This is quite similar to *unity in diversity*, as it ultimately creates an idealized vision of the future (EU)rope's interactions and spatialities. But unlike *unity in diversity*, which has been consistently revised

and redeemed in both legislative and lay arenas, why is the *European Dimension* so pervasive in official documents and decisions regarding the ECOC, but completely absent in the Culture Website's descriptions? And, what does this mean for the future space of Europe?

Returning to the neo-liberal division of (EU)rope according to uneven economic development, as the spaces of "core" and "periphery" (Agnew 2001), together with the cultural gap that exists between East and West (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002), these conceptions highlight the fissures of economic and political histories that have come with the integration of the EU's Central and Eastern European members. Thus, the allusion of unity behind the *European Dimension* is not easily translated to the citizenry in the context of the 2004/2007 enlargement. This certainly complicates the construction of a future, united (EU)rope, which was the goal of the *European Dimension* as. Along with the 2004/2007 enlargement came the idea that there is no longer a unity of knowledges, interests, fears, and futures, which is shared among all the citizens of (EU)rope. Increasingly, (EU)rope is seen as containing at least two, different sets of knowledges, interests, etc., being either of West or East. This means that the becoming (EU)rope is bifurcated and complicated by its own expansion. And still, the all-encompassing nature of the *European Dimension*, combined with the spreading of networks in the knowledge society may still offer some possibility toward a more unified becoming (EU)rope.

Discourses of Network in (EU)rope

What is evident behind the changing of discursive devices is a stronger sense of relationships and connections within the becoming (EU)ropean social and cultural space that can be connected to an emerging network discourse. Both *unity in diversity/intercultural dialogue* and *European Dimension* are transformative devices, each one trying to instill and indoctrinate certain values and behaviors that can contribute to an idealized future space of (EU)rope. Not only do the difficulties of the 2004/2007 enlargement require new versions of these devices, but the theory of the structure behind them must also change. The EU has turned to the "network" as a new philosophy and paradigm for many of its functional pursuits. As such, the EU makes explicit reference to their network-style approach to cultural and spatial relationships and activities in (EU)rope.

The *European Dimension* started out as an effort to provide mediation between the global and the local, between the culture of (EU)rope and the culture of member states, regions and localities. Since then, whatever challenges have come up in the current context of enlargement, the *European Dimension* still tries to encompass all of its conflicting spaces while providing "rules" for acting in such a space of plurality and complexity. It does so by calling for a European added value in policy, what is effectively meant to be the *European Dimension.* In this sense, the added value or *Dimension* is the creation of networks that open up new spaces and connections and the establishment of new values and relationships that qualify those openings. Specifically, the decline of *unity* in the face of the 2004/2007 enlargement has also been reflected in the network version

of the *European Dimension*. The question of, "How Many Europes?" (Agnew 2001) becomes irrelevant: they will all become connected through the logic of the network. This logic observes that all actors are individual and autonomous, but that in (EU)ropean space they are all obligated to work together to optimize the entire welfare of the network (Rifkin 2004). Thus, the *European Dimension* as a certain space and philosophy is itself a network device.

As a part of the *European Dimension*, the *unity in diversity* device also suggests the networked-style connections that could be made between specifically cultural actors and their products in (EU)rope. These cultural actors and products comprise the flows between multiple nodes that are no longer exclusively situated within the spaces of the state. In fact, in the perspective of the ECOC policy, the emerging nodes of this "cultural network" in the becoming (EU)rope are not state-centric because they provide opportunity for urban and regional actors to interact directly with the EU. Just like the rise of global networks, the relationships of the emerging (EU)ropean culture are undermining nation-state hegemony. And, like globalization trends, these relationships develop through existing links, like those between cities or regions.

Also evident in the resulting cultural space of the ECOC and in *unity in diversity's* newest incarnation of *intercultural dialogue* is the philosophical side of the network. *Intercultural dialogue* emphasizes negotiation, cooperation and communication all as necessary conditions of a culturally diverse network. Behind *intercultural dialogue* is the moralistic instruction for inter-cultural communication and cooperation, *and* the ideological, civilizational division

between "old" and "new" member states that are currently divided by the durable, conceptual West-East fault line. The cultural diversity rhetoric is the most significant for the overall narrative of (EU)ropeanization to create citizens that embody the best-practices of cultural morality. Further, these best-practices are then framed as economically valuable in the *European Dimension*, and are translated for urban and regional actors as values of a linked up cultural economy.

Conclusions: (EU)rope's Changing Discursive Structure

Overall, the network idea behind the *unity in diversity/intercultural dialogue* and *European Dimension* imagines multiple, cooperative non-hierarchical sets of connections between diverse, equal, autonomous actors. Through these two discursive devices the network offers a redeeming moment for the common Cultural Area of (EU)rope, which as a network would no longer need to be concerned with sensitivity of member states or localities over cultural sovereignty and would already have intrinsic values of cooperation and negotiation to be applied to relationships of cultural diversity, as well as to any tensions that arise from institutional politics and sovereignty issues. This, however, is the expectation behind network discourse, and it will be interesting to see the application of these values and relationships in the performance of cultural policy.

Naturally, these major devices, which support the hegemonic discursive structure of (EU)ropean culture, do not only operate from the top-down. The social world is formed by the pervasiveness and dynamism of discursive meanings as they circulate among they multiple and diverse social actors. Now

that the discursive structure of culture in the EU has been interpreted from the Culture Website, it is now appropriate to reverse the analytical perspective of this thesis. The bottom-up negotiation of the EU hegemonic structure by the individual cities of the 2007 ECOC will now be analyzed.

CHAPTER 5

A BECOMING (EU)ROPE: VIEWS FROM LUXEMBOURG AND SIBIU

Introduction

Due to the process of application and selection in the European Capital of Culture policy (ECOC), the final ECOC product of each city is largely determined early in the application process, when a city produces a proposal to the Selection Committee. During the selection process, the cities are judged for their ability to obsequiously repackage and reiterate the aims and symbols of the policy as they were prepared by the EU. This is partially about the necessity of deciphering the discursive devices of the EU as directional cues. Yet, each city has its own power to interpret the objectives of the policy and through the Proportionality Principle[8] they are able to relate their own power/knowledge as they frame and formulate their policy event. This framing attempts to pin down the ambiguous and ambivalent discursive structure of culture in (EU)rope.

In this chapter, the perspective of Luxembourg and Sibiu, the two 2007 ECOCs selected, will be considered for their interpretations of the becoming (EU)rope: of its culture, its relationships, its identity and thus, of its future. In

[8] As defined in chapter 2, the Proportionality Principle relates to the notion that when the EU is able to act in a policy area that it should always opt for policy structures that allows for the most freedom of member states or other non-member (urban) actors to act within (European Commission n.d.).

particular, each city's website will be the medium from which to analyze these situational interpretations. Part of this analysis is mindful of the significance of the application phase in the way that cities negotiate EU-led discourses on cultures and spaces in planning their event. But, this analysis is also interested in the way that these two cities integrate their own perspectives, knowledges and interests into the narration or enactment of EU discourses. It is thus possible to analyze the becoming (EU)rope through the spaces between each city's interpretations of (EU)ropean culture, as they are nodes in the shifting EU network. In the discontinuities of each ECOC's symbols and rhetoric, the politics behind the discursive constructions of (EU)rope can be further deconstructed. Especially in the EU's current context of Eastern enlargement and deeper integration, this analysis allows for some understanding of the discursive strength and challenges that the EU faces in its project to create (EU)ropean citizens.

Therefore, the overall goal of this chapter is to analyze the main discursive structure of (EU)ropean culture, by disentangling the apparent politics behind it in the performance of the ECOC policy. The chapter is organized into three major sections. First, the chapter will look at the basic definition and uses of (EU)ropean culture. This will proceed in a dialectic that investigates and compares each city's representation of culture as it is held in tension with the discursive structure set out by the EU. Second, the particular cultural politics behind each city's situated interpretation will then be addressed, especially as they grapple with the ambivalent and ambiguous *unity in diversity/intercultural dialogue* and how they can successfully embody the *European Dimension.* Third,

and finally, the chapter moves beyond the cultural politics, to consider the role of the positional geopolitical imagination of each city, and how each perspective allows for a reflection of one city by another, as well as an interpretation of the future space of (EU)rope. Together, the politics in the process of (EU)ropeanization will offer insight into a becoming (EU)rope.

Cultural Politics in the 2007 ECOC Events: Luxembourg and Sibiu

The first assumption of (EU)ropean culture is that it is an activity in which individuals, cities, and states participate. This fits with the EU's conception of culture as is evident in the screenshots of the European Culture Portal and Culture Website (Figure 6 and Figure 7, reproduced from chapter 1) where culture as an activity is categorically listed in the Activities section on the left of the webpage. In the EU's definition, culture is: architecture; visual arts; cinema and audiovisual media; dance; education and training in the arts; books; music; cultural heritage; and theatre. This list becomes a template for a unified (EU)ropean culture. The various member states' diverse renderings of these universal forms are what support the *diversity* idea of *unity in diversity*. These national expressions are also hyperlinked in the network through the National Culture Sites box on the bottom right of the European Culture Portal (Figure 6). The national culture links embody the *unity in diversity* structure as they are displayed on the webpage in a choropleth map of the European region.



FIGURE 6: European Culture Portal hyperlink network. There are many lists of hyperlinks on the homepage, and the European Culture Portal is itself just one hyperlink in the larger *Europa* hyperlink network. This is an illustration of the density of hyperlink networks in the *e*-EU. In addition, the header images, behind the webpage title European Culture Portal are representations of (EU)ropean culture. Also, the left-top sidebar labeled "Activities," where the activity-driven notions of culture are exhibited. Finally, the left-bottom sidebar labeled "National Cultural sites," where a typical spatial organization of (EU)ropean culture is embodied (European Commission 2007g).



FIGURE 7: Culture Website on the Culture 2000 Programme. The website homepage for the 2007 Culture Programme provides the descriptive and legislative purpose for the *e*-component of EU culture policy. The entire right sidebar box, underneath the title "News this month" lists several links that network to the legislative justifications of the Culture 2007 Programme (European Commission 2007d).

Each national space of culture is hyperlinked through the shape of its own national boundaries. Each member state hyperlink is mapped within the overall, unified whole of (EU)rope. This is the hierarchical spatiality that embodies the notion, "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts"--and thus, this is (EU)ropean unified culture.

There is a high culture assumption and (material) attraction-oriented notion of culture that is evident in the European Culture Portal and the Culture Website (Figures 6 and 7). Following from the activity template of unified (EU)ropean culture, it seems to be assumed that (EU)ropean culture is an expression of high culture. Such high cultural products are of the greatest societal value, and speak to the elitist European histories of France, Italy, Britain and Germany in particular. High culture in this (EU)ropean context is partially about historical, but also increasingly contemporary, professional art, music and stage products: paintings and sculptures; orchestral and opera productions; plays and ballets; cinema; and increasingly, modern, contemporary and avant-garde versions of all of these.

On the European Culture Portal homepage there are symbolic hints to this particular reading of (EU)ropean culture. Easily overlooked and possibly purposefully subliminal, there are four colored images that offer a highly symbolic, but also highly cryptic depiction of (EU)ropean culture because none of the four images reveal anything specific about what exactly is shown or where they came from (Figure 8). Each square offers a generic representation of (EU)ropean cultural heritage and activity. Interpreting the actual content of each

of these images is more difficult than understanding the general message that is being conveyed through them: that (EU)ropean culture is classical, musical, and architectural, to say the least.

A second image from the European Culture Portal, which is also a cryptic representation of (EU)ropean culture, is the webpage header (Figure 9). In these images there is clear construction of (EU)ropean culture, which is strongly activity-oriented. The images themselves are relatively devoid of any spatial referent, namely of where they originate. They are assumed to be essential to (EU)rope. These interpretations of (EU)ropean culture are strongly artistic and evocative of high culture activities, including stage performances of dance, instrumental music, and singing. This grounds (EU)ropean culture in a key set of activities, even as these are often performed differently depending on their national and urban contexts.

FIGURE 8: European Culture Portal images of (EU)ropean culture. Relatively generic images meant to convey the cryptic, activity-driven conception of (EU)ropean culture. Also reveals the generally ambiguous delivery of such hegemonic conceptions of (EU)ropean culture (European Commission 2007g).

FIGURE 9: European Culture Portal further images of (EU)ropean culture. Webpage Header reflects more of the non-specific, activity-driven cultural conceptions of (EU)ropean culture (European Commission 2007g).

In the 2007 ECOC policy implementations, culture is narrowed down further into a certain set of high culture activities that are about consumption and symbolic re-production of the *unity in diversity* ideal. In these events, culture is an attraction and it is consumed by residents and visitors as various cultural and symbolic products. Through this event, then, culture is a means for delivering the (EU)ropean cultural economy values of entertainment and conspicuous consumption. But culture is also a means for delivering symbolic identity/citizenship messages about the Europe of which these cities are a part.

In Luxembourg (Figure 10) and in Sibiu (Figure 11) the images and announcements of advertised cultural events that were presented in the policy implementation of each city were often connected with the bigger messages of their role in the EU and of their ECOC program. However, these messages were also mainly couched in a consumption-oriented format. Figures 8 and 9 thus illustrate (EU)ropean cultural assumptions, that culture in (EU)rope is made up of certain activities, and the cities interpret these assumptions as "must see" products and attractions.

This is obvious in both cities, as the many activities and events that predominate in each city's ECOC presentations are high culture products (Figures 10 and 11 illustrate just one example of the many images and events on each ECOC's webpage). The overwhelming preponderance of cultural activities in the webpage presented as theatre, cinema, art and musical productions were happening nearly everyday and all year long in each city. These products are

FIGURE 10: Sibiu 2007 homepage advertisements for ECOC cultural events. The "Concert Extraordinaire, Spirit of Europe" and the "Festival of European theater" both illustrate of the activity- and consumption-driven conception of (EU)ropean culture (Sibiu 17.11.2007).



FIGURE 11: Luxembourg 2007 homepage advertisements for ECOC cultural events. "Must See" Festival of Music, held throughout the Greater Region, which is particularly illustrative of the sensationalist consumption-driven logic of culture in the ECOC policy (Luxembourg 07.11.2007a).



FIGURE 12: "The" Official Luxembourg 2007 Shop. The opportunity to purchase blue Luxembourg 2007 themed memorabilia like T-shirts, scarves, hats, watches, pins and even flip flops. The Shop demonstrates the power of the cultural economy rhetoric condoning cultural consumption (Luxembourg 28.11.2006b).

delivered through consumptive activities of going to a concert, exhibition or performance, and even restaurants and bars. Each event is sold as an opportunity to participate or to consume, and there were countless opportunities to spend money and to purchase memories and souvenirs (Figure 12). Returning to the two cities' images (Figures 10 and 11), the cultural activities on each of their webpages could easily have been stripped of their specificities and used for the EU's generic culture marketing. After determining what is a unified (EU)ropean culture, it should be asked, what are the motives for seeing and promoting culture as an activity?

Motives for Promoting (EU)ropean Culture

Seeing (EU)ropean culture as an activity has two motives. From the EU-standpoint, it emphasizes the *unity in diversity* idea following the cultural rhetoric aimed at an emerging (EU)ropean community and its identity/citizen. From the standpoint of each city, it emphasizes an economic rationale for urban development and tourism following the cultural economy rhetoric. Essentially, the idea of *unity in diversity* speaks to the big picture goals of the EU, its ideals of community and cooperation, the challenges of increasing diversity and enlargement, and for its aims at deeper integration in the future. However, to convince cities to deliver these messages, there must be something to be gained. Thus, the EU panders to the economic rationale of the cities. What results is the interdependent partnering of the two cultural discourse rhetorics on developing (EU)ropeans, as an identity and citizenship subject, and on developing (EU)ropean cities, as strong nodes in an overall (EU)ropean cultural economy.

Unity in diversity is thus also a tourist slogan, a marketing tool to help cities in (EU)rope to compete for international and inter-European tourist time and money.

Culture and EU motives. First, through its Culture Programmes, the EU is especially interested in creating an ECOC event that will showcase the diversity of each city. At the same time, the ECOC will also highlight the shared unity of these cities, and by extension of (EU)rope as a whole. From the European Culture Portal the EU argues, "It is currently extremely important to encourage a sense of belonging to the same 'European' community, for example by stressing the elements and cultures which give European people a sense of being closer to each other, at the same time respecting their diversity" (European Commission 2007e, paragraph 1). This statement speaks to the tensions that have been at the heart of the EU. The consistent opposition of national interests and identities toward the efforts of (EU)ropean integration and identity are the central dilemma for the EU's practical pursuits.

As a thoroughly (EU)ropean city, the 2007 ECOC Luxembourg is an excellent example of the larger (EU)ropeanization goals of the EU. Not only is it the site of the European Parliament, the EU's member state elected body, it is also a multi-cultural city-state that offers an exemplary microcosm of the entire EU. Coming directly from the 2007 ECOC Luxembourg website:

> For the first time the area of the Capital of Culture will be extended across a whole region--in addition to Luxembourg the whole Grand Duchy of Luxembourg as well as the French and the German-speaking Communities of Belgium, Lorraine in France and Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland in Germany. This concept gives the Capital of Culture 2007 a special touch: promoting mobility and the exchange of ideas, crossing borders in all areas,

> physical, psychological, artistic and emotional. But the project reaches even further: for the first time another city will become the partner of Luxembourg and also a second European Capital of Culture 2007 with equal rights. This city is located in a country that was not yet a member of the European Union at the time of its nomination. The partnership of Luxembourg and Greater Region with Sibiu/Hermannstadt, a dynamic Romanian city in the heart of Transylvania, will provide an unusual opportunity to engage in cooperation for a promising future. (Luxembourg 07.11.2007b)

This illustrates the main goals of the EU: to establish a geography that goes beyond national borders, both in terms of mobility and identity; to illustrate the realities of multilingualism; to reinforce the ideals of cooperation; and most importantly, to overcome the internal division between West and East, of established members and new members in the EU.

Culture and ECOC motives. Second, as a pragmatic view, (EU)ropean culture for the individual cities is more about economic aims. For the EU, and for these cities, culture is something to be consumed; it is a multitude of activities and performances that define what (EU)ropean culture is and does. This notion of European cultural unity as an attraction is not new. Europe has been the world's premier tourist destination (Hall and Page 2002; Boniface and Cooper 2005). Many cities in Europe are tourist cities, meaning that most of the cities' economic activity and revenue is generated from tourism.

Since the competition between European cities for tourist attention and capital is fierce, each city of the ECOC hopes to capture these flows. From the urban perspective, the ECOC is about the long-term potential of urban development and tourism strategies. Even the European Culture Portal speaks to

these aims of prospective, former and future cities. In the section, "Why applying?" the website cites the main objectives of the ECOC. These include the enhancement of the city's "image and attraction" and likewise "fostering tourism." But, it also includes more locally-focused outcomes, such as: "improving cultural life," which likely means the economic bolstering of culture industry jobs and offerings for local residents; and the improvement of "cultural infrastructure," which is a likely economic code for increasing competitiveness and/or success of the city. And then quite literally, "integrating culture in an urban regeneration plan and the city in a network of European connections," which also speaks to a *tourist* network of European cities (European Commission 2008h). Further, the webpage offers study results that tout the increases in overnight stays and total employment in the culture/creative sectors. And the page reminds prospective cities that these " 'local' objectives" must be "harmonized [. . .] to create fruitful synergies," cryptically cautioning cities that the ECOC is firstly an EU event and has larger objectives like the "indirect effects" of social cohesion and (EU)ropean integration (European Commission 2008h).

Furthermore, the idea of culture as attraction is plainly about drawing tourists to consume cultural products, to use cultural infrastructures, and to ultimately spend money in the city. By highlighting the distinct cultural attributes of each city and by providing them within the generally approved (EU)ropean cultural attractions formats, the cities are tapping into a lucrative tourism market. This specific tourism audience is made up of international and inter-European

tourists. This group is also often exclusively of a Western, affluent background and is increasingly of the younger age groups. There is also a secondary audience that is the local and surrounding regional residents, which are also predominately affluent and youthful. This is especially evident in 2007 ECOC Sibiu "Tourist Attractions" webpage (Figure 13). More than just an illustration of the audience for the 2007 ECOC, the webpage also includes a description of the cultural attractions and infrastructure that the city offers, especially the consumptive activities of monuments, museums, and artistic/cultural events. Specifically for Sibiu, the ECOC event is a way for the city to get European-wide recognition as a tourist destination.



FIGURE 13: Sibiu ECOC 2007 "Tourist Attractions." This webpage features an image of a young couple in the central square of the city with their backpacks. This couple is representative of the ideal tourist/consumer. The ECOC focuses on this tourist/consumer as a part of the logic derived from the cultural economy rhetoric of (EU)ropean culture (Sibiu 03.12.2007p).

The absence of alternate European cultures. After consideration of the main motives for promoting (EU)ropean culture, of the EU's *unity in diversity* community as opposed to the ECOCs' tourist cultural economy, it is useful to highlight the possible incompatibility that exists between each motive. Since each motive draws from one cultural discourse more so than the other, investigating this incompatibility then reveals some of the spaces between the EU's and the ECOCs' understandings of (EU)ropean culture. In particular, there is an interesting contrast between these motives where certain cultural consumption activities may be discursively excluded from the EU's approved culture activities, and as a result, from the implemented programs of the individual ECOCs. This incompatibility between the cultural identity/citizen rhetoric and the cultural economy rhetoric is illustrated in the investigation of an absent cultural activity: sporting events.

As both a strong source of cultural identity common throughout Europe and as a source for tourism and development revenues, sporting events are noticeably missing in the two 2007 ECOC programs. Yet, including sporting events seems to be another opportunity to expand the overall audience for their ECOC event, and for long-term development strategies. However, this expression of culture can be viewed as being squarely in disagreement with the EU's overall vision of (EU)ropean culture: its high culture template; its universalist quality; and its cooperative association. The sporting example brings to mind the inherent tensions of local rivalry and competition that characterize sport in Europe. Whether football, rugby, tennis, or boxing, local and national sports teams or

individuals represent the antagonism and enmity between places, which is itself completely antagonistic to the bigger picture goals of the EU, of the ECOC as an EU policy, and of the becoming unified (EU)ropean Culture. This is illustrative of the important of implication in choosing expressions of culture for the EU, and to show that although revenue becomes a major point of interest on the part of cities and a selling point promoted by the EU, the ultimate purpose for the ECOC is the fostering and furthering of (EU)ropean culture.

Performing (EU)ropean History as Culture

There is a very important value component to what culture is and should be that is observed in the overall EU Culture Project. In the space of the EU, history is a source for: cultural morality derived from a viewing of history as negative; and, cultural heritage derived from a viewing of history as positive. History is then an ambivalent repository for (EU)rope: as a negative source for lessons and change and also as an irreplaceable, shared positive experience that forms the basis for unity. The view of European history as negative stems from the postwar unification of Europe and the admonitory values of cooperation and tolerance set in place by the recent memory of war and holocaust. This negative view also connects to the even longer histories of political and religious fighting between states. This is the negative history of *diversity*, which has needed *unity* to correct it. At the same time, history can also be viewed as a positive and uplifting event that instills a sense of community among those involved. In this way, European history also provides a certain shared cultural heritage among (EU)ropean states. This positive reading of history sees the sharing and spread of

certain cultural activities (high culture) that characterizes European history. Thus, it is this understanding of the dissemination of high culture customs, which has created the representation of a long history of unity in (EU)rope. Moreover, the diversity of contexts and applications of these unified customs has formed the basis for the *unity in diversity* ideal through which each member state's cultural expressions are practiced within the same template of cultural activities.

This is the ultimate performance of a unified (EU)ropean culture. In each of the ECOC programs, these two views of history are performed in tandem as an attempt to agree with the EU's contradictory message of *unity in diversity*. Each city shows its diversity to situate itself squarely as a (EU)ropean city, based on the understanding that (EU)ropean cities are marked by difference and tolerant of those differences. At the same time, each city performs its place within the larger (EU)ropean unified history. This history dominated by the EU moves from division to unification, and cities perform this history.

Performing (EU)ropean Cultural Relationships

An essential part of a unified (EU)ropean culture is to celebrate diversity, and to acknowledge the necessities of tolerance and cooperation that have come out of the shared history of war and conflict in Europe. This comes out of EU discourses of cultural morality that are specific to the spatial contexts of cultural diversity. In spaces marked by cultural diversity, proper cultural relationships are based in openness and *intercultural dialogue,* itself a device that stands for tolerance, better knowledge, and mutual understanding (European Commission 2008a). Through the *unity in diversity* ideal, cultural diversity (read: (EU)rope)

and cultural morality as defined by cooperation and dialogue (read: (EU)ropean morality) are co-constructive of this diverse space through the performance of cooperation and dialogue and the mixing of different socio-cultural groups. This becomes the EU-approved format for unified (EU)ropean cultural relationships.

For each ECOC, part of its purpose is to perform itself as a completely (EU)ropean space that is, above all else, marked by cultural diversity. However, since the EU's *unity in diversity* motto and what it means for cultural diversity, both positive and negative, is quite contradictory and remarkably vague, each city has an open field in which to situate its own perspective of *diversity*. Thus, each ECOC becomes a cultural capital for a different mode of (EU)ropean diversity, and the individual readings of their diverse place in (EU)rope and their contribution to unity speaks to their distinct positions within the EU, and (EU)rope more generally.

In the case of Luxembourg, there are many ECOC programs that exhibit themes of diversity. Some of the most publicized include "Global Multitude" (Figure 14), which is about the role of migration in cultural diversity with a global focus. "Migrations", an art/light installation reflecting on diversity of modern life as the *Jardins Nomades* (translation: "Nomadic Gardens") and viewing cities as full of "modern-day neo-nomads" (Luxembourg 28.11.2006a). "*ReTour de Babel*" (translation: "Back to Babel"), a book and exhibition, conveys a narrative about migrants to and from Luxembourg, communicating the importance of migration to the economy, society, and culture of the Duchy/city, and how these



FIGURE 14: "Global Multitude" program advertisement. Art installations that reflect on migration as a "driver" of cultural diversity by Global Artists who exhibit migration and expatriate movements themselves: Algerian-American, American-Belgian, American and Cuban team, Brazilian-German, Chinese-French, Cameroonian-Belgian, and Dutch-Indonesian (Luxembourg 07.11.2007a).



FIGURE 15: "World MeYouZik Festival" advertisement. Festival that brings together music, food and art from "all the corners of the Earth" (Luxembourg 24.09.2007d).

migrations are "essential contributions [that will be] able to allay the irrational fears and identity crises that are currently taking shape in Europe" (Luxembourg 2007). And finally, the "World MeYouZik Festival" (Figure 15), which features Brazilian, Indian and Aruban marching bands, a "Gastronomic Village" with food from Europe, Latin America, and Africa, and countless art, music and fashion exhibitions. These three events are the foremost representations for diversity in the Luxembourg program.

In each of these diversity events, Luxembourg's performance of the EU's unified (EU)ropean culture is evident. Some of the major challenges to (EU)ropean cultures in the EU have come through the increasing diversity along with the rising numbers of immigrants or Third Country nationals into Western European cities. These mostly non-European peoples have been associated with a mounting cultural tension between Western European cultural identities and their cultural Others from out of Europe. This was implicitly stated in explanation of the *ReTour de Babel* event (quoted above Luxembourg 2007) increasingly these cultural Others are differentiated by outward clues of race, ethnicity, or religion, as exhibited in the images of the World MeYouZik Festival.

Part of Luxembourg's performance is to practice "proper" (EU)ropean cultural relationships within this context. One of Luxembourg's earliest themes was "Discovering Yourself - Discovering Others" (Sibiu 03.12.2007b), and is quite a poignant statement for such current European challenges. Through its main events, the Luxembourg ECOC establishes migration/movement as a norm in modern (EU)ropean society. And, the "neo-nomad" becomes a powerful

allegory to support this. In addition, Luxembourg performs its (EU)ropean identity through a migration heritage narrative, which suggests that Europeans have been defined by their movements within Europe and throughout the world. The *ReTour de Babel* program thus provides another symbolic connection to the specific experience of movement to and from (EU)rope, with a mind to mitigate the tensions of current movements into the region. Moreover, since migration has fueled diversity in Luxembourg/(EU)rope, there are best-practices in such a space that is marked by global migrations, and they are to celebrate differences and diversity.

The World MeYouZik Festival becomes the ultimate realization of the EU's global vision behind the *unity in diversity* motto. By hosting such world cultural expressions, Luxembourg is performing the ultimate spatial act: *intercultural dialogue*. The World MeYouZik Festival is a moment for the realization of *intercultural dialogue* in (EU)rope. The festival is promoted as a "colourful festival of the cultures of the world, a joyous meeting of the various cultural communities from Luxembourg and the Greater Region" (Luxembourg 24.09.2007). Becoming, quite literally, a "colorful" festival, the images that promote the World MeYouZik Festival are just that--of colorful performers (Figure 16). This is quite different than the shots of monotone audience members (Figure 17), and certainly reveals a racial and ethnic dimension to the perspective of *intercultural dialogue* in Western Europe. The cultural morality of this form of *intercultural dialogue* seems to have neo-colonial undertones, as certain



FIGURE 16: "World MeYouZik Festival" performer images. The "Colorful" performers at the festival (Luxembourg City Tourist Office 2008).

FIGURE 17: "World MeYouZik Festival" audience image. Audience members of the festival (Luxembourg City Tourist Office 2008).

representations of diversity are on display. The major idea for *intercultural dialogue* is that behind such cultural activities of concerts/music and eating/cuisine is the openness to and support of cultural difference.

Further, these activities of *intercultural dialogue* are also about *knowing* Others. By approaching an instance of diversity with openness and tolerance, an individual becomes acquainted with someone they may not have known prior. This allows an individual to become accustomed to experiences of diversity through the production of "better knowledge" and "mutual understanding" (European Commission 2007b). This is especially important in Western European cities, like Luxembourg and those of the Greater Region, because they are experiencing the most palpable forms of cultural difference, be they race, ethnicity or religion. By setting *intercultural dialogue* in an environment of entertainment and activity, like in music, art or food, there is more ease and interest toward Otherness. At least this is the hopeful philosophy behind the act of *intercultural dialogue* in Luxembourg's ECOC implementation.

The point of Otherness leads to another challenge in the EU today. The increasing presence of another (EU)ropean Other: people of Central and Eastern Europe. These Central/Eastern (EU)ropean Others are felt at two general scales: at the urban, as economic migrants; and at the supranational, as EU member Others or Third Country nationals (European Commission 2007a). The presence of these Others are set against Western people and member states in terms of political, economic, and socio-cultural differences. Diversity in the EU is not merely about learning to have *intercultural dialogue* with global Others, but also

of (EU)ropean Others. Since the 2004/2007 enlargements, the presence of Central/Eastern (EU)ropean migrants has created tensions within Western (EU)ropean cities and the EU more generally. The first cultural morality step of *knowing* is also directed to these (EU)ropean foreigners. And, one of the secondary purposes of the 2007 ECOC is to introduce Western Europeans to their Eastern/Central European counterparts. Thus, the selection of Sibiu, Romania as the ECOC partner for Luxembourg. The rationale behind the choice of Luxembourg and Sibiu will be analyzed later in this chapter, but the cultural political moment will continue to be addressed. As a result of position and situation, Sibiu's perspective for cultural diversity, and morality, is certainly different than that of Luxembourg.

In the case of Sibiu, there are many points from which the ECOC addresses its cultural diversity. The very first perspective of Sibiu's cultural diversity is introduced simply and squarely in the ECOC's website logo (Figure 18). From Sibiu's perspective, it is spatially ordered within (EU)rope, and relative to this position is its diverse cultural identity. Sibiu is a Transylvanian city within Romania, while Romania is now a country in (EU)rope. As a result of this hierarchical outlook, cultural diversity is something that marks the city, as a "city of culture," and thus as a marker for its own version of a unified (EU)ropean culture, or the *unity* ideal. Yet, it is also a "city of cultures," as a marker for the cultural diversity that characterizes unified (EU)ropean culture, or the *diversity* reality.

FIGURE 18: Sibiu ECOC logo. Webpage logo, including its spatial hierarchy—Transylvania, Romania and Europe--and its cultural claims as, "city of culture. city of cultures" (Sibiu 17.11.2007).



FIGURE 19: Sibiu "Events" webpage. A partial list of one day's events, which also includes a short list of upcoming major events (Sibiu 17.11.2007).

Looking deeper at the logo (Figure 18), especially of the colors and symbols being used, there is also a more visual message that seems to be communicated. The "S", most obviously standing for Sibiu, is made up of two abstract, top-view human forms, made of heads, arms and hands. The clasping of the hands to form the "S" seems to represent the cooperation theme behind a unified (EU)ropean culture. What is more, the blue and yellow colors allude to two individual symbolic clues: blue and yellow, most obviously are the colors of the EU places Sibiu symbolically as (EU)ropean. And, the choice to have two separate colors symbolizes the idea of *diversity*, perhaps as racial difference, which also seems to strengthen the visual sign for cooperation or *unity* of the hand clasping. Overall, this logo and motto (Figure 18), "city of culture. city of cultures" are Sibiu's answer to the complex ideas behind *unity in diversity.*

As for Sibiu's ECOC program, there are plenty of cultural events that demonstrate the city's claims of cultural diversity (Figure 19). However, the emphasis of Sibiu's website is more about showcasing the city's cultural infrastructure and heritage, or its cultural attractions, rather than the plethora of cultural activities that it hosts in the program. This lines up with the observation that Sibiu's ECOC program is a specifically long-term, tourism strategy that follows the maxims of the cultural economy rhetoric. This is explicitly stated on the website in its Program Objectives, with the most straightforward examples: "raising the international profile of Sibiu"; "long term cultural development"; "attracting international visitors"; "growing and expanding the local audience for culture"; and, "improving cultural and non cultural infrastructure" (Sibiu

03.12.2007b, paragraph 3). The major function of the ECOC for Sibiu, is to help the city create a specific urban identity that will reinforce its tourism goals. This urban identity is certainly shaped by the EU's embedded ideals in the ECOC as Sibiu struggles to support its claims for cultural diversity.

The main thrust of Sibiu's performance of cultural diversity is to demonstrate the diversity of urban cultural attractions. A statement by Sibiu's Mayor and the Chairman of the Sibiu 2007 Association (the private group that executes the ECOC program in Sibiu) illustrates the focus on tourist appeal in the ECOC's interpretation of diversity:

> [T]he town opened its gates to the world and became home for many people of many cultures, speaking different languages and practisisng [*sic*] different forms of religious life. Sibiu/Hermannstadt with its different ethnic communities developed a unique multicultural life. [. . .] We invite you to stroll along the streets and into the squares of the Historic Centre, with its Gothic arcades, Renaissance houses and elegant Baroque churches as well as Art Nouveau buildings. There you can meet artists and their creative products, there you can taste our cuisine and wines or visit the museums that preserve beautiful art collections. Our city awaits you to discover its music, dance, theatre, visual arts and other events which move out of our cultural halls in the most provocative sttings [*sic*]: in the streets and squares, lofts and cellars, fortification walls and churches. (Sibiu 03.12.2007b)

The source of Sibiu's cultural diversity is its own urban heritage and landscape. The city performs its diversity as its audience experiences the public space of the old city, its squares, residences, and churches. The performance of cultural diversity in Sibiu is achieved by the selective highlighting of its history, its built environment, and its contemporary socio-cultural character. The architectural and cultural accounting of the city's attractions is the absolute minimum claim for

cultural diversity. So, what connects this common urban performance of culture to the greater ECOC purpose of a unified (EU)ropean culture marked by diversity?

Sibiu connects itself to (EU)rope through this commonplace expression of urban cultural diversity through its tourism strategies. According to the perspective of the Sibiu 2007 Association, the notion of a unified European culture arises from the shared experience of cultural tourism and the selling of diverse architectural, musical, artistic, and culinary urban activities (Sibiu 03.12.2007b). This experience connects with most European cities as tourist destinations. For example, another statement from the Sibiu 2007 Association says, "Sibiu/Hermannstadt as European Capital of Culture in 2007 aims at opening gates through which the city's rich cultural landscape and diverse life *will meet that of Europe* [emphasis added]" (Sibiu 03.12.2007b). For Sibiu, becoming a European tourist destination is about becoming (EU)rope. Sibiu's understanding of unified (EU)ropean culture is the diversity of experience that characterizes (EU)ropean spaces. By performing its urban diversity for the tourist, the city and the national space in which it is located is more firmly a (EU)ropean space.

Turning away from the urban space as a performance of (EU)rope, there is an interesting visualization of this expectation that is on the Sibiu website's flashplayer loop (Figure 20). In each of these images, female bodies are tattooed with standard, unified (EU)ropean cultural symbols quite literally inscribed onto the space of the body. These symbols of (EU)rope, in general are not unique or

relevant to Sibiu in any way. As females of Sibiu, they are representative of their city space. Also, since cities are often referred to by female signifiers it is more firmly assumed that the space of the female body is expressive as a symbol for the urban space, and as an extension, for the national space. This is a performance of inscribing (EU)rope upon the space of the body. In this example, the female body, urban or national space, are becoming (EU)ropean through their accepting of the necessary cultural symbols. It is also not implausible to suppose the couples in these images are the ideal audience for Sibiu: young, hip, and cultured. These couples are also, to some degree, images of the ideal, future (EU)ropeans of Romania.

FIGURE 20: "Normal. Sibiu. Young Since 1191." homepage flashplayer loop. Flashplayer images depicting young couples in Sibiu. Most importantly are the generic European culture symbols that are tattooed or inscribed on the female bodies. From left to right: comedy/tragedy masks from ancient, medieval and renaissance theatre; da Vinci's Mona Lisa; musical notation staff and notes; and the last two depicting a montage of string instruments (Sibiu 2007a).

As a becoming (EU)ropean tourist destination, the issues of cultural morality and of (EU)ropean cultural relationships are still a symbolic necessity for Sibiu's ECOC program. Sibiu's particular stance on cultural morality and its role in facilitating intercultural dialogue is framed in a strategy statement from its website:

> We intended to respond to the designation with a solid platform of partnership, both with the artistic and social communities of the city, as well as Romania as a whole. Through such partnership we discover ourselves: we find Europe at the heart of our own cultural being. (Sibiu 03.12.2007c, paragraph 1)

Unlike Luxembourg, where diversity and dialogue are directed from the city outward, Sibiu's diversity and dialogue are particularly contained within the space of the city and directed toward its local audience. While the partnership with Luxembourg is mentioned several times on the website, it is often in reference to the "duties" of Sibiu as ECOC or in relation to the planned cultural activities or events that form the background of the program. The *intercultural dialogue* in Sibiu is directed to its own urban, regional and national audience. Sibiu's program mentions explicitly "social inclusion and cohesion" and the "special focus [. . .] to create cultural opportunities for social groups outside the mainstream city culture" (Sibiu 03.12.2007c, paragraph 9), although how and to what ends this is achieved is less explained. Some of the groups that are specifically targeted in Sibiu's ECOC program for "cultural inclusion" are children and youths, the elderly, and ethnic minorities (Sibiu 03.12.2007c). And yet, these ideals are to be achieved to meet the objective of "growing audiences

for culture in the city" or elsewhere called "access development" (Sibiu 03.12.2007c, paragraph 3).

Some of the specific events that make up Sibiu's ECOC program are directed at its "social inclusion" goal. The *"Tineri marginalizaţi şi artele spectacolului"* (translation: "Marginalized young people and performing arts") is a project focused on accessibility of young people belonging to both ethnic and socially marginalized groups, such as, the Roma ethnic group, orphans and disabled children. Participants take part in performing arts workshops that are led by Romanian and British professional artists (Sibiu 03.12.2007n). Other than this major project, there was no similar project devoted to providing cultural opportunities to those groups "outside the mainstream city culture" (Sibiu 03.12.2007o, paragraph 9).

However, there are more projects that are devoted to the *knowing* of Others, most specifically ethnic minorities in the region. The photo exhibition titled *"Necunoscut europeni: A Journey Fotografică la Cinci Minorităţi Culturale"* (translation: "Unknown Europeans: A Photographic Journey to Five Cultural Minorities"), is one of the smaller projects that deals with ethnic minorities. The noticeable difference compared to most of Sibiu's other ECOC projects is the spatial perspective that searches for lesser-known ethnic minorities throughout Europe. What is most interesting here is that these ethnic minorities are either enclaves of (EU)ropean Others, originating from the *terra incognita* of the East or Balkans, or of Western minorities located in a Balkan state: Macedonian-Romanians in the Balkans; Spanish Sephardic Jews in Sarajevo;

Gotshers in the Croatian-Slovenian borderlands; Albanian Arbresh in Southern Italy; and the Slavic Sorbs of Eastern Germany (Sibiu 03.12.2007m). Such spaces and people are precisely of the (EU)ropean Others mentioned earlier, they are the unknown or foreigners in the shared space of (EU)rope.

A larger project devoted to minority culture is *"Europa cântă şi Dansuri. Din Europa de identitate şi în Europa de identităţi"* (translation: "Europe Sings and Dances. Europe's Identity and Europe of Identities"). It is an international festival that offers performances of several dance groups from the ethnic minorities located in Romania (Figure 21). This show is intended to highlight "the wealth and beauty of the traditions inherited proudly displayed [*sic*] by the ethnic communities in Romania" and through the "universal language" of dance the audience "will be a part of the celebration of colors and rhythm in a Europe united through music and dancing" (Sibiu 03.12.2007h, *description* paragraph). This "international" festival is more about the diversity located within the existing Sibiu/Romanian cultural space. By educating and introducing local audiences to such cultural diversity, the performance of *intercultural dialogue* is accomplished. Further, the post-modern slant of the second half of the title, "Europe's Identity and Europe of Identities", also speaks to the *unity in diversity* concept: that (EU)rope is united as one identity, and at the same time, it is made up of many identities which combine to create a distinct (EU)ropean identity.

All together, these three projects exhibit Sibiu's performance of its version of *intercultural dialogue* and its interpretation of (EU)ropean cultural morality. Important ideals of social justice or inclusion and *intercultural dialogue* become living moments through which ECOC visitors and Sibiu tourists can participate. Similar to Luxembourg, Sibiu's cultural aspiration is to introduce and know Others. However, the difference is a matter of scale and national significance. The Others that are highlighted in Sibiu are ethnic and social Others that are located in or around the city. This parallels Sibiu's broader perception of cultural diversity as defined by the local situation of the city or nation, and its endeavor to create a European tourist destination. Sibiu as part of Romania, is a new (EU)ropean presence; its foremost desire is to decisively place itself into the EU and Europe. This is only achieved by looking within itself to find its (EU)ropean cultural attributes. As the Sibiu 2007 Association says, "we find Europe at the heart of our own cultural being" (Sibiu 03.12.2007o, paragraph 1).

FIGURE 21: *"Europa cântă şi Dansuri. Din Europa de identitate şi în Europa de identităţi"* (Europe Sings and Dances. Europe's Identity and Europe of Identities). Some of the song and dance acts from this "international" festival, include German, Hungarian, Greek, Croatian, Ukrainian, Tatar, Bulgarian, and Serb dance groups from (EU)ropean ethnic enclaves (Sibiu 2008, photos by Adrian Bugariu and Ovidiu Dumitru Matiu).

Ultimately, each city maintains its (EU)ropeanness by identifying and normalizing its multicultural characteristics. Each city signals its multicultural profile primarily through the sources of ethno-linguistic and migration processes. Luxembourg is a city of three major languages, Luxembourgish, German and French, and it is a city of over 140 different nationalities (Luxembourg 2007). The city also mentions its privileged status as "one of the three capitals of the European Community" (Luxembourg 2007, 6), being the site of the European Court of Justice, although it does not attribute the bulk of its resident nationalities to this situation. Sibiu's story begins with its "complex" ethnic population, made up of Romanian, Hungarian, and German groups, but also includes even smaller minorities of Roma, Slovak and Ukrainians within the city (Sibiu 03.12.2007a). Sibiu's linguistic composition parallels its ethnic populations, and the city is officially bilingual, of both Romanian and German (Luxembourg 2007), but also that schools are multilingual teaching in all three languages (Selection Panel 2004). Each city thus underlines the role of movement and migrations, historically and today, that have contributed to their rich cultural diversities. Such characteristics constitute a multicultural (EU)rope marked by diversity and movement. Both cities, as a requisite, must emphasize these basic attributes. Yet, in the main themes of their programs, each city's distinct situation and perspective becomes evident: whether it is of migration, global diversity and mitigation of cultural tensions, as in Luxembourg; or if it is of tourism, regional diversity and its arrival to the (EU)ropean community, as in Sibiu.

Performing (EU)ropean History/Future

At the same time that each 2007 ECOC is performing its version of a unified (EU)ropean culture and the proper cultural relationships that accompany it, the two cities are also performing their temporal situation with (EU)rope. This performance is more subtle and is often obscured by the prevailing discourses of cultural diversity. In fact, in each city's articulation of the EU-led ECOC objectives, they are inherently performing from their own position in (EU)rope. This position relates to when they were admitted, where they are relative to the political-economic, socio-cultural or symbolic EU core, or what their challenges and ambitions are that stem from that position. Through the creation of their own narratives in the ECOC event, each city is revealing its own trajectory in larger (EU)ropean history and future.

Specifically, through the history of each of their greater national counterparts, of the Duchy for Luxembourg and of Romania for Sibiu, each city is situated within a certain cohort of (EU)ropeaness. For Luxembourg, it is one of the founding members of the EU, a staunchly Western European city, and a city that shares relatively similar political, economic and socio-cultural circumstances with the other member states in its cohort. At the complete opposite end of the EU spectrum is Sibiu. The Romanian city is one of two newest members to be admitted to the EU in 2007, a fatefully Eastern European city, and a city that shares as many similarities as differences with its Eastern, Central and Southern neighbors, both EU members and non-members. Each ECOC has certain

advantages and disadvantages that have arisen from their situations. And each ECOC is struggling to look forward from their position to perform a stronger role for themselves in the time to come.

Turning to Luxembourg, the Duchy/city is a thoroughly (EU)ropean space. As a founding member, a capital of (EU)rope, a multicultural/multilingual city-state, Luxembourg is very much the model for the EU's future. It is not coincidental that the city-state has chosen themes that also illustrate this ideal (EU)ropean future: "Beyond Borders" (Luxembourg 07.11.2007b) and "Europe of the Future" (Sibiu 03.12.2007o). In all of its cultural events, the city-state solidly performs its progressive and post-modern course.

At first glance, Luxembourg's ECOC website is very hip, polished and current, in terms of its current graphics arts presentation and implementation (Figure 22). Such an interface, although made up of traditional links and hyperlink network, is certainly more appealing to a younger audience as much of the visuals emulate popular media graphics in clothing, television and music styles today. Following this presentation, many of the individual events are also themed or promoted in this same youthful, contemporary mindset. This is most evident in some of the posters and images for other events (Figure 23). As for the content of some of the events, examples include: the *"Festival Begegnung--Tanz und Industrie"* (translation: "The Encounters Festival--Dance and Industry"), where industrial sites are turned into places for contemporary dance (Luxembourg 02.10.2007b); the "International Breakdance Festival", with team competitions

FIGURE 22: Luxembourg 2007 homepage. The trendy and "hip" presentation of the Luxembourg 2007 website (Luxembourg 07.11.2007a).



FIGURE 23: "Luxembourg Roundabout Exhibition" advertisement. A prototypical representation of Luxembourg's ECOC cultural events as a "new generation" of "refreshing" cultural products (Luxembourg 21.12.2006).

and performances from "the entire spectrum of contemporary hip hop culture" (Luxembourg 02.10.2007b); and countless other events that include massive city-size art installations, contemporary lighting and graphics exhibitions, exhibits inspired by modern technology and life, and others that signal the return to the avant-garde as the *ultramoderne*, where the exhibition venues are intentionally abstracted, challenged and advanced according to 21st century *ultramoderne* art (Luxembourg 24.09.2007c). Luxembourg's ECOC program is certainly of an artistically sophisticated, *ultramoderne* "high" culture production.

The sophisticated nature of Luxembourg's program is also paralleled in its outward representation. The challenges and opportunities that Luxembourg performs are the consequence of globalization in both culture and society. This is also inclusive of Luxembourg's perspective toward its own situation of cultural diversity and morality, as well as its expression of *ultramoderne* artistic performance. Globalization is a reality that permeates the ECOC's themes of migration, beyond borders, and *intercultural dialogue*. Even further, some of Luxembourg's events are specifically geared toward global society: "Hungry Planet--*So isst die Welt*" (translation: "Hungry Planet--What the world eats") a photography exhibit of families and their food from all over the globe (Figure 24); "All We Need", a participatory, interactive art exhibit in a converted steelworks factory that emphasizes "needs, resources and fairness" in the modern world (Figure 25); and "Global Multitude" as mentioned earlier (Figure 14, page 135), exhibiting the *ultramoderne* diversity of the global art scene.



FIGURE 24: "Hungry Planet--what the world eats" photo exhibition. Photo-tour of global families and their weekly food needs (Luxembourg 24.09.2007b).

FIGURE 25: "All We Need" interactive exhibition. Ultimate critique on the ultra-affluence of modern globalized countries (Luxembourg 21.05.2007).

In Luxembourg, what all of these examples amount to is a performing of the future (EU)rope or of a *becoming* (EU)rope. Of diversity and celebration, of affluence and conscience, and of environment and sustainability, the Luxembourg ECOC program conveys these messages through their cultural events. More than these social and cultural ideals, the Luxembourg program also indoctrinates ECOC visitors to the future space of (EU)rope (Figure 25): one that extends beyond borders, is multiculturalist, and results in post-modern forms of identity.

The main focus of the Beyond Borders premise, at work in the inclusion of the Greater Region that encompasses the city of Luxembourg, is the threefold illustration of a (EU)ropean space not constrained by national borders. It is a space that is defined by and at ease with its multicultural reality, and a space that increasingly influences post-modern, multiple forms of identification. The first instance is a functional, economic and political reality that has emerged with the Common Market of the EU. The second instance is the (EU)ropean societal reality that has been long in the making through historical movements, but that has also accelerated with globalization processes; it is more about forming a harmonious society that thrives in such a situation, rather than disintegrates as European history has illustrated. The third instance relates to both of the first two, which identity in (EU)rope is one that will go beyond current divisions as it maintains and celebrates them and this is specifically relating to the role of space in shaping individual identity. The ultimate ideal for (EU)rope is that individuals



FIGURE 26: 2007 ECOC "Beyond Borders." The map of Luxembourg and the "Greater Region", which is the main part of the 2007 ECOC's event presentation (Luxembourg 07.11.2007b).

will comprise multiple identities, as Luxembourg comprises several composite cultural identities in addition to its strength of its (EU)ropean identity.

Sibiu is situated as a complete opposite of Luxembourg, geographically, temporally and symbolically. Instead of a city that is already (EU)ropean, Sibiu is one that is more concerned with the becoming process, the performance and achievement of its right to be (EU)ropean. Since Sibiu, as part of Romania, is one of the newest members to the EU it is, perhaps, one of the more unknown Eastern (EU)ropean Others. In examining the future possibilities of the EU, Sibiu's performance is not of a generally forward-looking perspective, but one that is more retrospective and introspective.

In Sibiu, the (EU)ropean past is re-lived, its lessons and experiences are rehashed and its progress is a renewed possibility. Sibiu's ECOC program reveals a conventional perspective, in terms of political and cultural space. Its ECOC theme and spatial imagination (Figure 18, page 141), "Transylvania. Romania. Europe." and "city of culture. city of cultures" are both examples of the earlier outlook of (EU)rope. The spatial hierarchy views ordered spaces in a typical nation-centric design, and can be compared with the postwar standpoint of the nascent EU where space was very much defined by nation-states. The second motto is also reflective of this context. The city is both a site of culture, in terms of cultural activities and attractions, and a site of multiculturalism, in terms of people, difference and interaction. However, this urban culture is still also in the context of the nation-state. Culture in the city is a product of difference within the

nation, but that experience of multiculturalism has complicated the model "nation" behind the concept of the "nation-state." Throughout Sibiu's ECOC performance, this tension of diversity is revealed.

Beginning with Sibiu's homepage (Figure 27), the presentation is certainly of a standard format and arrangement. Made up of lists, drop down menus, image and hyperlinks, the most advanced aspect of the website's display is its flashplayer image loop. However, what is interesting about the some of the flashplayer links are the traditionalist view of culture embedded in these images. On the left of the homepage image (Figure 27), just underneath the ECOC logo and mottos, is an image of a woman on stage in traditional, folk cultural garb. Another image in this flashplayer series (Figure 28) represents a traditionally dressed couple, which by their relaxed, stationary embodiment could be assumed to be passive audience members or perhaps, active participants or performers. The two other images in this flashplayer loop are of detached hands playing piano and a gentleman performer dressed in costume reminiscent of military or aristocratic dress (Figure 29). All of these images suggest some degree of Europeanness as both high culture *and* folk culture representations. They are of a specific significance to Sibiu's cultural and spatial imagination, that the city becomes a space for performing cultural activities and also that it is a space of meeting for cultural heritage. Moreover, an interesting addition to the website and a stronger indication of the spatial imagination of Sibiu is the small woodland scene at the homepage header (Figure 27). This natural, rural scene combined



FIGURE 27: Sibiu ECOC homepage. The Sibiu homepage presentation with traditional representations of program events (Sibiu 17.11.2007).

FIGURE 28: Sibiu ECOC homepage flashplayer image. A representation of a traditionally dressed young couple (Sibiu 17.11.2007).

FIGURE 29: Sibiu ECOC homepage flashplayer additional image. A representation of gentleman performer in "European" dress (Sibiu 17.11.2007).

with the general images and portrayal of the city and its architectural heritage, provide a sense that Sibiu is a city of the idealized European past. Its landscape is preserved, both naturally outside the space of the city. At the same time, its urban landscape is preserved quite literally in the spaces of its city square and most of its built environment.

This also follows in the challenges or outlook of Sibiu, and of Romania. In Sibiu's ECOC, the view of multiculturalism as something that is accepted in their specific version of nationalism and regionalism becomes the content of their tourism message. In terms of the EU at large, Sibiu/Romania is certainly viewed as part of the "backward" East, or more kindly, as the traditional, or even to borrow from economic jargon, lesser developed (EU)rope. Such a view sees the East behind politically and economically, as well as socially and culturally. The relative trajectory of comparison between Western EU members and Eastern EU members, particularly of Romania, sees the experiences of democratic politics and capitalist economics as relatively new for the Eastern members, and it follows that the social and cultural changes are also quite different. This view is very much present in Sibiu's ECOC event, taken from the Strategy page discussing "New Horizons After 2007":

> The title of European Capital of Culture will act on behalf of Sibiu as good reference for potential tourists and investors. Creation of new jobs will have important effects in the living standards of the inhabitants of Sibiu area, prompting a faster social process of cohesion with the European Union. The improvements that will appear in the infrastructure, tourism, cultural facilities will last for decades as a material benefit for the city. (Sibiu 03.12.2007o, paragraph 15)

In this statement, the ECOC event provides an avenue to open up tourism possibilities, which in the reasoning of the Sibiu 2007 Association will lead to positive economic and social results that will also address the larger political goal of greater cohesion with the EU. This relates to the cultural economy rhetoric that has been introduced with the Culture Programme revisions.

Returning to the multicultural dimension of Sibiu's ECOC program, the joint appeal to tourism and EU cohesion is evident in a significant number of the city's projects. The most banal and straightforward being a conference titled, *"Diversitatea culturală ca şansă pentru dezvoltarea regională in Europa"* (translation: "Cultural Diversity as an opportunity for regional Development in Europe"). The main theme of this conference was "the perception of cultural diversity as potential for regional development rather than as a national problem" (Sibiu 03.12.2007g, *description* paragraph 1). This theme exhibits the positive-negative contradictory view of cultural diversity that exists in the EU's *unity in diversity* motto, but also more obviously in the reality of spaces marked by cultural diversity. The relative newness of nationalist ideology in Romania, in particular of the ideals of the nation, has embedded in it a preconception of cultural diversity as difficulty rather than strength. Further, this conference is geared toward a developmental view of regionalism, such that "regions can be viewed as enterprises, ethnic and cultural diversity can be consciously appreciated as something of added value and the true value of socially inclusive development can be realized" (Sibiu 03.12.2007g, *description* paragraph 1). This Sibiu

message might thus be reduced to a spatial logic that includes: 1) the nation is contested by multicultural reality; 2) the region rises to replace the nation as a space of culture; 3) culture becomes a way to further socio-economically strengthen the region; and, then, 4) through the strength of the region, the nation will also be strengthened. This is indeed oversimplified. At the same time, it presents a reading of Sibiu in terms of the social and economic goals that the so-called "principles of diversity management" mean for such cultural spaces (Sibiu 03.12.2007g, *description* paragraph 1). Further, this regionalism and acknowledgement of the contested nature of nationalism is certainly an experience that has marked the older members of the EU. Now armed with new tools for addressing the unity in diversity ideal, new members (read: new to EU, at same time being new to such experiences) hope to have a more prosperous and peaceful adjustment to their accepted multicultural society.

In Sibiu, its multicultural character is portrayed as a function of movement, especially migration into the physical landscape. Of Sibiu's more cultural attraction-based events, "Sibiu 2007: a Crossroads of Culture" project is quite significant for this portrayal. This project brings in the multicultural and regional perspective that is evident in the Conference on Cultural Diversity and Regional Development. At the heart of this project are the "multicultural tradition of Transylvania, in general, and of the area of Sibiu, in particular" and the "oldest and most representative examples of the mixture of cultures in this area" (Sibiu 03.12.2007i, *description* paragraph). The project is aimed at finding historical

examples of migration and cultural movement. It is also designed to provide connection with other regional/cultural spaces and with individuals. This takes place in two ways: first, by connecting the Saxon people's historical movement from the Moselle River regions (including modern day Benelux countries, Germany and France) and into the Sibiu/Transylvania region; and second, in the literal, contemporary movement of young people from the five countries of origin and of Romania, for "cultural discovery and exchange of ideas" (Sibiu 03.12.2007i, *description* paragraph).

The cultural attraction aspect is also in two moments: first when these young people arrive in Sibiu; and second, when they return home. Upon their arrival in Sibiu, they will be a part of their own tourist moment (Figure 30) where they, under the guise of "cultural discovery and exchange", will become tourists visiting city sites where performances of "daily chores in a typical Transylvanian household, traditional arts and crafts workshops" are on display (Sibiu 03.12.2007f, paragraph 1). They, in turn, perform as the tourist spectacle themselves as they "reveal elements of their cultures (images, costumes, songs, dances, games) in an interactive way so that more visitors or citizens of the city would come and see them" (Sibiu 03.12.2007e, paragraph 1). Finally, before leaving, these young people will participate in a large exhibition that they organized themselves to showcase the cultural projects that they created in the process: "small shows, photograph projections, films (made throughout the implementation of the project), [and] speeches" (Sibiu 03.12.2007d, paragraph 1).

The last aspect of the program is the traveling exhibition and the caveat that each national group of youths will organize their own exhibits at home. During this process, the dominant expression of culture, be it in Sibiu/Transylvania or of the youths' national cultures, is traditionalist and retrospective. There does not seem to be a strong moment for these youths to seek any *ultramoderne* expressions of culture that are exhibited in Luxembourg.

This program is an excellent example of the dual purpose of the overall Sibiu ECOC event, of its economic touristic goals, cultural heritage goals, and social cohesion goals. The students participate in tourist experiences, performing on both sides as audience and player (Figure 30 and 31). As such, they help to facilitate the social cohesion goals behind the EU's cultural discourse. Despite these lofty goals there is still a tendency to view multiculturalism from traditionalist binary of nationalism-regionalism. Students were chosen based on national origination, then grouped into national groups that created their own nationally inspired group flags (Figure 32). However, all together these students participated in a larger process of regional differentiation, brought together to study their "mutual" national ancestors, the Saxon people. This is an interesting reverse form of multiculturalism, where the definition of the region as constructed by one culture is created and then complicated by the diversity of nations that come to be represented within it. To this end, the experience of diversity is then furthered within those nations.

FIGURE 30: "Sibiu 2007: A Crossroads of Culture" homepage student images. Images from the "Home" webpage, representing students as tourists, and then, students as tourist spectacle (Crossroads of Culture n.d.).

FIGURE 31: "Sibiu 2007: A Crossroads of Culture" news page student images. Images from the "News" webpage, representing a typical student/tourist getting her face painted (Crossroads of Culture n.d.).

FIGURE 32: "Sibiu 2007: A Crossroads of Culture" additional news page student images. Images from the "News" webpage, representing the Luxembourg Group of student/Nationalists holding a self-made flag (Crossroads of Culture n.d.).

Returning to Sibiu's ECOC theme and motto (Figure 18 page 141), "Transylvania. Romania. Europe." and "city of culture. city of cultures," there is a sense of a historic (EU)rope. This is the regress of a (EU)ropean space where national borders, national cultures, and modern identity are the defining characteristics of the politically unified space. The contemporary trajectory of Sibiu/Romania is starting from this point: the recognition of a multicultural reality within a national space. Following this moment, the accelerated (EU)ropean process of regional development is then pursued and is an act that satisfies the ECOC's objective of *intercultural dialogue* and the *European Dimension*. This is all facilitated by the appeals to tourism as a means for translating cultural diversity to something positive, for accelerating socio-economic "progress" within the "backward" East, and for expediting the future trajectory of Sibiu/Romania in the grand scheme of the EU.

Conclusions: ECOC Cultural Politics

Overall, the ECOC performances of these two cities certainly allows for the explanation of their program in terms of their present and future in wider (EU)rope. The comparison of these two cities reveals the positional and situated cultural challenges and the geographical imaginations through which they must work. From this comparative focus, it is seen that each city performs its obligated objectives through its own unique position and voice. The concept of a unified (EU)ropean culture along with the various motives for its implementation are tackled by each city. Such political moments of interpretation reveal an essential

difference between the two cities. Through such an instance of (EU)ropean cultural spectacle, each city offers up its own premeditated performance of what (EU)ropean culture means for them, and their take on what it should mean for the rest of (EU)rope. The performance of cultural relationships, of proper or moral actions and behavior in the each city's context of cultural diversity, advances into an elevated performance of each city's respective (EU)ropean history and goals for its future. In each of these performances, the superficial cultural political moments of the ECOC policy are somewhat revealed, and so are the differences that are at the heart of the 2007 ECOC event year.

Geopolitics in the 2007 ECOC Events: Luxembourg and Sibiu

Not necessarily requiring an intellectual division from the cultural are the geopolitical imaginations and performances within the 2007 ECOC event. It is certainly argued that, as its signifier of space, geopolitics is one and the same with its cultural counterpart. However, in an attempt at analytical and intellectual simplicity, the stronger geopolitical manifestations in each city's ECOC program are discussed separately as a distinct set of cultural manifestations. As will surely be seen, the geopolitical imaginations and performances that are yet to be discussed echo similar objectives, lessons, and perspectives that the previously discussed cultural moments have already exhibited. Regardless, there are certain questions that can be asked about the role of geopolitics and how it influences ECOC performances: What is the geopolitical state of (EU)rope? What does this say about the specific case of the 2007 ECOC event? How do these cities manage

or perform this geopolitical context, as individual (EU)ropean cities or as partnered (EU)ropean cities? And, as exemplary (EU)ropean cities do they attempt to offer lessons to posterity?

Geopolitical (EU)rope: Division between West and East

Since the 2004/2007 enlargement, there has been a geopolitical "gap" between the West and East within the EU. This gap has been characterized by the supposedly insurmountable differences that exist between Western members and Eastern members in terms of economic, political, social, and cultural experiences and histories. Overall, this gap is a particular narrative that reveals a deeper geopolitical imagination at work in the mind and actions of (EU)ropeans.

This geopolitical imagination stems from the relatively recent historical division--the bipolar partition of Europe during the Cold War. During this rather short period of time, of about 50 years, the two halves of Europe experienced markedly different political-economic and socio-cultural trajectories. This amounted to two societies and lifestyles seemingly isolated from one another. Moreover, the power of this dual history in the minds of Europeans has created a misconception of homogeneity within the West and within the East. This has led to the propensity to see only difference between these larger spaces. This geopolitical imagination, as a holdover from the Cold War period, has re-emerged within the 2004/2007 enlargement. The signifier "East" also represents the states of Central Europe, who may not consider themselves as Eastern or Western. Their historical ties to the former Soviet Union thus positions them as Eastern

within the confines of (EU)rope. Overall, the geopolitical imagination of (EU)ropeans is complex and also situationally specific, as the Central European case illustrates.

As (EU)rope unifies, the power of this geopolitical imagination, fueled by some true material differences, has become a source of tension in the mind of Eurocrats, EU citizens, outsiders and observers. It is quite interesting how the role of history in this geopolitical imagination plays out in diverse ways: history becomes a source for change in the EU; history is a source of difference which then becomes a cause for fear and xenophobia in some Western circles; and history, also as a source of difference, becomes a moment for progress, a foundation for promise and prosperity for some in the Eastern and Central European public. The selective narrative of these interpretations of history is what defines the relative geopolitical imaginations of the various players in (EU)rope.

The geopolitical division of (EU)rope is also characterized by the contemporary situation. As a legacy of Cold War division, among other things, democratic and capitalist Western Europe has been strengthened overtime. Part of this has been due to the unification processes of the EU, but also because of other global political, economic and socio-cultural circumstances. Regardless of the reasons, the West in (EU)rope has established its hegemonic role. Another contributor to this hegemony has been the fall of its main competitor the Soviet Union. This event changed the possible horizons for the West in (EU)rope. As a

result, the symbolic and material power of the West in (EU)rope today has created a moment of "re-integration" for a larger Europe. This re-integration is a product of cultural arrogance bolstered by the favorable world standing of the (EU)ropean West. The process of re-integration on the part of Western (EU)rope is to bring back the former Soviet bloc countries into Europe, all while disregarding the latent geopolitical conceit that these states had somehow left Europe previously. The other side of re-integration is the gravitational pull of success that the EU commands, and the real desire of Eastern and Central Europe to share in it, whether from a position of last resort, lesser evil, or genuine want. Whatever the motive, however, this process of re-integration for Eastern and Central European states certainly emerges somewhat as a form of voluntary Westernization.

This geopolitical imagination was certainly at work in the 2007 ECOC event. Whether deliberate or not, the European Commission has done an excellent job of politico-speak, each of the decisions and amendments that dealt with the 2007 ECOC nominations, selections and designations did not reveal any premeditated or purposeful rationales (European Commission 1999a, 2000b, 2004, 2005; Selection Panel 2004). In the direct context of the ECOC, the closest admission briefly says, "In the light of the 2004 enlargement, it is important that the new Member States should likewise be able within a short period of time to submit nominations in the context of the European Capital of Culture event, without changing the order for the other Member States . . . " (European Commission 2005, 2). Regardless, in the 2007 ECOC event, West and East are

represented by their respective Cultural Capitals: of Luxembourg for the West and of Sibiu for the East. There is *no* coincidence that the same year that the final two, of twelve total, Eastern members gained their membership, is the same year that the ECOC featured this West and East pairing. It was also just an added bonus that the East representative was Romania, one of the two 2007 accessions.

Obviously, this pairing has a strong geopolitical significance. As mentioned in the cultural political discussion, each city represents a certain spatial and historical consequence to (EU)rope: with Luxembourg representing the contemporary Western urban experience of immigrant cultural diversity as well as the future of (EU)rope; and with Sibiu representing the Eastern national experience of minority cultural diversity as well as a hopeful future trajectory of becoming more solidly (EU)ropean and Western. In the words of Sibiu 2007 Association, "the partnership between Luxembourg and Sibiu/Hermannstadt has a profound basis not only in the history but also in the present" (Sibiu 03.12.2007b, *sidebar* paragraph).

Perhaps the best articulation within the 2007 ECOC event of the profound significance of this pairing comes from Luxembourg. This is not too surprising considering the close spatial and symbolic proximity of Luxembourg to the EU. On Luxembourg's website (Figure 33), the *European Dimension* is expressed as "Building Bridges in an expanding Europe" (Luxembourg 07.11.2007c). Already, the geopolitical imagination is evident. Bridging the gap, which is the cultural and symbolic role of the 2007 ECOCs and the parallel liability of

FIGURE 33: Luxembourg 2007 "General Info/Sibiu" webpage. "Building Bridges in an Expanding Europe," an important geopolitical message for the EU (Luxembourg 07.11.2007c).



FIGURE 34: Sibiu 2007 "European Dimension/Luxembourg" webpage. This page includes only photos and web-links (Sibiu 03.12.2007k).

enlargement, continues to be a central them within the process of re-integration and the making of a larger (EU)rope. As a constructive offering, the Luxembourg's website introduces the 2007 ECOC as "A real proof of European integration!" (Luxembourg 07.11.2007c, paragraph 3). This exclamation seems to stem from an EU-led imagination that sees the ECOC as a solid step toward the future of a truly unified (EU)rope. Through this pairing "although geographically apart, the two regions have common roots and historic links which allotted them very similar cultures and traditions" (Luxembourg 07.11.2007c, paragraph 1). What seems like a very clear argument for the existence of *unity in diversity* also has a geopolitical message that can be relocated to the larger site of the EU. Such discursive statements are directed at the geopolitical imagination of an expanding (EU)rope. More specifically, it seems that the geopolitical prerogative of the ECOC event, which is evident to varying degrees in the EU's selection and in each city's programs, is the ultimate re-integration or Westernization of the East, represented by Sibiu/Romania.

Geopolitical Reorienting of History from East to West

In each city's website there are distinct differences in the time and attention paid to one another, in terms of words, images, and links. As mentioned above, Luxembourg does offer a narrative for Sibiu, a "bridge" to connect the two cities (Figure 33). The story on Luxembourg's page tells of the two cities' "common roots and historic links" of purely ethno-linguistic affiliation (Luxembourg 07.11.2007c). There are no images of the Romanian city, and there

is only one link to connect to its partner ECOC website. Conversely, on the Sibiu page there is no similar narrative or description of Luxembourg. There is one page with an image and its only function is devoted to offering web-links for Luxembourg's ECOC site, tourist and political sites (Figure 34). It is speculated that this absence on the part of Sibiu is due to the geopolitical imagination that sees Luxembourg's specific history as already known, or perhaps even as less important than that of Sibiu. This is assumed to be part of the greater goal of reorienting Sibiu, and Romania, toward (EU)rope, or more specifically to Western (EU)rope.

It does seem that both cities are complicit in the task of re-orienting East to West. Returning to Luxembourg, namely its perspective on European cultural relationships and the knowing of Others, the ECOC makes a careful effort to narrate Sibiu's more Western qualities. The "Building Bridges" narrative is certainly a selective reading of Sibiu's heritage, emphasizing, for example, Hermannstadt as the city's equivalent German name, its Saxon/German ethnic heritage, its Hungarian ethnic and political heritage, its cultural capacity for theater, music, paintings, dance and artists, and its "2 theatres, a philharmonic concert hall, 2 cinemas, 5 libraries, 5 cultural centers and 10 museums as well as the prestigious University Lucian Blage" (Luxembourg 2007, 28). In addition to this cultural narrative, Luxembourg's historical account of Sibiu begins with its pre-modern beginning in 12th century and the mention of written documents which cite the city's earliest Latin naming. What is interesting is how this

narrative, only briefly mentioning the political consequences of the city's place in Hungary and then as part of Romania, fast forwards to Sibiu's 1989 revolution against communism, proudly reporting that it was "the second city of the country to engage into a [*sic*] revolution" (Luxembourg 2007, 28). Because of all this cultural and historical accounting of the city, it is shown to be a categorically Western city, "qualified as the cultural capital of Romania" (Luxembourg 2007, 28), and also as a city that has determinedly fought against their socialist past. It is important for Luxembourg to recite this story, as it is a geopolitical authority in the Western imagination precisely the audience that is targeted for a deeper dialogue with the Eastern Others.

For Sibiu, there is no time or web-space to be wasted on the story of Luxembourg--it is a Western city, a "capital" of (EU)rope, and an *established* space. This role of Luxembourg is of some use to Sibiu, at least in a minor way. On Sibiu's *European Dimension* site is an urban landscape image of Luxembourg, which provides a subliminal moment of comparison to the several urban landscape images of Sibiu (Figure 35). Although the two images are not placed next to one another on the same webpage, they are prominently displayed when searching through the various hyperlinks. Seeing the two images together does illustrate the visual similarity of each privileged view of the urban landscapes. In this moment, the knowledge of Luxembourg as a touristed, Western European city is then likewise mimetically sutured to the landscapes of urban Sibiu. On a

purely visual level, Sibiu becomes akin to most other European tourist destinations and to some degree becomes better known.

This knowing is taken further by the Sibiu website, and a similar selective narrative to that of Luxembourg is told by Sibiu itself. The same story of German and Hungarian ethno-linguistic heritage is recited, along with the specifics of the cities religious character, and all the more detail of the proportions, numbers and dates of both (Sibiu 03.12.2007c). An interesting addition to this narrative is the "key economic areas" in the city, listing the importance of the auto supply industry, mechanical engineering, electronics, textiles, logistics, packaging, food processing, trade and craftsmanship. This list seems to evoke a modern industrial city of factories, yet also of specialized traditional artisanship. And, as its ticket



FIGURE 35: ECOC urban landscape images from Sibiu 2007 webpage. Sibiu (Sibiu 03.12.2007c) and Luxembourg (Sibiu 03.12.2007k) are pictured on Sibiu's website.

to further development, the webpage also reports the completion of a new industrial park in the city. The city is also highlighted as a site of a "well-developed network" of educational, medical and social institutions (Sibiu 03.12.2007c, paragraph 6). All of this focus on economic activity and social services, supported by the linguistic claim of Romanian as the only Latin language in Eastern Europe, sets Sibiu/Romania apart to certainly settle "one of the main concerns for the city [of] attracting new investors to locate their businesses in Sibiu/Hermannstadt" (Sibiu 03.12.2007c, paragraph 5). This is surely directed at Western investors, and the assurances of a solid Western-leaning city, combined with the benefits of relative levels of Eastern economic development, provide another narrative to bridge the gap.

There is a more detailed, yet selective, historical narrative and timeline of Sibiu, which is also included on the 2007 Sibiu page. What is most interesting about this longer narrative is the portrayal of the Eastern years, or the years that Sibiu/Romania was dominated by the Soviets. Before getting to the 1945-1989 history, the narrative sets the stage by describing how the Romanian and other minority populations had come to be in the primarily Saxon/German, and then, Hungarian city. The presence of these groups began with 1781 "Enlightenment reforms," an orienting of a decidedly Western Civilization heritage. "The Romanian population became more and more present in the life of the town, which become [*sic*] around the middle of the 19th century the spiritual centre of the Romanians' struggle for political emancipation" (Sibiu 03.12.2007b,

paragraph 10). The next stage of this history saw the stripping of "the privileges and territorial administrative autonomy of the Saxons," which by the end of the World War I, saw Transylvania united with Romania, a decision led by the Romanian population and only a year later "voted for" by the Saxon Assembly (Sibiu 03.12.2007b, paragraph 11). Most of this early history is narrated as a general loss of autonomy and decreasing presence of the Saxon/German populations. This can be read as a loss of the more Western-defined representation of the city, to that of the Eastern. However, the narrative returns to its celebration of cultural diversity as a Western perspective: "Although the number of Romanians in town substantially raised, Sibiu/Hermannstadt remained the main centre of the German culture and education in Romania and witnessed a vivid cultural life of all the ethnic groups" (Sibiu 03.12.2007b, paragraph 13). This history is of the increasing diversity of Sibiu, but with a sense of that diversity coming at the expense of the Saxon/German, or Western-like, residents.

After this narrative describes the pre-WWII context, it then goes on to explain the postwar history, and the continuation of the same trend. Within this postwar history, "For the population of Sibiu a long suffering began" (Sibiu 03.12.2007b, paragraph 14). The experience of Communist rule in Sibiu saw the nationalization of factories and lands, at the same time as political arrests and trials of individuals challenging that rule. In particular, this narrative highlights the oppression of the Saxon/German populations: "The communist authorities considered Saxons guilty in corpore [*sic*] for collaborating with the German Reich

and many of them were deported in [*sic*] the Soviet Union for forced labour" (Sibiu 03.12.2007b, paragraph 14). The narrative continues with the mass emigration of Saxon/Germans away from the city and into West Germany. The important moment for Sibiu was its December 1989 rebellion against the Communist regime which was "prompted by the dictatorial regime and economic hardships" (Sibiu 03.12.2007b, paragraph 15). Following this achievement, "the city resorted its democratical [*sic*] institutions and faces now the task of renewing the infrastructure and raising the living standard of its inhabitants" (Sibiu 03.12.2007b, paragraph 16). This narrative, similar to many others of Eastern and Central Europe, exemplifies the forced, oppressive character of the Socialist interlude in these places. It then follows that the rebellion and revolutions to end Communist rule in these places were analogous to the Cold War approach of Western European states that abhorred and "fought" the incursion of such an ideology. Also, the task of reconstruction and progress is also alluded to, as Sibiu must renew and raise its material and social structures, just as Western European states should also so vividly remember their own trials in those matters.

Overall, the geopolitical imagination that sees the spatial signifiers of West and East in (EU)rope, with their distinct histories and trajectories in the Cold War period, is the starting point for both of the re-integration narratives told by Luxembourg and Sibiu about Sibiu/Romania. In Luxembourg, the goal is to highlight the tradition of Sibiu as a Saxon/German space akin to Luxembourg itself. The cultural diversity of ethnic and linguistic character is the "common

roots" between the two cities. For Sibiu there is much more work that has gone into its performance as a quasi-Western city, which was taken over by the East. By highlighting the change in ethnic composition and political situations, both of which are assumed to have made it easier to be swept up into the purely Eastern interlude of Communism, became rationalizations for West being so easily diverted to the East. Such a narrative hopes to subvert the Cold War geopolitical imagination, to separate the states of the Soviet Bloc from their Eastern qualities, and to emphasize Sibiu's Western traditions, beginnings, or predispositions. This is the retrospective performance of the geopolitical imagination, but there is also one that seeks a future path to bridging the gap.

Geopolitical Futures: Networking Space and Identity in the ECOC

In the ECOC, this historical narrative inspired by the Cold War geopolitical imagination and the previously described cultural political performances, are particularly about the re-formation of both the geopolitical imagination and the cultural space in (EU)rope tied to the EU's *European Dimension.* As briefly mentioned at the start of this section, the cultural and geopolitical features of space are one and the same. As such, the intent of (EU)rope is to transform the identities within its own bounded space, as the borders themselves are expanded to encompass a greater material cultural and geopolitical Europe. This transformation of borders do not exclusively mean the political lines dividing European nations, but also more subjectively, the many material and non-material borders that demarcate regions, cultures, histories, and

identities within the geopolitical imagination. In (EU)rope especially, the persistence of borders in the geopolitical imagination has certainly been influential in the tensions that have arisen within cities, nations, regions, and geopolitical imaginations: between Third Country nationals and EU immigrants; between cultural majorities and minorities; and, between West and East.

The main way to transform borders is to shift the spatial imagination from fixed space to fluid network. In a network, the actors are interconnected and thus bound to one another in a new type of structure that requires unified mechanisms of communication and cooperation. Transforming bounded spaces into networked spaces is a tremendous change for the way that interactions then proceed in space. This is particularly the point for the *European Dimension.* Whether it is the cultural politics or geopolitical imagination of (EU)ropean space, this re-structuring is intended to affect relationships, imaginations, and identities within it. This is also particularly the point for the ECOC event, and specifically for the 2007 ECOC event. Luxembourg's early theme, which was more advertised by Sibiu in the end, "Discovering Yourself--Discovering Others" (Sibiu 03.12.2007l) is a profoundly networked concept. Thus, for the 2007 ECOC event, the network between Luxembourg and Sibiu becomes the moment for discovery of both individual cities. At the same time, it is also a moment for discovery of the larger *European Dimension* as a networked space.

The importance of networked processes is evident in the event, as cultural diversity and *intercultural dialogue* and a new the geopolitical imagination and

re-integration are both moments of recognition and reconsideration of the Other. Specifically for the geopolitical imagination, the reconsideration through a Westernized history is a way of interpreting the interconnectedness between West and East. In looking forward, the future of the geopolitical imagination becomes an opportunity to transgress the borders of nations. And, through the network structure of the *European Dimension*, new cultural and geopolitical nodes can emerge. In addition to the nation, the reemergence of the city and also of the region as strong spaces of culture and sources for identity complicates the bounded order between nation and EU, between West and East. This is intended to create a space without binaries, without divisions, as a space of dialogue among difference, tolerance of disagreement, and mutual understanding of history or identity. Finally, these futures are being performed through the ECOC event. This is evident in the themes/mottos and through the partnered events.

In Luxembourg, the Beyond Borders theme is quite inspirational for the future (EU)rope. Specifically intended for Luxembourg, as a small political space that is immensely influenced by its main neighbors, France and Germany, the Beyond Borders idea is more resonant for the *European Dimension.* As mentioned, the multi-cultural and multi-lingual aspects of the Greater Region (Figure 26, page 157), can be transferred to the greater (EU)ropean region. In Luxembourg's description of the Greater Region, the ECOC argues for "an overall decompartmentalization" of cultural events, specifically (Luxembourg 2007, 4). This "decompartmentalization," as the reversing or removing of

divisions or separations, seems to be a direct allusion to the *European Dimension* and the overcoming of borders as partitions in (EU)rope. The Greater Region is also made to emphasize the current, continuing existence of relations between the states of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, which are approximating the existence of relations between the member states of the (EU)rope. The Beyond Borders theme and the Greater Region, both seem to offer a reality for the existence of a network (EU)rope.

However, in Sibiu, there is no similar reading of the future of (EU)ropean political space. As mentioned earlier, the accepted spatial hierarchy of urban-regional-national-supranational ordering is still very much evident. This illustrates the long-term work that still needs to be undertaken in the name of the *European Dimension*, which will need to re-orient the modern geopolitical imagination of Romania toward a network understanding. In Sibiu, the event *"15+10+2 Identităti Europene"* (translation: "15+10+2 European Identity") is an important identity-building moment for the future (EU)rope. The project has a networked theme, "Cultures hand in hand to the future" (Sibiu 03.12.2007j, *description* paragraph), which implicates the interconnectedness and philosophic morality of network relationships. This project is also more specific to the geopolitical imagination of the West-East divide as it is an exhibition to showcase the material cultural products of all twelve of the 2004/2007 enlargement members. This view of a unified (EU)ropean culture as a simple addition equation can be linked to the structure of the network, and particularly to the logic

behind the expansion of the network. Often, the network can easily become altered and re-defined by the simple process of addition of nodes or actors. This is a similar interpretation of European identity, something that does become re-defined with addition, but also as something that is not easily distorted because the common function is intended to remain the same. However, the apparently insurmountable difficulties associated with the borders and divisions of the modern geopolitical imagination make such a seemingly simple equation quite difficult to comprehend.

Conclusions: ECOC Geopolitics

Overall, the ECOC event and the partnering of Luxembourg and Sibiu, serves two main geopolitical tasks within the EU. First, it problematizes existing borders of bounded spaces and identity at work in (EU)rope. This is particularly aimed at the current state of geopolitical imaginations that inform perspective from the EU through to individual citizens. Second, as a result of the focus on geopolitical imaginations, this partnering calls into question the existing geopolitical and cultural division that separates West from East. To this end, the 2007 ECOC's are specifically contributing to the *European Dimension*, as a becoming (EU)ropean and postmodern networked space.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

Discourse, Politics and Network in the 2007 European Capital of Culture

The European Capital of Culture has been a rich and multifaceted event for tourism and urban development in the EU since its inception in 1985. However, as this thesis has illustrated, the 2007 ECOC event has also been equally as rich and multifaceted in its discursive flows and political implications. Through examining this event, it has been possible to theorize about the becoming (EU)rope, by investigating the political tensions and the discursive strategies that the EU and each ECOC have navigated in the creation and execution of such a symbolic and transformative policy. In analyzing the discursive structures of a becoming (EU)rope, the cultural and geo- political tensions that exist in the EU around issues related to (EU)ropeanization, for example, can also be examined. More than this, however, the (EU)ropeanization project has afforded the opportunity to interrogate how individual ECOCs interpret and adjust to the tensions present in (EU)rope in their own contextualized responses.

This concluding chapter offers an overview of this study's findings and then focuses specifically on a network future of a becoming (EU)rope. First, this chapter reflects on the discursive structure set up by the EU, highlighting the

sensitivity to the situated reality of actors' geographical imaginations (Gregory 1994). Second, the three major inter-discursive strategies are identified. The three discursive strategies, of culture, geopolitics, and networks, construct certain cultural spaces of diversity and morality, while attempting to deconstruct certain geopolitical "borders" and "gaps," all achieved by the application of network structures or philosophies. Third, a final conclusion is offered as an interpretation of the political moments that were analyzed in the policy. These politics, whether they were cultural or geopolitical, often related back to the tensions of a state-centered geopolitical imagination and the institutional politics between scales over sovereignty and authority. The final contribution of this research is to introduce opportunities for further research based on its findings.

The Discursive Structure of the 2007 ECOC

Based on the theoretical and methodological framework applied to the social/policy/hyperlink network that is the 2007 ECOC, it is possible to discern the emergence of the EU's regulatory discursive structures, particularly as this relates to the tensions present in the enlargement process. First of all, the selection and pairing of the two 2007 ECOCs, Luxembourg and Sibiu, offer evidence for situated cultural and geopolitical imaginations at work (c.f., Atkinson et al. 2005). For the EU at large, its geographical imagination is ambivalent and contradictory, as it attempts to discursively balance the political tensions that arise in its (EU)ropeanization process. The situated perspective is even more pronounced in each of the 2007 ECOCs. For Luxembourg, its

geographical imagination is constructed thought its contemporary experience in post-modern (EU)rope, defined by a global cultural diversity and the postmodern geopolitical condition (Tuathail 2000). This is in contrast to the geographical imagination of Sibiu which is defined by its own regional diversity and its struggles to "re-integrate" itself into (EU)rope. This policy is part of the greater (EU)ropeanization process, which continues to take many forms, while trying to incorporate multiple perspectives and activities. This balancing-act, then, illustrates that the selection of paired cities highlights the diversity of experiences and perspectives that the EU must traverse in such a process.

The reality of enlargement has the potential to upset the EU's regulatory framework (Waitt 2005), as the discursive structure that largely informs the (EU)ropeanization process is then interpreted from the unique positions of actors and thus contextualized by each participant. This process is a performative moment, where the overarching discursive structure of (EU)ropeanization has the possibility to be altered or reified by the situated position of each ECOC. Yet, for the most part, the countering aspect in the process that comes with each actor's situated interpretation is minimized by the strength of the (EU)ropeanization discourse that is embedded in the ECOC. In particular, through participant-tailored incentives of structural funds as well as redevelopment and tourism discourses, the (EU)ropeanization discursive structure is left principally intact. Through the 2007 ECOC, the regulatory framework set up by the EU is also

established as a long-term, ongoing strategy, one that builds with each new ECOC project.

What is also evident about the (EU)ropeanization discursive structure of the 2007 ECOC is that it is managed through three major inter-textual and interrelated discourses: as cultural, geopolitical, and network discourses. Beginning with the cultural discourse, the reiteration of narratives, such as cultural diversity and cultural morality, have show the becoming (EU)rope to be an increasingly diverse, complex, and tension-laden space. Further, such culturally diverse spaces are also shown to be situated within urban space. As a result, in this discourse, cultural space is widely assumed to be urban space. Thus, the significance of cultural discourse is to instruct EU citizens and member states that cultural diversity is a source of pride. From this recognition, then, is also the message that within such diverse cultural spaces, there are proper relationships and manners that should be observed when performing this diversity in (EU)rope. The rules regulating diversity are thus backed up by appeals to a European shared history, and the experience of progress coming out of that history. This is part of one of the oldest, most established unification discourses in (EU)rope, which sees cultural diversity and cultural tension as sources for war and conflict.

The cultural discourses of (EU)rope can also be read through the tensions of the geopolitical discourse of the border of (EU)ropeanization, both in material space and in the space of the imagination. This geopolitical discourse links up

with the cultural one in material and immaterial space through: 1) the recognition of the seeming incompatibility of national borders and the lesson of (EU)ropean cultural diversity; and, 2) in the "culture gap" that partitions EU member states on either side of a West-East border. Specifically, these divisions are illustrative of the persistence of the modern geopolitical imagination, being one that maintains the spatial centricity of the state and the legacy of Cold War bipolar ideological spatialities in Europe. In either case, the geopolitical discourse in the 2007 ECOC stresses the desire to "bridge" the gap, between culturally diverse Others in nations and between geopolitically diverse (EU)ropean Others within the EU.

Finally, an emerging network discourse serves as a uniting force for the needs of both the cultural and geopolitical discourses. Resulting from the material functioning of policy and decision-making networks, the structure and philosophy of the network of (EU)rope has been applied to the 2007 ECOC's cultural and spatial practices. Since the network is about certain best-practices of cooperation and understanding, it is also centered in certain spatial practices that transcend conventionality and introduce relative equality. In short, the network discourse of (EU)rope is applied to the cultural and geopolitical needs of a growing macro-political and social institution.

As a result, the philosophy of the network in (EU)rope becomes inspiration for the best-practice relationships of cultural diversity and also serves as an example of the links that can be made beyond the state. The philosophy of the network, with its inherent inter-textual links to the cultural and geo- political

discourses, is evident in the performance of this region's *intercultural dialogue* device. This device is particularly geared toward the relationships between a fictive centered (EU)ropean subject (read: Western subject) and its Other, a device designed to regulate the cultural and geo- political struggles that are part of the enlargement process.

The expanding structures of the (EU)ropean network is also the materialization of a postmodern geopolitical imagination that transcends the bounds of the state by offering opportunities for new actors and spaces to re-structure their conventional relationships. In terms of EU discursive devices, this is certainly the intent of the *European Dimension*, which provides for a space of *both* (EU)ropean cultural diversity *and* the forum within which appropriate cultural behavior is observed. Within the *European Dimension*, both cultural and geo- political tensions are alleviated as it is a space of diversity and dialogue, and it is a space of openness and possibility, at least discursively.

The Political Moments of (EU)ropeanization

The intertwined discourses, which are part of a process of a becoming (EU)rope, are intended to mitigate certain "points of struggle" (Mitchell 2000) or political moments in the (EU)ropeanization process. In particular, these discourses are meant to influence the meanings of identity and citizenship in the EU. At the same time as this process is about creating a larger (EU)ropean space of identity and citizenship, the cultural and geopolitical discourses of a becoming (EU)rope are also about regulating the tensions that develop around a persistent

state-centered geopolitical imagination among member states and the continuing role of the state in maintaining its control over culture, history, territory and identity. This has been especially evident in the institutional politics that exist within the EU's many legislative and bureaucratic activities, as well as within the minds of EU citizens, who by and large, continue to see themselves first as national citizens. It could be argued, certainly, that the endurance of this modern geopolitical imagination is the basis for the consistency of cultural and identity tensions, which serve to strengthen the existence of borders both material and immaterial within (EU)rope. And, these are, without a doubt, the sources for the weakness of EU legitimacy among member states and the citizenry.

It is because of these political moments that the (EU)ropeanization process has continuously developed new discursive devices intended to allay the cultural and geo- political strains on EU legitimacy. The introduction and updating of discursive devices such as *unity in diversity*, *intercultural dialogue*, and the *European Dimension* are evidence of this continual process. In particular, (EU)ropeanization has sought to increase social cohesion by fostering community- and identity- building in the EU. The ECOC is one of these community- and identity- building activities. The policy is one that is directed to the "local" EU and one that symbolically extends beyond the reach of the state. At the same time, however, the political struggle still exists between a state-centric, modern identity and the space of a post-modern, borderless entity known today as the EU. Tensions also arise because the myriad number of actors in the

EU--from Euro-skeptics who despise the EU and its threat to their national identity and sovereignty, to the Eurocrats whose universalist ideals and cosmopolitan lives loft beyond average experiences in the EU--who respond differently to the experience of and spatialities constituted with a becoming (EU)rope. Thus, a continuing pursuit of (EU)ropeanization is developing new strategies that may intend to foster an identity to continually encompass such differences. And, that may also form an identity that is behaviorally conditioned in certain relationships and contexts.

Opportunities for Further Research

This conclusion is not intended to predict the future, but instead is excited at the possibilities. In a general sense, the ECOC is a provocative case study for the future, for the emergence of new notions and organization of culture/space, political/space, and identity space. The EU's discursive structure and its situated and positional implementations by each ECOC reveal a becoming (EU)rope. In fact, taking off from where this research has left off in its investigation of the becoming (EU)rope, there are a number of new research opportunities available.

The frame of this research has only been directed at a small portion of the larger processes of (EU)ropeanization within the becoming (EU)rope. The EU has many different projects and policies that could also be instructive for understanding this process. What is more, since the (EU)ropeanization process is an ongoing, long-term project, there will always be opportunities for its study within the constantly changing contexts and situations that come with the passage

of time. Specifically in discursive inquiry, there are constant changes, updates, retirements, and introductions of discursive devices, narratives and entire structures that can be examined. It will be most interesting to also connect these changes to the major EU events such as its efforts toward greater integration and/or toward wider enlargement.

More specifically, the ECOC can also be studied in a similar way. This policy is also an ongoing event, one that literally happens every year in (as introduced beginning in 2007) two distinct spatial contexts. These events are also consistent opportunities for gauging the changing situations and contexts of the EU, of individual cities, and of their political struggles. In particular, because of the selection procedure that selects two cities from two EU designated states, there is an ever arising opportunity to investigate the discursive structuring of these pairings. Some of the upcoming ECOCs are already telling of the emerging "cultural map" of (EU)rope: in 2008, the pairing of Liverpool, UK with Stavanger, Norway could be the existence of a Northern network that connects EU members with Third Countries; in 2010, the tripling of Pecs, Hungary, Essen, Germany and Istanbul, Turkey, could be interpreted as a cultural route from Germany or one of the hearts of (EU)rope to one of the EU's prospective members in Turkey, and along the way finding out much about the interplay of West and East in different contexts, as has been the experience in Hungary. These are just a two of the many upcoming opportunities that the pairings of the ECOC provide. Furthermore, the ECOC can be investigated through many

approaches, as in more on the ground investigations or as in the example of this research, through the virtual space of the ECOCs.

Finally, this leads into yet another research opportunity, one that is not specifically in the context of the EU, (EU)rope or the ECOC, but that is interested in the methodological framework of this research. As mentioned, the use of web data is quite novel in geographic study, despite the obvious richness that it exudes in terms of discursive appeal and sheer volume. The methodological framework that weaves together discourse and network analyses is a widely adaptable framework that can be applied to countless research interests and projects. The focus on web-data as a focus for such an analysis also has many logistical advantages as it is perhaps the most cost effective in both time and money, as it is easily accessed at most any time, is relatively easy to store and catalog, and is often only at the price of internet access (which itself is easily circumvented with public Wi-Fi access). Furthermore, the discourse/network analysis is also a favorable method of examination as it is relatively open to the researchers imagination and interpretation, although does require a large degree of cognitive and reflexive discretion.

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